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Abstract	  	  
This thesis focuses on the role and impacts on women of the system of wilaya 
(guardianship)  – enshrined in Muslim family laws and, more specifically, in the 
Jordanian Personal Status Law. In this thesis, wilaya over women is treated as crucial 
to maintaining a system of domination over women, as such designates women as 
legal minors and forms the basis of women’s legal and social subordination. 
Therefore, I argue that wilaya plays a key role in the reproduction of the gender 
hierarchy system. The thesis makes three central points with regards to wilaya. First, 
the systematic inclusion of provisions of wilaya over women serves as a construct of 
normative femininity. In this light, I address the relevance of the state as a gender 
regime in analysing how the masculine and feminine selves are constructed and 
reproduced in the context of Jordan. I also probe how a masculine state works in 
collaboration with other institutions to give power, founding legitimate operations and 
procedural methods for institutions such as family and tribe to manage, produce, and 
construct normative femininity and masculinity. Second, a relationship exists between 
the extent/degree of wilaya over women and the view of the Self from within, 
through, or outside the normative construction of femininity. I argue that women’s 
experiences of male authority that intersects with tribal, ethnic and class membership 
inflect the ways in which women interpret and experience the boundaries of the 
wilaya system. Therefore, this system impacts the diverse and contradictory 
constructions of Jordanian women’s femininity, where some conform to the system 
and others contest or embrace a complex combination of compliance, accommodation 
and resistance. Third, the ambiguous and contradictory state of women’s various 
forms of femininity resulted in women’s adoption of practices with a tactical nature, 
which are also informed by available options, opportunities, and the potential for 
escaping the wilaya system without facing sanction or punishment. Although these 
tactics of survival and/or resistance have not ensured a substantive transformation in 
women’s lives at the collective level, they can materialise into strategies aimed at 
achieving autonomous selves at the personal level, where wilaya is questioned and 
possibly contested.  
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Chapter 1 
The Politics of Wilaya Over Women in Jordan 
	  
Introduction	  	  
Between 2011 and 2013, the Jordanian Parliament was in a state of chaos. King 
Abdullah II dissolved Parliament twice, and within the two years parliamentary 
elections were held twice in the country. The conduct of Members of Parliament 
(MPs) was characterised by regular violent acts against each other. It became 
commonplace for some MPs to openly carry guns when attending Parliament’s 
sessions. One of the fights broadcast worldwide involved one of the MPs firing three 
shots at another. While no one was harmed, the incident certainly changed the image 
of Jordan as a ‘modern’ and ‘model’ state in the region, particularly as no legal case 
or procedures were taken against the MPs involved in the fight.  
One of the widely distributed YouTube videos of the Parliament’s sessions was of the 
fight that took place between Senator Abdel Raa’of Al-Rawabdeh and MPs in one of 
the sessions of the Majlis al-Ummah (the General Assembly, which includes both 
senators and MPs) in July 2013. Al-Rawabdeh provoked the row when he suggested 
that the session should be comprised of two speaking MPs and one speaking Senator 
because “The male has a portion of two females.”1 Very critical of the MPs, Al- 
Rawabdeh meant by this statement to degrade the Parliament’s status to a state of 
femininity, while assigning masculinity to the Senate House. MPs angrily responded 
to his suggestion with statements such as that of MP Tamer Beno’s, who declared: the 
“Jordanian Parliament has no females in it and female MPs are men in their political 
stands.”2 The MPs wrote a joint statement requesting the head of Majlis al-Ummah to 
restore dignity to the Parliament and its members.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Accessed on 17 March 2013, <http://ar.ammannet.net/news/206006>. The statement of “the male has 
a portion of two females” is taken out of a Quranic verse that is related to inheritance. It is commonly 
used to emphasise men’s superiority over women.  
2 Ibid.  
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Apart from distributing the video to mock MPs, the news media paid no particular 
attention to how, in a house that legislates people’s rights, women are seen as weak 
and were used to degrade the status of MPs, especially by a senator who served two 
terms as Jordan’s Prime Minister. Furthermore, MPs who tried to defend themselves 
did so through statements akin to: women MPs are masculine in their political 
dealings. I went to Jordan a few weeks after this incident and was particularly 
interested to learn how women in the Majlis and women activists responded to this 
incident. Several conversations took place, but here I want to address two particular 
discussions: one with a senator and another with an activist. In my discussion with the 
senator, I asked about her reaction to what has been said, and she stated: “when I 
heard what he said I laughed, shockingly, maybe.” I then asked if she had responded, 
or if any woman in the Parliament or the House of Senators had taken any action. She 
told me:  
There are so many issues facing us [women senators and MPs] in the Majlis. 
We usually pick our fights in accordance to our priorities. If I want to engage 
in a dispute in the Majlis I would prefer to have it about something with more 
substance, not a jerk like this. In addition, this discussion will be useless.  
 
In my discussion with an activist, she stated:  
We hear such statements from male writers, journalists, poets, and activists 
every day. I am not surprised, and you should not be surprised either. We do 
not engage in such discussions because it is not going to have any significant 
results.   
 
Neither the activist nor the senator – both of whom are undoubtedly committed to 
women’s issues – considered this incident to hold any substantial meaning, pointing 
to the prevalence of sexist statements in general and this incident’s insignificance 
compared to issues of law reform and rights for women in public spaces.  
 
The general public’s lack of interest in this incident, women’s rights activists in 
particular, raises a question about whether the dominant norms of femininity have 
been unquestionably internalised, resulting in the ‘common sense’ of normative 
femininity as ‘self-evident’. The treatment of the statement as not posing a threat to 
women – dismissing it as a ‘regular’ comment by a ‘jerk’ – is striking, particularly 
from those who legislate or defend women’s rights, as such does not take the 
intertwined relationship between how women are commonly viewed, what legal rights 
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they enjoy and the positions they occupy in the family and wider society into account. 
Such treatment underlines a naturalisation of normative femininity, whereby women 
are conceptualised as weak, dependent, and unreasonable human beings. The fact that 
raising a discussion about how women are perceived in the Majlis al-Ummah is seen 
as ‘useless’ suggests that an established set of norms, perceived to be facts, exist 
about women and changing the mentality that constantly enforces these perceptions 
would be impossible or unimportant compared to other gains or rights. This also 
raises questions about how women react to statements that conceptualise them as the 
Other, as the ‘weak, minor, dependent subjects’, leading them to consider which 
‘battle to pick’. 
This thesis is about the construction of normative femininity in Jordan, a context 
where the state adopts and enforces the system of wilaya (guardianship) over women 
in family laws. It investigates the ways in which the state’s adopted policy of men’s 
wilaya over women contributes to constructing women’s sense of femininity, and 
hence influences women’s conceptions of the Self and everyday practices. It 
examines wilaya over women, which is one of the core legal provisions in the Arab 
states’ Muslim family laws, to analyse the intersectional nature of women’s 
subordination in the law, religion, tribe and family relationships. The thesis posits that 
wilaya over women, which designates a legal minority status to women, not only 
forms the very basis of women’s legal and social subordination but also plays a key 
role in the construction and reproduction of a gender hierarchy system.  
Muslim family laws in the Arab region routinely include provisions that grant a wali 
(usually a male blood relative) the right to wilaya over women. A basic definition of 
wilaya over women is that it grants the father or another male relative the right to act 
on behalf of his daughter, or female relative, in matters of marriage.3 The definition of 
wilaya in most of fiqh literature is: “The legal authority vested in a person who is 
fully qualified and competent to safeguard the interests and rights of another who is 
incapable of doing so independently.” In holding such a meaning of legal authority, 
wilaya notably signifies the power of someone over another without the consent of 
those who must submit.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See among others who have addressed wilaya over women in Muslim family laws: Welchman, 2007, 
2011 and 2012; Al-Azhari, 2003; and Mir-Hosseini et al, 2013. 
11	  	  
 
However, there are two types of wilaya provisions in interpretations of Muslim family 
laws: the first pertains specifically to a woman’s choice of marriage partner, and the 
second applies in general terms. The general provisions place women under the 
guardianship of a man either until they reach a certain age (for example, in Jordan 
women are placed under wilaya until the age of 30) or for their lifetime (for instance, 
in Yemen and Saudi Arabia). By this, wilaya provisions define women as legal 
minors and dependent subjects.  
Although Muslim family laws have been studied extensively in various contexts, the 
linkages between how laws operate not only to organise women’s lives but also to 
construct and reproduce norms about women, and how women perceive these norms, 
have been infrequently addressed. This thesis, therefore, presumes that provisions of 
wilaya encapsulate the knowledge that women internalise about themselves, are co-
opted by, or challenge. By investigating a set of questions in relation to wilaya 
provisions and their relationship to women’s perceptions of the Self and their 
everyday practices, my research interlinks law and anthropology. The questions 
include: how is the idealised image of femininity constituted in the provisions of 
wilaya over women in Jordan? How do women respond to this idealisation, and is the 
law capable of producing one fixed type of femininity? Is such a model of femininity 
contested, negotiated or challenged by women and, in turn, how would this 
internalisation and contestation impact women’s lived realities? What are the 
mechanisms of control and disciplinary measures of normative femininity, and can 
women escape these techniques of control by developing their own ways of 
operating? If so, what are the consequences for women, and how do their class and 
tribal affiliations limit or broaden the mechanisms of control? And finally, what is the 
relation between state and tribe in reinforcing and naturalising patriarchy over the 
state of law? 
In this introductory chapter, I first analyse the politics of gender in Jordan. I look at 
how Jordan’s colonial experience, political economy, tribal system, and the state’s 
relationship with Islamic parties have been essential to determining the trajectory of 
women’s status and rights in the country. I then set out the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks of the research. I discuss my position in relation to the 
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approach of feminist scholars in dealing with laws and femininity, as well as consider 
different theoretical frameworks that address issues related to women’s conceptions 
and everyday practices of femininity. Finally, I explain my ethnographic work 
methods in Jordan, research ethics and positionality in terms of the insider / outsider 
duality.  
Women, Colonialism and the Creation of a Masculine State in Jordan 
Jordan has been seen by different historians not as a postcolonial country but “an 
external neo-colonial project.”4 In this way, Jordan’s experience of colonialism differs 
largely from other countries’ colonial experiences in the region. It is considered as 
“Britain’s most successful colonial project in the Middle East.”5 Unlike in 
neighbouring countries, Britain ruled Jordan peacefully and in accordance with its 
philosophy of indirect imperial rule.6 It also managed to earn tribes’ loyalty to the 
British colonial administrators and the Hashemite rulers.7 The tribes’ loyalty was 
gained through their participation in the state’s formation, rather than the state’s 
formation being at the expense of tribal autonomy and identity.8  
 
The relation between British colonialism, the state and tribes was characterised by a 
formula of partnership that was based on processes of negotiation and mutual 
understanding and interests.9 As Jordan was directly ruled as a British colony until 
independence in 1946, indirectly run by the British administrators until 1957, and 
remained a significant ally for Britain and later the United States of America, it has 
continued to perform a twofold policy. On the one hand, it maintained the interests of 
Britain and the United States by controlling political settings in the country in such a 
way as to ensure Jordanians (more than half of whom are Palestinian refugees) are not 
hostile to Western policies,10 and in particular do not pose a threat to the Zionist 
project in Palestine. On the other hand, it promoted the collective tribal identity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Joseph A. Massad. 2001. Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan: Columbia 
University: 30. 
5 Yoav Alon, 2007. The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State, I.B. Tauris: 158 
and, Philip Robins, 2004. The History of Jordan, Cambridge University Press: 1. 
5 Alon 2007: 3. 
6 Ibid: 3.  
7 Ibid: 5.  
8 Ibid: 148. 
9 Ibid: 148. 
10 Frances Hasso. 2005. Resistance, Repression, and Gender Politics in Occupied Palestine and 
Jordan, Syracuse University Press: 17. 
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through what was deemed the preservation of culture and ‘Jordanisation’ of people in 
Jordan (the construction of a supposedly authentic Jordanian).11 However, such a 
policy was not welcomed by all tribes in Jordan; opposition formed at the early stages 
of the establishment of the state of Jordan, which resisted both the colonial project in 
Jordan – created to absorb Palestinian refugees – and the empowerment of the 
Bedouins at the expense of people from urban communities.12 The response of the 
Jordanian State and Britain to such opposition, according to Joseph Massad (2001), 
was implemented in two ways: first, through enforcing martial law from 1957 to 
1989; and second, through the defining of Jordanian nationals in the Jordanian 
nationality law, which I discuss in greater detail in the next section.  
 
Until the establishment of Jordan, there was little sense of the common grounds for a 
collective identity of Jordanian people; however, the state sought to build its 
nationalist ideology upon just such an identity.13 Hence, the state introduced the 
nationalist discourse in an effort to gather tribes around one identity of space and 
geography rather than several tribal identities of kinship.14 Massad (2001) 
demonstrates how colonial masculinity was institutionalised in the Jordanian national 
identity through the military forces, and then transferred to Bedouin Arabs living 
across Jordan.15 In the autobiographical writings of John Bagot Glubb – British 
commander-in-chief of the Jordanian Army and the Arab Legion, who served in 
Jordan from 1930 until 1952 – the orientalist feminisation of the oriental Other is 
dominant. Massad posits that Glubb taught Bedouins gender difference, which led to 
the creation of masculine identity as a basis for national military identity amongst his 
soldiers. In a description of Bedouin Arabs from an earlier encounter in the country, 
Massad states that Glubb likened Bedouin men to British women, describing them as 
having long hair, soft voices and feelings, and guided by passion rather than reason.16  
 
Glubb’s description of men’s and women’s relationships reminded me of a Bedouin 
girl who was a schoolmate of mine in the late 1970s. The girl, who I am calling 
Basma, was older in age due to her late admission at school. Once, Basma was absent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Massad, 2001: 45. 
12 Alon, 2007: 157. 
13 Robins, 2004: 5. 
14 Massad, 2001: 43; Robins, 2004: 5. 
15 Massad, 2001: 137. 
16 Ibid: 138-139. 
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from school for two weeks; when she returned, she was wearing full make-up, a 
golden necklace and high-heel shoes. The teacher talked to her and then told us that 
Basma was married and no further details should be asked. Out of curiosity, several 
other girls and I walked Basma to her house; on the way, she told us that her father 
wanted to marry her to someone not of her choosing. So instead, she ran away with a 
boy she loved and came back to the family the next day. Her family brought the boy’s 
tribe and celebrated the marriage of Basma to her lover. Apparently, Basma’s action 
was a traditional, legitimate practice for some tribes, the practice called khatifah 
(kidnapping) with a woman’s consent. This practice, which posed no threat to a 
woman’s life, along with Joseph’s description of gender relationships before the 
establishment of the state demonstrate that, during and after state building, the state of 
Jordan turned tribes into conservative institutions; the, relative, freedom enjoyed by 
women was demolished by the state’s policies and laws aimed at controlling women’s 
decisions on matters of marriage and divorce.  
 
Hisham Sharabi (1988) relates the changes in Arab society as a whole to the marriage 
between neo-patriarchy, modernisation processes and imperialism.17 The formation of 
alliances amongst Bedouins, as Sharabi posits, was based on needs rather than 
ideology.18 As the British ‘educators’ were fulfilling the ‘modernising’ needs of the 
tribes in Jordan, they developed the neo-patriarchy discourse, which not only affected 
women but also empowered the structure of the tribe at the expense of individuals.19 
In such a structure, individuals are tied to their tribes in a way that their relationships 
with the state and political parties are managed and controlled by the tribe.20 It is in 
this sense that the tribe has been the most powerful unit in Jordan and is, therefore, 
still relevant to the question of power politics in the country. Whilst relating neo-
patriarchy to Western imperialism, Sharabi does not argue that patriarchy did not 
previously exist as part of the tribal structure; rather, he argues that colonialism gave 
patriarchy an authoritarian power and a modern character.21 The state that evolved 
from such a process, therefore, adopted a social and legal organisation that 
represented a conciliation of Bedouin, modern, and neo-patriarchal identity.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Hisham Sharabi, 1988, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, Oxford 
University Press: 21. 
18 Ibid: 28. 
19 Ibid: 35. 
20 Ibid: 29. 
21 Ibid: 33. 
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Notably, Jordanian women were left out of the national identity established by the 
nationality law. Women were considered merely their husbands’ followers, and only 
wives of Jordanian men were seen as Jordanian themselves. Replicating the British 
Nationality Law, the 1928 Jordanian Nationality Law stated: “The wife of a foreigner 
is a foreigner.”22 This law has denationalised hundreds of women, depriving them of 
retaining their Jordanian nationality. Though the law was amended in 1961 and 1963, 
women married to non-Jordanians could not retain their Jordanian nationality until 
1987.23	  The awarding of Jordanian nationality was promoted to naturalise a model of 
“extended male-centred patrilineage”24, which governs kinship relations; when 
Jordanian women marry foreign men, the children’s blood is assumed to be that of the 
paternal line and, thus, a mother’s blood is inconsequential.25 	  
According to Article 6 of the 1954 Nationality Law, children of Jordanian men are 
Jordanian regardless of their place of birth. Based on the patrilineal principle, children 
of Jordanian women are foreigners; they belong to another nation. Women’s 
nationality rights have been reduced to protect the dominance of male-centred 
patrilineage. The recent debate on the nationality law in Jordan shows how women’s 
citizenship rights continue to be based on women’s ‘Otherness’ and the principle of 
patrilineage. In January 2014, the government announced its intention to issue a law 
that would grant children and spouses of Jordanian women limited civil rights related 
to health and education, which are rights based on providing services. The 
government’s proposal, which is based on the humanitarian claim of “ending the 
suffering of Jordanian women’s children,”26 as stated by the Minister of Political 
Development, met with harsh opposition and opened up the debate around the 
national identity of Jordan.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Massad, 2001: 46. 
23 Ibid: 45-49. 
24 Mounira M. Charrad,200.  State and Women’s Rights: the making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, 
and Morocco, university of California press: 5; Suad Joseph (ed.) Gender and Citizenship in the Middle 
East. Syracuse University Press. 
25 On further discussion of nationality rights, patrilineage, and kinship relations see  Mounira Charrad,  
2001 & 2000. “Lineage versus Individual in Tunisia and Morocco” in Suad Joseph (ed.) Gender and 
Citizenship in the Middle East. Syracuse University Press, pp. 70-88. 
26 Al-Monitor, 2014, “Jordanian decision on children's rights sparks uproar” (accessed on 1 February 
2014), <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/01/jordan-decision-palestinain-civil-rights-
uproar.html>. 
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The news was announced by the Minister of Political Development, who confirmed 
that: “these rights are not considered a basis for granting Jordanian citizenship to the 
children and spouses of Jordanian women.”27 The Minister further assured – no less 
than five times in his short statement – that Jordan had no intention of making 
changes to the nationality law or granting any political rights to children and spouses 
of Jordanian women. The leader of the Jordanian opposition, the former head of the 
royal court, retired General Riyad Abu Karaki, responded in several statements to the 
government’s proposal, saying: “We can no longer take it. Taking care of our children 
is enough for us. We cannot [take care of the children of others].”28 “Why should we 
pay for schooling, health care or feeding those children when we barely can do that 
for our own citizens?”29 He further added: “It seems that Jordanian women … have 
nothing to do but to give birth [to foreigners].”30  
 
The debate in Jordan around women’s nationality rights has always shifted towards a 
discussion of national identity, unity, and harmony. This approach, as Kandiyoti 
suggests, is a form of control over women, which curtails and restrains women full 
citizenship.31 This is clearly manifested in the right-wing nationalists’ view of a 
woman’s right to pass her nationality to her husband and children as a threat to 
Jordan’s national identity. The claim is that if women are granted such a right it 
would change the demography of Jordan and add an economic burden to a country 
that can hardly meet its own citizens’ needs. Leftist national opposition, on the other 
hand, views such rights in relation to the settlement of Palestinians in Jordan as a 
perceived danger that opens the door for the naturalisation of Palestinians and 
provides a basis for the ‘alternative homeland’ of Palestinians in Jordan.   
State officials and both wings of the nationalist movement, regardless of the basis of 
their arguments, agree on a basic principle that women are followers of their husbands 
and male relatives; thus, the children of Jordanian women married to foreigners are 
foreigners, as a Jordanian is defined as a person who is born to a Jordanian father. By 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ali Younes, 2014. “Jordan Says Women Married to non-Jordanians Lose Their Civil Rights”, The 
Arab Daily News, (accessed on 1 February 2014), <http://thearabdailynews.com/2014/01/07/jordan-
says-women-married-non-jordanians-lose-civil-rights/>.  
30 Al-Monitor, 2014.  
31 Deniz Kandiyoti,1992. “Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation” in Millenium 20 (3): 
429-43. 
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this, Jordan’s national identity, as reiterated by the state’s nationality laws and 
discourse of nationalism, is masculinised. A woman’s choice to marry a foreigner is 
also perceived as a threat to this national identity, particularly when this foreigner is a 
Palestinian. Comprising around half of the population,32 Palestinians who were 
granted nationality rights in the 1950s are considered Jordanians who must suppress 
their Palestinian identity to be loyal citizens.33 On the other hand, Palestinians who 
were forced to flee to Jordan during the 1967 War – mainly from Gaza – who number 
around 350,000 in the country, have not been given Jordanian nationality or any civil 
or political rights in Jordan under justifications related to preserving Palestinians’ 
‘right to return.’ Palestinian women married to Jordanian men are granted nationality 
after three years of the marriage, if the husband wishes to give his wife Jordanian 
nationality. In this sense, Palestinian women – as followers of their husbands – are not 
required to preserve the ‘right to return’ and do not pose a threat to the national 
identity, as they will be giving birth to Jordanian children. Along with the subordinate 
position of women under the law, women’s national role is curtailed, as Massad 
(1995) puts it, “to the issue of reproducing the nation”34 and, hence, “the respective 
responsibilities of men and women to the nation emerged as epistemic cornerstones of 
nation-building.”35 By this not only is “masculinity nationalised,”36 as Massad (1995) 
suggests, but femininity is also defined in relation to women’s reproductive role and 
their dependent status. 
 
Control of a woman’s choice of marriage and denying her equal rights regarding 
nationality is one of the main features of the nationalist discourse in Jordan. The 
masculine characteristic of national identity appears to be widely agreed upon and is a 
prevalent and collective pattern of national identity. This is because the question of 
‘who is the true Jordanian?’ is a very vexed issue in Jordan. It is rare for a question 
like ‘where are you from?’ not to be followed by a questions such as: ‘Are you a 
Palestinian Jordanian? Or a Bedouin, Transjordanian, Eastern Jordanian?’ The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Palestinians in Jordan are estimated to represent around 65% of the population. However, the 
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33 Laurie A. Brand, 2010. “National Narratives and Migration: Discursive Strategies of Inclusion and 
Exclusion in Jordan and Lebanon”, International Migration Review, Volume 44 Number 1 (Spring 
2010): 78–110. 
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identity of a Jordanian is constantly questioned and challenged under the 
unanswerable question of ‘who is the ‘true Jordanian,’ which makes the national 
identity of a Jordanian in “a state of continuous adjustment.”37 This is not only a 
challenge to Jordanians like myself who are of Palestinian origin, but also a challenge 
to eastern Jordanians, for whom the question pushes them to constantly ascertain their 
nationalist loyalty. 
 
To be a loyal Jordanian entails embracing the monarchy’s version of Jordan’s 
authentic identity. This identity is portrayed in the national narrative as based on the 
role of the Hashemite in the Great Arab Revolt, the Hashemites’ kin ties with the 
prophet Muhammad and their role in protecting Islamic heritage, and the tribal 
character of the nation.38 Therefore, to be a Jordanian is to be loyal to the Hashemites’ 
rule in the country and to belong to tribes. The national narrative that constitutes 
Jordan’s authentic identity thus considers Hashemite rulers as the heroes of the Arabs 
due to the role played by Sharif Hussein (the great-great grandfather of the current 
king of Jordan, King Abdullah II) in uniting the Arabs against the Ottoman empire, 
designates a sacred status to the royal family and conveys Jordanian values as driven 
by Islamic and Bedouin traditions. The three features of the national story, hence, are 
hardly to be challenged when associating Jordan’s national identity with the Arab 
nationalist discourse, Islam and tribalism. However, these features are also difficult 
for all Jordanians to embrace, as some or all of the three features do not relate to the 
history or social characteristics of different segments of the population.39 Besides 
producing a national narrative that gives legitimacy to the monarchy, national identity 
created within this narrative represents a small percentage of Jordanians who 
belonged to the tribes of Transjordan before the establishment of the Jordan Emirate 
in 1921 by King Abdullah I. Many Jordanians lived before that time in urban 
communities and Palestinians are left outside of this narrative.40   
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Jordan, Princeton University Press: 26; see also Laurie A. Brand, 2010, for further discussion of the 
creation of Jordanian national identity through national narrative.  
39 Laurie A. Brand, 2010. “National Narratives and Migration: Discursive Strategies of Inclusion and 
Exclusion in Jordan and Lebanon”, International Migration Review, Volume 44 Number 1 (Spring 
2010): 78–110. 
40 Ibid. 
19	  	  
 
When a Jordanian can be a Muslim or a Christian, an Arab or a non-Arab (as in the 
case of Circassians and Chechens), of Jordanian origin or not, a Bedouin or urban, it 
is challenging to create a collective identity, and the national narrative avoids this 
diversity and the histories of people before the establishment of Jordan. The state’s 
adoption and symbolism of masculine identity in the national discourse serves as a 
twofold strategy aimed at building consensus around the question of the ‘true 
Jordanian’ and restricting ‘unwanted refugees’ from becoming Jordanian through 
controlling women and their choice in marriage. To put its project into effect, the state 
must ensure consistency between the portrayed national identity and the legal 
framework pertaining to women’s position, be it in civil or family laws, where the 
legal personality of women is attached to a male relative. Women’s rights have been 
refuted in favour of the collectiveness of the nation, which implicitly protect and 
preserve the power of male-centred patrilineage relationships.41  
The Politics of Gender in the Democratisation Process   
In April 1989, the ‘Bread Uprising’ broke out in the southern city of Ma’an.  Within a 
few days, the revolution had expanded to other cities in the north and middle of the 
country. The uprising of tribes in the south and north came as a surprise to the regime, 
as the monarchy had relied heavily on tribal support since the establishment of 
Jordan.42 With the fall of oil prices in the 1980s, Jordan “as a semi-rentier state”43 
began to wane. The disengagement of the administrative relationships with the 
Palestinian territory, due to the conflict with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) over representation and the peace process in the mid-1980s, also caused a 
serious currency and economic crisis.44 This left Jordan with no sufficient national 
income and, thus, it “sought International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance to cope 
with the fiscal crisis. However, the fiscal dictates of the IMF came with a political 
price.”45 The revolution was in response to price increases on goods and fuel inflicted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Charrad, 200 0 & 2001.  
42 Malik Mufti, 1999. “Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan” Comparative 
Political Studies, Vol. 32 No. 1, February 1999, pp. 100-129: 105. 
43 Russell E. Lucas, 2003. “Press Laws as a Survival Strategy in Jordan, 1989-99” Middle Eastern 
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44 Ibid. 
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as part of the IMF debt’s conditions.46  
 
Jordan had been under martial law since 1974. During this period, political parties 
were banned from operating and a limited number of NGOs, particularly royal 
organisations, were permitted to work, while grassroots organisations were dissolved 
and banned. The regime had also allied with tribes and Islamist groups against both 
Palestinian and Jordanian political opposition in order to survive after an attempted 
military coup in the 1950s, defeat in the 1967 War that led to the loss of the remaining 
part of Palestine and some Jordanian lands, and the conflict with the PLO in 1970-71 
that developed into a war between the Jordanian military and Palestinian rebels.47 
 
The alliance with tribes demanded that they continued to operate under tribal 
customary law. It had also required the Jordanisation of the public sector and the 
military, where the employment of the eastern Jordanians in the public sector to 
replace Palestinians became not just a goal but also a national slogan of the State in 
Jordan. The alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood Party was a result of King 
Hussein’s mistrust of Jordanian leftist political parties affiliated with the Ba’thist 
regime in Syria and strong ties with the Nasserist regime in Egypt. Islamists also had 
a mutual interest in allying with the monarchy, as it had not posed any ideological 
threat to them.48 Therefore, Islamists in Jordan backed the regime and stood against 
the Ba’athist and communist opposition.49 King Hussein “returned the favour during 
the 1980s by sheltering the Syrian Brothers as they waged their campaign to 
overthrow Hafiz al-Assad in Syria.”50 King Hussein also allowed the Muslim 
Brotherhood Party to organise activities and open branches across the country openly 
prior to 1989, not as a political party but as a charitable organisation.51 Through this, 
the Muslim Brotherhood Party enjoyed an atmosphere of free movement, whereas 
other political parties were banned and their members imprisoned. This enabled the 	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Brotherhood to expand at the expense of other political parties. 
 
The austerity measures imposed in 1988 affected eastern Jordanians more than 
Palestinians, as the latter were more dependent on the private sector and work in the 
Gulf states than the public sector and state services.52 The 1989 uprising posed a real 
threat to a monarchy that was no longer seen as fulfilling the demands and needs of 
Jordanian citizens. King Hussein responded to the 1989 revolution through a series of 
political and economic decisions, including: ending martial law, holding 
parliamentary elections, postponing the austerity programme, the foundation of the 
National Charter, and legalising political parties.  
 
The shift to democracy in 1989, however, has not led to significant change in the 
political system in Jordan. Tribes continued to have power over parliamentary 
elections, particularly after the change made to the electoral law in 1993, where the 
unlimited vote system was replaced by the one-person-one-vote system that aimed to 
limit the representation of political parties. This is because the old system allowed 
voters to elect a number of candidates based on the number of seats allocated for the 
district, while the new system limited them to one vote only. The king also continued 
to reserve the power to select the prime minister and the upper house of the 
legislature, to issue temporary laws, and the right to dissolve Parliament.53 State 
policies towards women, however, have slightly improved. Special attention was 
given to services and the registration of dozens of charitable women’s organisations. 
The ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) in 1992 and the establishment of the Jordanian National 
Committee for Women (JNCW) as a mechanism and monitoring body of the 
government’s compliance to CEDAW in the same year have marked a new level of 
work on women’s rights. Women’s groups continue to demand reforms of 
discriminatory laws against women.  
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The last two decades, therefore, witnessed several changes to women’s legal and civil 
rights. In 1999, the government responded to the demands of women’s NGOs and 
amended the marriage age to 18 for both males and females, yet gave the judge the 
right to conclude marriages for girls under 18 if the marriage was seen to be in the 
best interest of the wider community.54 The country also witnessed several other 
developments that reflected positively on the status of women,55 including halving the 
percentage of illiteracy amongst women.56 According to the 2007 report of the 
Jordanian Statistics Department, the literacy rate of women has increased from 84.3 to 
89.4%, the improvement in the status of women's health complies with global 
indicators, and the number of women who have attained leadership positions in the 
government’s institutions has also increased.57 
 
In the 2010 Official Report of Jordan to the CEDAW committee, the JNCW 
highlights several other changes that were made at the level of political participation, 
such as: the six-seat quota in the Parliament, which increased to 12 out of 120 seats in 
the last amendments made to the Jordanian Electoral Law in 2010; the seven 
appointed women in the Senate in 2009; the appointment of four women ministers in 
the Ministerial staff; increased representation of women in municipal councils to 
reach 25%, the highest representation of women in Jordan in competitive elections; 
appointment of a woman as Secretary-General of the Ministry of Health; the 
appointment of the first woman to the rank of governor at the Ministry of the Interior; 
and, the appointment of the first woman President of the Court of West Amman.58 
 
The state provided progressive liberalisation projects aimed at increasing women’s 
political participation, inclusion in the labour force, and rates of literacy and 
education, but had only limited potential for change at the level of personal and 
family rights. The state in Jordan continued to play a central role in constructing the 
rhetoric of national identity based on women and gender. Secular nationalist discourse 	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that used women as a symbol of national authentic identity on the one hand, and 
progressive politics, on the other, which Kandiyoti (1991, 2001) examined in the 
Middle East region, has been and is still of significance for the regime in Jordan.  
 
Madawi Al-Rasheed’s remarkable book, A Most Masculine State: Gender Politics, 
and Religion in Saudi Arabia, underscores that gender inequality is persistent in Saudi 
Arabia given the politics of the state and nationalisation of religion, rather than tribe, 
Arab culture or religion.59 Al-Rasheed’s compelling analysis of state policies towards 
women, along with the effects of the oil economy, demonstrates that it is the state that 
regulates the role and place of the tribe and religion in shaping gender roles and 
relations, not the other way around.60 As the previous analysis of Jordan’s historical 
formation shows, the Jordanian state, similar to Saudi Arabia, continues to privilege 
tribal structures pertaining to social relationships at the expense of individuals, in 
exchange for legitimacy.  
 
There are a few differences in the case of Jordan from that of the Saudi case, one 
being that the royal family of Jordan is an outsider family. It does not belong to the 
tribes in Jordan, a matter that necessitated an even stronger relationship with tribes. 
Jordan’s reliance on Western foreign funding and the role assigned to the ruling 
family in the region by the British empire, and its continuous key role in the peace 
process with Israel in the region, required a balanced relationship with Islamic and 
conservative groups. When the regime forged an alliance with the Muslim 
Brotherhood Party it did not adopt its ideology, as in the case with the Saudi state’s 
adoption of the Wahabbi ideology. In this way, Jordan has not nationalised religion 
nor adopted Islamic traditions in its ruling, it rather limited the role of religion merely 
to family issues, which is intended to keep women under the authority of male 
relatives, among other things.61  
 
As it is addressed by the literature related to other authoritarian regimes in the region 
such as that of Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which are viewed as having 
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instituted “state feminism,”62 the “double-speak” policies, as Kandiyoti (1987) 
termed, brought some positive change to women’s rights, but have not had any 
concrete effects on the ways women are perceived as weak, dependent, and followers 
of their male relatives. Women’s representation in Jordan at the political level cannot 
be perceived as part of a progressive policy towards women, as several steps taken to 
include women in the public sphere took into consideration representation of the 
tribes and the elite. For example, the quota assigned to women in the Parliament is 
designed to serve tribal interests rather than increase women’s representation. The 
calculation made for the quota is based on the number of votes a woman can get from 
the total number of votes in the voting district, thus women from small, tribal areas 
where the number of votes is not large can win in the election while women from 
bigger urban areas cannot. Women appointed as ministers or to the senate house also 
come from families that are inherently represented in the senate, whether from 
wealthy Palestinian families or those close and loyal to the royal family. Jordanian 
women constitute 50% of the public sector,63 however, the percentage of women in 
the public sector decreases when moving up towards higher and senior positions to 
10% of the leadership positions.64 Those women who occupy higher positions are 
mostly of Jordanian origin employed as part of the national plan of Jordanisation for 
the public sector. The aim is then for them to fill the place that Palestinian men had 
been occupying in the public sector. The regime, while trying to demonstrate 
progressive steps towards women, is using these policies to maintain the balance and 
structure of power in the country that serves its stability and survival.  
 
It is within such a context that women in the Parliament and senate do not perceive 
themselves as women but rather as daughters of particular tribes or families whose 
role is to keep the interests and representation of tribes. This perception impacts upon 
women MPs and senators’ performance and their disengagement with the women’s 
question and lack of interest in changing how women are perceived and treated in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See Deniz Kandiyoti, 1987. “Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case” 
Feminist Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer 1987), pp. 317-338; Mervat F. Hatem, 1995. “Political 
Liberalization, Gender, and the State,” in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab 
World, V. 1, edited by Rex Brynen and Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, pp.187-207; Al-Ali, 2008; 
Charrad, 2000 & 2001. In relation to state and Islamic parties see Mansoor Moaddel, 2002. “Religion 
and the State: The Singularity of the Jordanian Religious Experience” International Journal of Politics, 
Culture, and Society, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Summer 2002), pp. 527-568. 
63 National Committee for Women, 2010. Gender Auditing in the Public Sector, JNCW. 
64 Ibid. 
25	  	  
Majlis a-Ummah. It also might explain why women did not publicly respond to 
statements, such as that made by senator Abdel Raa’of Al-Rawabdeh discussed 
earlier.   
 
The previous brief analysis of the Jordanian case shows that, despite historical and 
contextual differences, the political project and interests of the Jordanian state is 
similar to Al-Rasheed (2013), Charrad (2000) and Kandiyoti’s (1987) discussions of 
how the state “can exert a powerful influence which inflects and modifies the place 
and practice of Islam”65 along with other institutions like tribes and thus, the ways in 
which women’s positions are situated within these institutions. It is with this 
understanding in mind that I turn next to discuss how normative femininity is 
established in the provisions of wilaya over women in the Jordanian Personal Status 
Laws (JPSL) and the ways in which this impacts on women’s sense of the Self and 
their everyday practices.  
 
Theoretical	  Framework	  	  
If every state tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilization and of 
a citizen (and hence of collective life and of individual relations), and to 
eliminate certain customs and attitudes and to disseminate others, then the 
Law will be its instrument for this purpose.66 	  
In the 2010 JPSL, guardianship over women is one of the main grounds for the 
validity of marriage. As Article 14 stipulates: “The wali (guardian) in marriage is 
according to the order of al-`asaba (male blood relatives) as established by the Hanafi 
school.”  Guardianship over a ward is specified in Article 223: “the wali of a ward is 
the father, then the custodian assigned by the father, the paternal grandfather, the 
custodian assigned by the grandfather, and then the court.” Article 15 sets the 
conditions for a wali to perform guardianship in marriage as: sound mind, maturity, 
and Islam. However, Article 15 does not specify maleness as a precondition for 
wilaya over a female in marriage; nonetheless, this precondition is implicitly assumed 
in Article 14, which stipulates the order of al-`asaba or male –blood descendants. 
There is no mention of the age at which guardianship over women ceases. Article 185 
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of the 2010 JPSL grants the wali custody of a woman under 30 years of age, and 
extends such custody past the age of 30 if a woman is deemed to pose a risk to 
herself. As delineated in Article 184, the wali supervises all of  his ward’s (males 
under 18 and females under 30) matters, such as choices in education and residency.  
 
These articles, which I examine in greater detail in Chapter 2, are the basic grounds 
on which judges rule with regards to wilaya over women in marriage, in cases of legal 
dispute over women’s choices in education, travel and work, or pertaining to disputes 
over women’s wilaya over their children. However, the role these articles bestow 
upon men, granting them privileges and treating women as legal minors, extends 
beyond dealing with legal disputes. As Gramsci notes, we must free the concept of 
law from absolutes and “moralistic fanaticism”67 and see it as being in the service of 
dominant power, which does not lead people by “force alone, but also by ideas.” 68  
Hence, laws tend to normalise a particular system of principles that constitutes what is 
socially natural and legitimate; thus, those who are the subjects of subordination 
accept it as “common sense.”69  Common sense, as Gramsci suggests, is established 
by mass consent to the ruling class’s beliefs and ideas on social norms, which society 
accepts as being in its own best interests.70 
 
Wilaya over women treats women, regardless of their age or position, as legal minors. 
Consequently, this provision not only controls women and limits their choices 
through the use of force, but also constructs and produces a universal knowledge and 
imposes a gender regime, which defines the gender hierarchy. Thus, the provision of 
wilaya over women in the law normalises views of women’s capacities, behaviour, 
acts and roles. Studied in this way, wilaya highlights how the construction and 
internalisation of the dominant view of femininity is crucial to the Jordanian gender 
regime. State legislation not only organises women’s relationships within the family, 
but also naturalises dominant social and cultural norms about women as a common 
sense. While the role of cultural and religious systems in constructing dominant views 
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of femininities is examined in various feminist literature,71 the ways in which legal 
provisions and state discourses operate to construct and normalise specific notions of 
how to be a ‘woman’ is less scrutinised. By locating the normative construction of 
femininity within the state’s political project, it is possible to analyse “the ways in 
which power operates to form our everyday understanding of social relations”72, as 
well as how such power “orchestrates the ways in which we consent to and reproduce 
those tacit and covert relations of power.” 73  One question addressed in this thesis is 
whether the state and its masculine institutions of law, religion, tribe and family 
succeed in imposing a dominant form of femininity that is, in the Gramscian sense, 
accepted by women as 'common sense'; if so, grantees consent without the use of 
coercion or employ tacit ways of escaping or resisting the social and legal 
construction of femininity.	      
 
Alternative	  Forms	  of	  Femininity	  	  	  
Kandiyoti (1987) observed that femininity in the Muslim/Middle East region is “an 
ascribed status rather than something to strive for. The same cannot be said of man's 
masculinity.”74 Femininity is then something to live with not to live for; unlike 
masculinity, which is to be achieved.75 Femininity is understood as a natural, integral 
part of femaleness and, as Kandiyoti posits, “Although woman's very humanity may 
be in question, her femaleness never is.”76 This explanation of femininity, as an 
ascribed status, resonates with how wilaya over women is justified either in fiqh 
literature or by judges, as I explain in Chapter 2, based on the intuitive and inherent 
taba’it el-mar’ah el-da’ifah (the weak nature of women). Following this logic, 
femininity is conceived as a set of values, discourses, ideas, and bodily dispositions 
about women, which positions them as subordinate to men, and is hypothesised as 
women’s natural configuration. Any traits, characteristics or roles that do not 
correspond with this normative construction of femininity are assumed to be against 	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el-taba’ih. The reference to a natural, biological, immutable condition constitutes a 
mode of production that defines and maintains the “delimitation of powers between 
the two sexes through the ethical dispositions”77; in addition, it produces the logic of 
the natural/cultural explanation, which, as Ortner suggests, has a highly persuasive 
nature: “for if it were not so persuasive, people would not keep subscribing to it.”78  
Reference to nature guarantees women’s social adherence to the dominant 
classification, which, in turn, creates what Bourdieu terms the “doxa”: “the 
experience of quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective and the subjective 
principles of organisations of the natural and social world appears as self evident.”79 
Thus, in the context of doxa, people legitimate and naturalise predominant forms of 
power.80 Furthermore, the social norms of ideal feminine, which are politically 
produced, constructed and normalised, are explained as a mode of nature; hence, 
women have no other choice but to see and accept themselves as weak and emotional 
beings, and to recognise and assume social control as legitimate, not arbitrary, 
common sense.81 The normative construction of femininity is, consequently, a 
dimension of politics that operates to reproduce women’s undisputed social obedience 
to the symbolic dominant power, as well as to “impose the principles of construction” 
82 on women’s reality.  
The normative construction of femininity based on Bourdieu’s “doxic mode” 
corresponds with Kandiyoti’s description of femininity’s ascribed status and 
Connell’s term “emphasised femininity”83, which he defines as women’s compliance 
with an unequal gender order “oriented to accommodating the interests and desires of 
men.”84 For Connell, subordination to men is always emphasised in femininity, as 
such legitimises the order of patriarchy.85 Thus, the femininity constructed by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Pierre Bourdieu, 1977. The Outline of A Theory of Practice, Cambridge University Press, Translated 
by Richard Nice: 165. 
78 Sherry B. Ortner, 1974. “Is female to male as nature is to culture?” In M. Z. Rosaldo and L. 
Lamphere (eds), Woman, culture, and society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 68-87:86. 
79 Bourdieu, 1977: 164. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid: 164. 
82 Ibid: 165. 
83 R. W. Connell, 2001. “The Social Organization of Masculinity” in The Masculinities Reader edited 
by Stephen M. Whitehead, Frank Barrett, Polity Press: 33-34. 
84 Connell, 1987: 183.  
85 Connell, 1987: 183-186. 
29	  	  
provision of wilaya encapsulates women’s inferior position, as such is based on 
nature; the classification of masculinity, on the other hand, as something to be 
achieved, places men who comply with hegemonic masculinity in a position of 
authority and superiority.86 Such classification is both explicitly and implicitly 
manifested in wilaya over women provisions through the criteria for male 
guardianship over females, the natural principles of women’s dependence, and 
women’s assumed irrationality. In these provisions, women are deemed legal minors, 
defined only through their guardian not their individual selves. Therefore, unlike 
hegemonic masculinity, which assumes “the subordination of non-hegemonic 
masculinities,”87 femininity is presumed to be the subordination of women to men and 
works to perpetuate a particular, unified and fixed model of what a woman is and 
what she ought to do.  
Bourdieu’s conception of doxa – where the subject’s internalisation of social norms is 
sufficient for the structure of reproduction – does not presume that those who are the 
objects of subjugation have a static or rigid status; rather, Bourdieu suggests that 
social norms are sites of contestation and struggle.88 Hence, assuming women 
internalise a normative femininity, is there any possibility that the values, behaviours, 
ideas, and bodily acts associated with femininity are brought into question? If so, 
when and under what conditions can the doxa and common sense be contested? Have 
women’s differing positions effected the “doxic mode?”89 Is the ‘self-evident’ and 
‘common sense’ – left unquestioned by many – questioned by some women? 
Furthermore, and particularly applicable to the Jordanian context, to what extent does 
the field of doxa vary depending on women’s class and tribal affiliation?  
Thus, the question is threefold: do women merely internalise, naturalise and submit to 
the state’s discourse (which would bring the analysis back to seeing women as victims 
of false consciousness); are they rational agents who make use of the system and are, 
thus, able to destabilise their subordinate position; or, is there a complex combination 
of compliance and resistance to power. In Chapter 3, I discuss these questions and 
ethnographically demonstrate how, despite the established common sense of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Connell, 2001: 39. 
87 R. W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, 2005. “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the 
Concept”, Gender and Society, Vol. 19, No. 6 (Dec., 2005), pp. 829-859: 846.  
88 Gramsci, 1971; Bourdieu, 1977.  
89 Bourdieu, 1977: 164. 
30	  	  
femininity, women do not simply comply with these norms (false-consciousness) or 
actively engage in an overt form of resistance; it is more common that women 
simultaneously comply with and resist the normative gender order, which clearly 
favours men’s interests over women’s.  
Most of the political life of subordinate groups is to be found neither in the 
overt collective defiance of powerholders nor in complete hegemonic 
compliance, but in the vast territory between these two polar opposites.90  
This happens through covert forms of resistance, what James Scott (1990) termed 
“hidden transcripts”91, which are the established methods of a subordinate group to 
insinuate and determine political spaces in a “muted or veiled form”92 in a particular 
context.  
The hidden and muted forms of resistance are particularly effective in situations 
where brutal and effective means of oppression are used to maintain the normative 
order, allowing “a veiled discourse of dignity and self-assertion within the public 
transcript… in which ideological resistance is disguised, muted and veiled for safety’s 
sake.”93 Women’s limited access to power – coupled with the concentration of power, 
be it legal or social, for men – leaves little room for women to publicly and overtly 
resist.  In a context of brutal domination, the existing social and legal sanctions may 
lead women to internalise, naturalise and thus consent to a normative gender order 
that determines women’s experiences and defines their subjective understanding of 
femininity. This is not simply the consequence of false consciousness or direct 
coercion; instead, such consent is the result of a system in which overt resistance can 
be seen as “suicidal actions”94 – overt resistance comes at a high cost, as it risks both 
reputational damage and the loss of freedoms that women may somehow enjoy 
through indirect and covert resistance. The severity of the potential consequences and 
the complexity of the context of domination determines the extent to which women 
can manoeuvre outside the normative gender order and, thus, openly question the 
normality of submission. As Scott (1990) argued: 	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The greater the disparity in power between dominant and subordinate and the 
more arbitrarily is exercised the more the public transcripts of subordinate 
will take on a stereotyped, ritualistic cast. In other word, the more menacing 
the power the thicker is the mask.95 
With this in mind, this thesis examines how femininity is constructed in a system that 
has institutionalised discipline and punishment for women, as well as how this system 
“influences subjective experiences of womanhood and femininity.”96 However, the 
institutional mechanisms of control are not “immutable and unchanging”97, as 
Kandiyoti (1987) puts it, nor are they practised identically for all women. Moreover, 
women are not fully aware of the impacts these institutions have on the construction 
of their gendered roles; in the end, as Moore (1994) says, “no one can ever be fully 
aware of the conditions of their own construction.”98 These institutions “are 
intimately related to the construction of oneself as a gendered subject.”99 I suggest 
that normative femininity – constructed within the principle of wilaya – works to 
define women as “agents who are as similar to each other as possible” 100 in terms of 
both how they internalise, accept and legitimise male authority and as agents removed 
from the masculine position of authority and domination.  
The intersectionality of gender, class, and tribe, however, modifies the ways in which 
the boundaries of the wilaya system are interpreted and, thus, impact on women’s 
experiences of femininity. In fact, the experiences of women living in tribal 
communities, where the tribal leader controls families’ decisions regarding marriage 
and divorce, differ from the experiences of those living in Amman’s diverse and open 
communities. Women in tribal communities are more obliged to accommodate family 
and tribal interests, and potentially face more severe consequences for open 
resistance. On the other hand, legal limitations can be reworked in the tribe’s interest, 
allowing women with tribal affiliation to escape the state’s sanctions and disciplinary 
measures more so than poorer women from Palestinian camps and deprived areas; as I 
discuss in the case of women prisoners in Chapter 5, such women have no option but 
the state’s prison for ‘protection’ in case of family threats.  
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Richer women have access to other opportunity structures, allowing them to bypass 
some legal limitations and enjoy, relatively, greater personal freedom. However, this 
does not necessarily result in a total rejection of the assumed position of normative 
femininity; particularly for rich women from influential tribes or who have male 
family members with political positions or ambitions, stepping outside the normative 
framework risks reputational damage and could lead to men’s loss of power within 
the tribe or failure to obtain the tribe’s nomination for parliamentary elections. 
Therefore, rich women with no tribal affiliation have more opportunities to escape 
normative submission, resist and take less account of the legal and social implications 
than poorer women and those with close tribal connections. Consequently, the extent 
of internalisation and/or questioning of normative femininity is profoundly impacted 
by the symbolic and material opportunities, as well as possibilities to avoid 
punishment and consequences, that women’s statuses provide.  
Here, the consideration is also whether the material opportunities provided by class, 
education or work can influence women’s social position in a context where this 
position continues to be characterised as natural, is afforded the status of legal minor, 
and control over women’s choices is politicised as a cultural arrangement. In the 
previous section, I discussed how the legal construction of femininity casts women as 
a unitary group; it does not differentiate based on women’s class or position with 
regards to structures of power, as this would defeat the symbolic order of nature. 
Therefore, the extent to which material opportunities can rework the system for 
women’s interests – in a way that could destabilise, pose any threat or jeopardise the 
structure of power – is limited. In Chapter 3, I discuss how women can push the 
boundaries of their gender roles in work, to some extent, or have freer movement, but 
such should not conflict with the established gender hierarchy; this is particularly true 
regarding decisions related to the supposed cultural authenticity of family 
relationships, such as marriage and divorce decisions. This means that women have to 
make sense of male authority from the specific positions of father/daughter, 
brother/sister, or husband/wife.  
The rejection of some aspects of femininity, or that femininity is about submission, 
may not only be tied to the availability of opportunities, but could also emerge in 
situations of crisis between the interests of women and those in power. A conflict – 
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such as disputes over marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and type of 
education and work – sometimes, in and of itself, provides both the opportunity to 
contest authority and an environment where women can refuse to submit to the 
normative gender order. This conflict with normative submission could be just an 
occasional event or, like a few cases I met, a turning point in women’s conception of 
the Self; such conflict can mark women’s beginning to question and push the limits of 
their subordinate positions.  
Consequently, women’s differing conditions, opportunities, and positions within the 
power structure necessitate diverse, and indeed changing and open to interpretation, 
understandings and personal responses to normative femininity. Although the 
empirical evidence demonstrates that women in Jordan internalise, to varying degrees, 
normative femininity, it is also evident that different forms of femininity emerge from 
women’s various positions related to class, tribe and ethnicity. Women’s membership 
in the latter inflects the ways they interpret and experience the structures of the wilaya 
system.	  
An intersectional approach, such as the one adopted in this research, shows that 
women follow three main patterns in relation to the dominant construction of 
femininity and gender roles. The first model is compliance with subordination by 
accommodating tribes’ and family’s desires, which are underlined by men’s interests. 
The second is a pragmatic and strategic combination of compliance, resistance, and 
accommodation. Here, women can be more critical in some ways, even more 
sceptical, of the values and beliefs that constitute normative femininity, but continue 
to conform to them nevertheless. 
The third model is the masculine/exceptional form of resistance and non-compliance 
with normative femininity. Here, when women seem to be departing from or escaping 
the normative construction, their identity is either masculinised or desexualised, as 
they are positioned – or, indeed, may position themselves – as either masculine or 
exceptional. This model may show nothing more than different points of the same 
process, where, according to Bourdieu, women may perceive different principles of or 
differently employ the common sense that differentiated them as a social category in 
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the first place.101  
 
Practices of Femininity in Women’s  Everdy Life  
 
In the first seven months of 2014, 19 women were murdered in Jordan under the name 
‘honour crime’ and an equal, if not a higher, number of women were incarcerated for 
‘protection’. 102 In Chapter 5, I analyse the case of women prisoners and the 
conditions under which they were imprisoned. The case of women prisoners shows 
the cost of women’s overt resistance to and rebellion against the system of wilaya; it 
also shows the extreme and brutal response of family members and the state to 
women’s decisions and manoeuvring outside the wilaya system. This is not to suggest 
that every Jordanian woman is under real threat of being killed or imprisonment, but 
rather to show how the state’s disciplinary mechanisms – condoning killing and 
ordering women’s imprisonment – create the sense of a symbolic threat amongst the 
vast majority of women, which deters them from resisting openly and overtly. In this 
system, the symbolic threat of killing and imprisoning of women, as Bourdieu 
suggests, is a form of a “symbolic violence”; a mechanism of domination and a “more 
effective, and in this sense more brutal, means of oppression…. the violence has 
become soft, invisible.”103 In this system, as Bourdieu further argues, it is very 
difficult and there little chance for resistance.104 
 
In this thesis, the symbolic threat to women raises further questions relating to how 
power operates and the prospect for and scope of women’s resistance to the operation 
of power. Bourdieu suggests that power operates through external and internal forces, 
the former being symbolic domination, which is “something you absorb like air, 
something you don't feel pressured by.”105 External, symbolic violence implies 
discipline; something that subjects are made conscious of so that it be obeyed. In 
other words, Bourdieu suggests that power does not rely merely on its ideology to be 
absorbed in a doxic mode, it also operates through disciplining methods that aim to 
correct and govern the practices of those under domination and, thus, determine their 	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lived realities. 
 
The only possibility for overt resistance to the doxa is when the interests of the 
dominant class conflict with the doxic mode and, hence, force them to limit its field of 
power. This, as Bourdieu posits, would imply different belief of what was beyond 
questioning.106 The analysis of gender relationships in Jordan, through provisions of 
wilaya, exemplifies how power is still concentrated in the hands of men; as long as 
men continue holding legal and social authority over women, there will be little 
chance for women to redefine the doxa and, thus, openly question its limits. The other 
possibility for resistance, as Bourdieu suggests, is to direct it towards discipline, as “it 
is easy to revolt against discipline because you are conscious of it.”107 It is here where 
Bourdieu argues against false consciousness, he sees agents as neither “mistakenly 
guided by false representation” nor “not aiming consciously towards things.”108   
 
The symbolic threat against women’s lives and wellbeing is not imaginary, it is 
actual. The fact that some women, although very few, have already experienced its 
extremes, implies that the majority of other women determine their scope of actions in 
everyday life so as to not pose a threat to the power structure and, hence, avoid 
punishment. On the other hand, while these practices do not necessarily directly or 
overtly confront domination, they do not necessarily guarantee women’s strict 
compliance either. Women’s daily practices can involve covert, indirect and hidden 
forms of resistance, including guises of: bargaining, false-compliance, bribing 
brothers, hidden relationships, and tricks to escape forced marriages.  
 
The resistance that women’s daily practices offer is also dependent on whether 
women see situations as significant or unimportant at any given time. For instance, 
women may choose to compromise on choices of education, type of work, or dress in 
some ways in order to maximise other areas of freedom they see as more important, 
such as in the choices of marriage, travel, or mingling with friends. Consequently, in 
the practices women perform to infiltrate and escape disciplining mechanisms, there 
is a thin line between women’s compliance and resistance. This elicits the question of 	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whether what appears to be a practice of defiance could somehow offer resistance.  
 
Many such practices fit James Scott’s notion of “covert resistance,”109 where some 
practices portray false-compliance in order to escape punishment and enjoy a degree 
of relative freedom in another sphere. Similarly to how James Scott elaborates in 
relation to subordinate classes forms of resistance, some women in Jordan “are, after 
all, far less interested in changing the larger structure and the law,’’110 as that could be 
suicidal, and so are “working the system… to their minimum disadvantages.”111 This 
raises the question of whether women’s practices are merely a “tactical choice born of 
a prudent awareness of the balance of power”112 and only women direct their attention 
towards minimising the effects of control mechanisms; or, can these practices, on the 
one hand, contribute to the maintenance of the power structure and, on the other, 
effect change at the structural level and rework gender power relationships, be it at the 
individual or collective level.  
 
Kandiyoti’s (1998) critique of Scott’s approach posits that by recognising only the 
‘limits’ (without in-depth analysis of these limits) of subordinate resistance, which 
makes other forms of action seem ‘suicidal’ or ‘impractical’, Scott is “concealing the 
evidence of hegemony by relabeling its effects.” 113  She argues that we must 
acknowledge some acts of resistance may be both legitimate and maintain the system 
of domination. In domination that is based on arbitrary arrangements of kinship and 
marriage, control mechanism are naturalised and have moral and/or material 
sanctions; this means, as Kandiyoti suggests, that even contestation and defiance 
could, at times, hold some aspects of the limits set by the normalised social 
practices.114 In her view, revisiting her “patriarchal bargain” approach, this type of 
resistance may not lead to renegotiation of the conjugal contracts, but “produces relief 
within them.”115 Moreover, moments of contestation and resistance do not necessarily 
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imply an absence of acquiescence.116 So, by only acknowledging a particular range of 
strategies, Kandiyoti argues we may not be able to see alternatives that could occur 
under different conditions and situations.117 The complicity of the gendered subject’s 
experience within the “messiness of social reality,”118 requires us to acknowledge 
women as agents who are “both rational actors and unable to think beyond the 
‘naturalised’ givens of their communities.”119  
 
Historical political processes and changes to the socioeconomic conditions that have 
taken place over the last few decades in the Middle East region – particularly in 
relation to changes to the extended family structure, women’s work and education – 
required a transformation of women’s positions within the structure of power; in other 
words, such changes may have implied inter-subjective relationships embodied in the 
complex interplay between gender, class, caste, ethnicity and socio-economic 
factors.120 The complexity and multiplicity of systems of domination in Jordan, 
women’s changing position within the structure, and the changing position of women 
in their lifecycle, as Knadiyoti (1998) incites us to think, are inevitably reflected in 
the ways in which women experience normative femininity and, consequently, how 
they adopt strategies of resistance and/or coping and survival tactics.121 This context 
“require(s) sympathetic and open-minded examination, rather than hasty 
categorization,”122 of different forms of struggle. 
 
Thus, examination of women’s everyday practices, often seen as ‘manipulative’ and 
‘contradictory,’123 demands a linking of the practice to the limits and extent of 
domination, the available power and opportunities for women within each system124 
and sanction, and the consequences and discipline mechanisms imposed on women. 
Accordingly, to avoid the categorisation of women as either resistant or submissive 	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agents, I look at the tactics women use in daily life and analyse the ways in which and 
under what conditions these tactics take the form of compliance – surviving or coping 
with male authority – and when and how they can materialise into strategies aimed at 
realising autonomy.  
 
Through analysing women’s everyday practices of femininity, I aim to contribute to 
the literature – such as Kandiyoti (1987, 1988, 1998), Abu-Lughod (1986, 1990), and 
Moors (1995, 1996) – on women’s everyday practices and survival, coping, and 
resistance strategies, through which they challenge the stereotypical image of women 
in the Arab/Middle East region as passively contributing to their oppression.125 In 
doing so, I benefit a great deal from James Scott’s (1985, 1990) discussions of 
“everyday forms of resistance”, Kandiyoti’s (1988) “patriarchal bargain” approach 
and (1998) “rethinking patriarchal bargains”, as well as from the hidden and secret 
forms of women’s resistance discussed by Lila Abu-Lughod (1986, 1989, 1990) in the 
context of Bedouin Egyptian women.  
Sites,	  Surroundings	  and	  Research	  Participants	  	  	   	  
I conducted my fieldwork in Jordan between June 2011 and August 2012, by 
interviewing 62 women from different classes, including women activists and women 
prisoners in protective custody in the Jwaidah Jail in Amman. I also interviewed six 
judges of shari’a courts in Amman, and conducted one focus group with lawyers and 
activists in the Reforming JPSL Coalition. In addition, this research is informed by 
innumerable discussions of my topic in workshops and conferences with friends, 
colleagues, and family members, as well as by my own work with JWU and other 
organisations in Jordan over the last 20 years, where I engaged in activism related to 
women and worked with women from different backgrounds. I refer my own 
experiences in different parts of the thesis.  
 
My fieldwork took place in Amman, the capital of Jordan. Amman is divided 
geographically into west, east and central. It is an extremely diverse city with a 
population of different backgrounds and ethnicities: Jordanian, Palestinian with 	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Jordanian citizenship, Palestinian refugees, Iraqi refugees, Christians, Muslims, 
Baha’is, Circassians, and Chechens, all constituting the community of the city. The 
clearest social division in Amman is not a division based on ethnicity and religion, it 
is rather the division between the west and east. West Amman is largely the area for 
wealthy people, however, some parts of west Amman consist of middle-class 
professionals who have well-paid jobs. East and central Amman contain both middle-
class and poorer populations, and some parts are less privileged than others. Some 
areas in east Amman are very poor and lack basic services, such as Hai al-Tafaileh 
and Jabal Al Nadhaif, where I conducted interviews with women from disadvantaged 
areas.  
 
As my focus is on wilaya over women in the JPSL, I have planned to interview only 
women with Jordanian nationality and with a Muslim background, as the JPSL deals 
with family issues related to Muslims including Christian women married to Muslim 
men. Christians are treated under special courts that rely on Canon Law. The choice 
of Jordanian Muslim women is intended to explicitly look at how women 
conceptualise themselves in relation to wilaya provisions in the JPSL, which the 
research assumes clearly constructs and produces notions of normative femininity and 
masculinity. This is not to assume that Christian women are treated differently in 
relation to wilaya; the paternal influence over a woman’s choice of the spouse and 
other decisions is of significance for both Christians and Muslims in Jordan. During 
the course of my fieldwork, I interviewed a woman unaware at the time that she was a 
Christian. Unless it is clear from the family name or if a woman is wearing a religious 
symbol it is not always possible to distinguish Muslim women from Christians in 
Jordan. Indeed, families of Muslims and Christians sometimes have the same family 
name. I met the middle-class woman at her house, where we talked for an hour, and 
she shared with me several stories related to her choices of marriage, education, and 
work. Her stories did not seem any different to those of Muslim women. Only at the 
end of the interview did I realise she was a Christian when she stated, “Things are 
more difficult for us. Beside our families’ interventions we have to choose a partner 
from a very small community, even foreigners, who are Christians, are still not 
preferred as they are not Jordanian.”  
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My interviews included an open discussion that included questions like: How do you 
define wilaya over women? Do you think that wilaya provides protection for women? 
Why, and under what circumstances? How do you think of yourself as a woman, and 
what does ounotha (femininity) mean for you? Do you think the role of the wali is 
important for women, in which ways? Under wilaya rules what are you supposed to 
do? Do you agree with these rules? If not, how do you react to such rules? Have you 
ecer thought of challenging/negotiating wilaya rules? What did you challenge and 
how? If you can imagine that you have no wali, what would your life look like? What 
are the things that you will be able to do that you cannot do under the rules of wilaya?  
Interview Structure and Sites 
I first structured my interviews with women in a semi-structured format. The choice 
was based on the assumption that a method of in-depth semi-structured interviews is 
the best way to have informal, lengthy and well-focused discussions.126 In-depth 
interviews are similar to active natural conversations127 and the role of the researcher 
and respondents is clearly defined.128 While some studies129 look at the interviewer as 
a facilitator and listener, in my experience, the less structured and more open and 
reflective the interview is, the more women can engage and share experiences. This is 
precisely demonstrated in feminists’ approach to researching women’s daily 
experiences, where the researcher’s interviewing is more reflective and interactive.130 
Whilst I continued to have main themes for the interviews, my questions and 
interactions were more reflections on what women wanted to speak about and share 
with me. This led to having some very long interviews, lasted on some occasions for 
hours or meeting a woman for a second and sometimes for a third time. Ten of my 
interviews turned out to capture entire life histories.   
 
On some occasions, the interview became a group discussion. This was particularly in 
neighbourhoods of Jabal al-Nadhaif, where there was no control over visitors. 
Unexpected visits from women in this neighbourhood sometimes turned the 
interviews into discussion groups, which was very insightful and enabled me to 	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engage in women’s daily conversations and gatherings. I deliberately did not try to 
impose any structure on these conversations and left them open for the women to 
lead. It was very natural for some women to take the lead and start asking other 
women questions related to wilaya over women and femininity. Asking each other 
and sharing their experiences together made me less visible and thus gave these 
women a freer space to reflect on each other’s opinions and experiences. In these 
communities, it is very common for women to share their own experiences with each 
other; privacy is very limited, as usually living in close proximity to each other leaves 
no room for secrets. Jabal al-Nadhaif is a Palestinian neighbourhood located in the 
central part of Amman. It is an unofficial Palestinian camp as the United Nations 
Relief Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) does not recognise it as a 
camp but still provides some health and education services for people in the area. 
Similar to other Palestinian camps and neighbourhoods, Jabal al-Nadhaif is a very 
underprivileged and crowded area.  
 
Interviews with women from the middle and rich classes took place in different areas 
of west Amman. Mostly the interviews were at women’s places and a few interviews 
were conducted in restaurants and cafés. On some occasions, I had back-to-back 
interviews with women from Jabal al-Nadhaif and women from Abdoun, an 
extremely wealthy area. Leaving a very unprivileged area and arriving at one of the 
wealthiest areas in Jordan at first made me think whether the comparison between 
women from those two extremely distinctive places would be valid. It was highly 
improbable to assume the connection between women’s understanding of normative 
femininity, tactics, and strategies when merely looking at their different lifestyles and 
availability or lack of resources. It was only possible to understand similarities and 
differences between women from different classes by analysing their narratives 
related to how close or remote they were from the power structure of family and 
tribalism, how women’s decisions were made in relation to or in divergence from 
family and class interests, and the possible consequences and fear realised by women. 
 
Interviews with women disputing wilaya in the legal system	  
I conducted interviews with women who sought legal assistance in relation to disputes 
over wilaya in the courts, either related to wilaya over women or women’s right to 
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wilaya over their children. These cases provided data on the experiences of women in 
the legal system and how judges, family, and tribes deal with women engaging in 
such disputes. Those cases were selected through the Jordanian Women’s Union 
(JWU) Shelter and Legal Aid Centre. The JWU Aid Centre includes a health clinic, 
support and counselling unit, legal unit, and a shelter for women. I established this 
centre in 1995 and directed it for seven years, and am therefore very much aware of 
its procedures, ethics and principles of confidentiality and privacy. The lawyers first 
called women from the six cases I selected for the interviews, and then the women 
and I arranged how to meet. Four of these interviews took place at JWU and the other 
two preferred that I conduct the interview at their homes. 
	  
Interviews with judges  
I conducted interviews with judges in the west Amman shari’a court and Swaileh 
shari’a Court. Generally, there was no objection from judges to talk to me as some of 
them already knew me, and others I was introduced to by lawyer Elham Al-Shawa, 
who is well known in the shari’a courts. It was only on one occasion that a judge 
objected to do the interview unless I covered my hair. I was standing outside waiting 
for Elham, who went to see if he was available for the interview. I could see that they 
were debating something but did not know what it was about. When Elham told me, I 
was shocked and asked her if this is also the case with lawyers and women who stand 
before this judge. She told me that there is not anything that obliged women or 
lawyers to wear the hijab but judges will comment on them or give them religious 
advice, which as Elham recounted: “sometimes makes lawyers who are not wearing 
the hijab hesitant to take cases in the shari’a courts to avoid judges’ offensive 
comments or being in awkward positions.” It seems that some of the shari’a court 
judges assume the role of the wali over women in the courts regardless of women’s 
positions: being lawyers, having a legal dispute or even being a researcher.   
	  
Interviews in the tribal communities  
Initially, I planned my fieldwork in Amman without any particular interest in a 
specific neighbourhood. My plan was to interview women from different classes, 
different educational backgrounds, and both working and non-working women from 
west and east Amman. When I interviewed women who were seeking legal assistance 
at JWU and courts, I learned that some cases were referred to tribal leaders to solve 
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their problems. I mistakenly assumed that tribal interventions and unofficial tribal 
jurisdiction take place only in the tribal communities outside of Amman. Though I 
have worked with women from different locations in Amman previously, I never 
knew that there is a tribal judge who is appointed by the king, called Qadi al-Diwan 
al-Malaki (the Royal Court Judge), to deal with tribal disputes and social relationships 
within tribes who live in Amman. This was a very striking finding that shifted my 
interests to study how women who live in semi-enclosed tribal communities in 
Amman experience wilaya and whether their experience would be different from 
those who live in an open community that is not governed by tribes.  
 
I therefore decided to interview women from two tribal communities in Amman, first, 
Hai al-Tafailah (a neighbourhood for people originally from Al-Tafailah, a city in the 
south of Jordan), and the second, Hai Al-Ajarmeh in Naour.  Naour is a small town on 
the suburbs of Amman. Its population is mostly from one tribe, Al-Ajarmeh, but 
recently some Palestinians and other Jordanian people have started to move to the 
area. Tribes in Naour own the surrounding lands and they are very influential and 
have powerful positions in the country. I was introduced to women in this 
neighbourhood through a small women’s charity – the Women of Naour Society.  
 
Hai al-Tafailah is a closed community located in the heart of Amman with a very poor 
population. The area is very disadvantaged and lacks basic services and facilities. 
Working in such a neighbourhood was challenging as strangers are identified easily. 
The first time I went to the neighbourhood with a friend, who is familiar with the 
area, it was impossible for us to do any interview. The visit was in late 2011, when 
the area was under monitoring and surveillance of the police and security. A few days 
prior to our visit, tribal leaders and people from the area organised the first ever 
protest to reach the Royal Palace in the downtown area and demanded the end of 
monarchy with slogans directly attacked the king. After a few days of confrontations 
inside and outside Hai al-Tafailah, a large number of people were arrested and 
referred to the State Security Court on the charge of “undermining the political system 
in Jordan,” which could carry a sentence of life imprisonment. A negotiation process 
started with the government and al-Diwan al-Malaki to release them. A few months 
later, the king issued a decree of forgiveness and thus they were released.  
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During this time, it was impossible to interview women in the neighbourhood. I 
managed to arrange some interviews with women in their work places, or at some of 
their friends’ houses. Later, in 2012, I went twice to the neighbourhood and 
conducted some interviews with women. Although the situation was stable people 
were still very suspicious of strangers mingling in the area. On several occasions, men 
were the first to talk to me. After a long discussion and answering an array of 
questions about my research and myself, they felt comfortable to leave me with 
women in the house.  
 
As the time spent in the two neighbourhoods was not enough to observe the details of 
women’s realities in these areas, I did not include a particular chapter about women 
living in closed tribal communities but through women’s narratives I was able to 
analyse their experiences in relation to wilaya. Through their stories it was clear that 
the tribal leader is still a significant enough figure to ensure that all of the tribe’s 
members, as Jameilah from Naour stated, “adhere to the rules and values of the 
community.” Therefore, the harmony of the community is a priority over the interests 
of the individuals and families.  Disputes related to marriages and divorces rarely 
reach the court and mostly are solved by the tribe’s leader, who serves as a judge in 
such cases. The matters of marriage and divorce in both neighbourhoods seemed to be 
a tribal issue rather than a matter between two persons. Males and females are forced 
into marriages and sometimes without being consulted, however, men have more 
flexibility than women in accepting or rejecting the arrangements of the marriage.  
 
The examination of women’s conceptions and everyday practices in two tribal 
communities, one very disadvantaged and the other very wealthy, certainly shifted my 
thinking of tribal practices as homogenous to tribal customs as diverse and implicated 
by power structures and economic factors. Although in both communities the role of 
the tribal leader is of significance to every member, it was more readily challenged by 
tribal members who hold powerful positions within the tribe and state structure. For 
instances, daughters of those members are less supervised within universities by 
males from their tribes, while women from Hai al-Tafailah were under constant 
supervision and surveillance of male community members who were not even related 
to them by blood. Issues of marriage and divorce are also more easily negotiable by 
women in Naour than women in Hai al-Tafailah. Women’s position within the tribe, 
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therefore, is also determined by their family’s position within the broader structure of 
tribe and state.  
	  
Interviews with women in Jwaideh Jail 
Interviews with women prisoners were arranged through Mukarram Odeh, the 
Director of JWU Aid Centre and Shelter. She organised the visits to the jail and 
joined me on my two visits. The decision of who to interview was made by the jail’s 
director, who selected women for interviews based on the relevance of their cases to 
my subject. I had ensured the full consent of women to participate in the interviews 
and explained my research so as to ensure that the women were comfortable and 
willing to share their experiences. Mukarram was present during part of the 
interviews, as she thought it was a good opportunity for JWU to intervene in these 
cases. However, I made a clear distinction between my role as a researcher and 
Mukarram’s role, so the interviews were not guided or influenced by expectations that 
I could meet. Therefore, Mukarram only joined in the end of each interview to discuss 
options and possibilities for intervention. The intervention of JWU in releasing 
women from the prison usually happens in collaboration with the prison’s staff, a 
good number of whom have shown great sympathy with women incarcerated in the 
prison for protective reasons. They usually contact non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) to assist these women’s release from the prison.   
 
When I visited the prison, there were 39 cases of women who were in the prison for 
protective reasons, of whom I interviewed seven. The deputy director of the prison 
described women who are in protective custody as: “sabaya zie el-ward (young 
women like flowers). Most of them are innocents, have done nothing wrong, some of 
them jad (for real) are banat a’lam o nas (daughters of good families and tribes).”  
She, by this statement, informed us that the majority of women in the prison have 
neither committed any sexual acts nor were involved in any behaviour deemed 
dishonourable, as women in the protective custody are usually portrayed in the media. 
She also indicated that not only poor women from underprivileged areas were in the 
prison but also women who belong to tribal communities.  
 
The interviews in the prison were not as lengthy as other interviews, some only taking 
one hour or less. Although I was provided with an office where I talked to the women, 
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it was not very private as from time to time the interviews were interrupted for 
various purposes and the environment of the prison in itself was a barrier to a free 
interview. However, I felt that women were very keen to share their experiences and 
disclose their stories. For some of them, I felt that telling their story was an 
opportunity to reflect on what had happened and how they wanted to move forward, 
as they were hoping to leave the prison. But being in the prison, for some other 
women, seemed to kill every hope they have had in life and they were so desperate to 
the extent that they were not interested in JWU’s intervention to release them.  
Statement on Research Ethics  
Some of the research ethics are already addressed briefly in different parts of the 
methodology. Here, I want to address several ethical issues that were important to 
consider during the course of my fieldwork and writing of this thesis. My research 
ethics are guided by feminists’ ethical research principles of equality, confidentiality 
and responsibility towards research participants. Feminist research has been not only 
about addressing issues of equality and power in particular contexts but also between 
the researcher and research participants.131 The position of the researcher either from 
epistemological standpoints or in the dynamics of power in the research context is of 
great consideration for feminist research.132 Feminist researchers thus engage in 
raising some inquiries that question and “explore how their personal, professional, 
and structural positions frame social scientific investigations”133 and how failing to 
realise their positions within the societal web of relationships might “produce 
dominant gender, race, and class biases.”134 My awareness of my positionality both in 
relation to the research subject and the hypothesis I am making and in relation to my 
set of statuses, which I will discuss shortly in the note on positionality, contributed to 
approaching my research participants with an open mind where I formulated the 
questions and facilitated the discussions in a way that women did not feel any 
pressure but rather engaged freely in the interviews.  
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Despite the fact that my research is based on the assumption that provisions of wilaya 
over women construct and reproduce normative femininity and thus contribute in 
positioning women in a subordinate status, I am aware that researching any issue 
concerning women should be objective in a way that does not overlook how women 
themselves consider wilaya and the ways in which they have developed their 
understanding of this issue. Therefore, representation of women’s voices is one of the 
goals of this research and I have not assumed myself to be a representative for them 
or able to speak on their behalf. Women’s voices – whether or not supporting the 
assumptions of the research – are presented and analysed openly and objectively. 
 
Confidentiality is a major principle that has been addressed in feminist methods and 
ethics.135 I have ensured that my research participants had the full right to decide what 
information is to be disclosed and what is not to be shared in the research. There were 
times when I had to stop the recorder so women could feel more comfortable in 
answering and engaging in the discussion. I have also shared my contact details with 
women in case they have decided afterwards to take any information they shared with 
me off the record. It is also recognised that information provided by research 
participants is only for the purpose of this research and will not be used for any other 
purposes. 
 
Responsibility towards research participants is another principle of feminist ethics.136 
It is considered in my research at two levels: first, the responsibility to represent 
respondents’ viewpoints without any fabrication or misinterpretation. Second, I have 
a responsibility to avoid any harm that might be caused through revealing certain 
information about my research participants or might result in their identification 
against their will. It is thus important to mention in this regard that names, ages, 
professions, places, and any information that might lead to the identification of any of 
my research participants have been changed.  
A Departure Note from the Insider / Outsider Dichotomy  
When I started working on my research proposal, I was very much concerned with 
wilaya as a legal barrier to women’s independence. This focus was based on my 	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experience in working with women who are victims / survivors of violence. During 
my seven years at the JWU Aid Centre and Shelter, I witnessed many women making 
the choice to return to abusive relationships. These choices were informed by 
women’s awareness of what could happen to them if they rejected what their male 
guardians viewed as suitable for them. Family reconciliation was in many 
circumstances the only available option for women. Failing to do so, or trying other 
ways, might result in risking a woman’s life; a matter that was of great concern to me. 
Although in 1999 JWU established a shelter for women, the issue that women’s 
families have to be informed of their presence in the shelter (without informing them 
of the location of the shelter), was also related to the system of guardianship. By 
informing families, we were aiming to reduce the possibility of reporting a woman’s 
absence to the police, which could result in the imprisonment of a woman, even if she 
was in the shelter.  
 
This was one of many other legal and procedural barriers related to wilaya I have 
experienced working with women. However, during the first year of conducting this 
research, my thinking towards the implications of wilaya over women has shifted to 
look beyond the legal constraints it imposes on women and to examine its impacts on 
women’s conceptions and lived realities of femininities. The shift in thinking 
necessitated a shift in my methodological framework. I redesigned my ethnographic 
fieldwork to include interviewing women from different classes and women who are 
not in legal disputes or seeking assistance to escape family violence. My goal was to 
see whether women think of themselves in light of what the definition and system of 
guardianship in the JPSL entails, and if so how that impacts on women’s everyday 
practices of femininity.  
 
My first fieldwork trip to Jordan was a very challenging one. The challenge was not 
related to difficulties in reaching women from different classes, but was rather related 
to how I placed myself in the positionality of the insider researcher. I went to Jordan 
with the question of “what could I learn more about women in Jordan?” I was raised 
in Jordan, lived all of my life there, worked with women from different classes and 
educational backgrounds, and engaged in activism on women’s rights in rural and 
urban settings along Palestinian camps. In the first few interviews with women, I was 
very frustrated and had the feeling that my research was not going to reveal to me 
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anything new about women. The moment I realised that I was mistakenly positioning 
myself as an insider, where I was assuming and anticipating women’s responses to 
my questions, I managed to turn my fieldwork into a different experience than that 
which I experienced when I was working with women who sought assistance and 
support at the JWU Centre.   
 
In ethnographic literature, different advantages to being an insider researcher are 
addressed: belonging to one community, being familiar with customs, speaking the 
same language, and having relatively easy access to the community of the study.137 
Some of the pitfalls of being an insider include the issue of social class or category 
when the researcher belongs to the research community, where the social life of the 
researchers might be open to questioning when they belong to the same community of 
the research, especially when the researcher is a woman.138 However, Hiba Kholy and 
Nadje Al-Ali (1999) challenged the doctrines of insider / outsider by underscoring 
that the pertinent matter for them is more related to knowing the research community 
and being able to fit within its conditions regardless of the insider / outsider status.139 
Merton (1972) incites researchers to think of themselves outside of the category of 
insider / outsiders. He posits that, “In structural terms, we are all, of course, both 
Insiders and Outsiders, members of some groups and, sometimes derivatively, not of 
others.”140 The definition of oneself as an insider for Merton has further implications 
on the research as by assuming “insiderness” with all of the research population might 
be decisive where the researcher is looking at a static status of themselves, or of that 
of the research community, rather than a set of statuses that s/he achieves throughout 
a lifetime:  
Insofar as Insider doctrine treats ascribed rather than achieved statuses as 
central in forming perspectives, it tends to be static in orientation. For with 
the glaring exception of age status itself, ascribed statuses are generally 
retained throughout the life span. Yet sociologically, there is nothing fixed 	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about the boundaries separating Insiders from Outsiders. As situations 
involving different values arise, different statuses are activated and the lines 
of separation shift.141  
 
Another point for Merton is how researchers define themselves and how others define 
their positions within the groups. It is not only significant for the researchers to locate 
themselves as insiders but also whether the group accepts them as insiders or not.142 
Merton suggests it is crucial to assess before determining one’s status as an insider 
whether the research group is homogenous, to the extent that all members erase all 
other differences and their identity is harmonised, or if there are distinctive features 
for some of the group members, where they identify themselves as a subgroup.143 
 
In taking my experience as an example, I agree with Merton that the category of 
insider / outsider is insufficient when one works within a diverse community of 
multiple social categories and ethnicities. In Jordan, as I mentioned earlier, there are 
different communities, the country is very diverse, and political, economic, and social 
conditions implicate the ways in which identities are recognised and practised. I 
conducted my research among women who have Jordanian citizenship and Muslim 
backgrounds. However, having Jordanian citizenship does not necessarily mean 
claiming to be Jordanian or self-defining as a Jordanian. In the tribal communities, the 
question of Palestinian or Jordanian identities was the first to be asked and discussed. 
Thus, the community immediately placed me in the status of an outsider. I have also 
never lived in a tribal community and while I knew theoretically about some tribes’ 
rules, structures and customs, I had never been fully part of any tribal community, and 
therefore also had a sense of outsiderness.  
 
In the Palestinian communities, I considered myself as an absolute insider; I am a 
Palestinian refugee, I was raised in a Palestinian camp, and I have Jordanian 
citizenship. I share different statuses and positions with the majority of the people 
there. However, I was not seen in this way in the neighbourhood of Hai al-Nadhaif. 
While as a refugee, a woman, and a Jordanian citizen, it was relatively easy to access 
people’s houses, it was only possible to engage in the interview after I answered all 	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types of questions about myself. My changing situations from being a refugee, living 
in the west of Amman and studying in London, while a matter of pride for some, for 
others made them view me in an exceptional sense that placed me in an outsider status 
rather than insider who shares several statuses with the women interviewed.  
 
I tried to escape this exceptional status. I have always rejected this kind of a stance 
from wealthy women, so I was surprised to be viewed in this way by a Palestinian 
community, as it is part of stereotypes that portray refugees with limited capacities in 
terms of education and work qualifications. However, for some people who still live 
in the area, those who left the camp because of changing positions are no longer 
insiders as they used to be. Even if those people are their sons, cousins, close 
neighbours or relatives, in any of the cases, as soon as they leave the camp, they were 
seen as having a different status. What changes their status is that they become remote 
from the daily details that constitute the meaning of being from a camp or a 
Palestinian community, which includes sharing suffering and enjoyment, engaging in 
solidarity activities or even in disputes and conflicts among people in the area. So it 
was not enough that I was recalling moments of joy and suffering as long as I was no 
longer living these details and they only constituted my past not present, the 
insiderness status was in question. Between past and present, my identity has become 
a matter of discussion that on different occasions placed me in an outsider status.  
 
My present set of statuses also did not qualify me to be an insider when I was 
interviewing women in the west of Amman. Being well-educated, having a good 
career, and living in West Amman were statuses that were not adequate to make 
middle-class and rich women perceive me as an insider. There are other inscribed 
affiliations that are more pivotal in determining who you are as a person in these 
communities: family name, origin, and where you were raised and studied. Therefore, 
the past-inscribed statuses surpass over any present-achieved statuses. While in Hai 
al-Nadhaif my past was not the issue of discussion and more questions were related to 
the present, while in west Amman questions related to my past were more related to 
define me as an outsider.  
 
In one of my interviews with a woman from a wealthy Palestinian family in Al-Rabia 
in west Amman, the elderly mother of the daughter I was interviewing asked me, after 
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her daughter introduced us, “Where are you from? Where do you live?” I replied, “I 
am from Hebron. I live in Tel’a al-Ali.” She immediately said: “Where did you live 
before that” I answered, “I lived in Baqa’a camp.” She looked at her daughter and 
said: “If people tell you they live in these new areas of Amman ask them directly 
where they have lived before. These areas are new and mixed they do not reveal the 
origin of the person.” I smiled and asked her: “Where did you live before, Al-Rabia is 
a new area, is not it?” She replied: “We were living in Jabal al-Hussein but so many 
people from the Hussein camp moved nearby and started making troubles so it 
became uncomfortable for us to stay there.” The daughter was very embarrassed by 
her mother’s comment about refugees and tried to make amends by saying: “Not all 
refugees are troublemakers. We had a neighbour who used to live in a camp. She was 
very well-educated and her kids were very well-mannered.” Again, the exceptional 
sense meant you are neither part of the past, nor fully part of your present, but 
somehow you are a combination of the two, a matter that shows there is no clear cut 
rule of how people can perceive the researcher in an insider or outsider sense.  
 
Merton’s critique of the insider / outsider dichotomy is that it presupposes that 
researchers in social structures cannot be located differently in terms of one social 
status, a single category, or one group affiliation, or even of several categories. Such a 
presupposition “neglects the crucial fact of social structure that individuals have not a 
single status but a status set.” By changing situations, Merton suggests that 
researchers “activate differing statuses in the status set.”144 His analysis here 
corresponds with the question of present and past set of statuses that transformed my 
thinking about my positionality. I believe that in the west and east areas of Amman, I 
was neither an absolute insider nor a total outsider. The realisation of my new position 
was a turning point in my fieldwork. When I was working with women at the JWU 
Aid Centre, my status as a director of the centre was the main issue of concern for 
women, not any other achieved or inscribed sets of statuses. Thus, for years, I escaped 
the social categorisation because of my powerful position within the organisation. In 
my fieldwork, the story was different, I was in women’s territories, and women 
determined the time, the location, and the period we spent in the interview. The power 
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dynamic was different and thus the questions and interests of women had to be 
answered first in order to gain their trust.  
 
Their trust, then, was built upon questioning my identity. Activating certain statuses 
and deactivating others while I was interviewing women helped in distinguishing my 
experiences from those of the women interviewees. The recognition of the diversity of 
my research participants and their definition of my position as insider or outsider was 
eye-opening in the sense that features that placed me as an outsider created a different 
type of awareness of the interviews’ context and surroundings, which sharpened my 
observation of details that I otherwise could have perceived as normal if I had 
continued to assume the status of the insider researcher.  
Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis is organised in six chapters. Chapter 1 frames the research in the 
introduction. In Chapter 2, I examine wilaya over women in contemporary Jordanian 
Personal Status Laws, first in broad terms and then particularly as it relates to the 
gender relationships within the state institutions of law, religion, and tribal customary 
laws and practices. I discuss how the adopted interpretations of fiqh (Muslim 
jurisprudence) in the JPSL, that is, judges’ convictions of what wilaya means and 
entails, have constituted an important basis for the construction of normative 
femininity. The chapter also explores the contradictory and discrepant landscape of 
the wilaya system, and shows how state legal institutions respond to women’s legal 
disputes over matters related to wilaya differently and based on women’s tribal and 
class status  
 
Chapter 3 examines women’s attitudes and forms of femininity by scrutinising how 
women view themselves within the discourse of wilaya and the restrictions it imposes. 
The chapter challenges the general notion that education, class, and secularism are the 
main factors providing women with the tools to challenge normative femininity and / 
or wilaya. Rather, it proposes to complicate and go beyond this classic understanding 
to show how women enact and perceive normative femininity in countless ways, 
regardless of their backgrounds or beliefs. It sheds light on three particular ways 
through which women perceive their femininity: a compliance with normative 
femininity, a pragmatic view, where the perception of the Self and practices are often 
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at odds, and finally, an exceptional view where femininity is masculinised and seen as 
an exception from the norm.  
 
In Chapter 4, I examine the ways in which wilaya disciplinary measures and methods 
influence women’s everyday practices, as well as whether these practices offer sites 
of compliance or contestation, sometimes both, to male authority. I discuss how the 
tactics developed by women are influenced by and affect women’s status within the 
wilaya system. The chapter makes a distinction between women’s strategies that are 
determined in conjunction with women’s perceptions of normative femininity and 
tactics that are developed in a timely manner and in relation to available 
opportunities. It also examines the entwined relationship of women’s strategies and 
tactics, and the ways in which tactics that could appear to be in agreement with 
normative femininity can rather be part of a strategy to achieve autonomy.   
 
Chapter 5 deals with the particular case of women who are prisoners in what is called 
“protective custody.” I examine the interconnection of wilaya over women with the 
state’s perceptions of women who reject their family’s orders as being in need of 
correction and rehabilitation, and how the state situates women’s protection within the 
framework of male authority and the interests of the family and the tribe. I discuss 
several cases of women in the Women’s Correction and Rehabilitation Centre / 
Jwaidah Jail to examine the state’s response to those who seek autonomous decisions 
related to marriage, divorce, inheritance rights, and mobility. I show how the process 
of jailing women sums up the ways in which the legal and social powers of wilaya 
over women are given priority over the safety and well-being of women. I offer my 
conclusions in Chapter 6.  
 	  
55	  	  
Chapter 2 
Wilaya Over Women and the Construction of Femininity 
	  
Introduction	  
At the Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU) Shelter, I met Amani. Amani was 13 years 
old. When I saw her I asked Mukarram Odeh, the director of the JWU shelter, “What 
is she doing here? She is a child.” Mukarram replied: “I know but we have to have her 
here. Her grandfather does not want her. He refuses to permit Amani to live with her 
mother or give custody, he wanted her in jail.”145 Amani’s story, as she narrates, 
involves her father who has a mental disability, and her grandfather who has 
guardianship and custody rights over her. Amani looks like her mother, who left her 
father when she was six months old and later married another man. Her father’s 
family accused the mother of being responsible for Amani’s father’s mental disability. 
As Amani has her mother’s skin and hair colour, the family rejected her. From an 
early age, Amani has lived bearing the responsibility of her mother’s departure. As 
she was growing up, her grandfather kept reminding her that she would be punished 
for what her mother did.  
 
Amani was totally empathic with her mother’s actions: “My dad was ill. I do not think 
she could have survived living with him, he is mentally disabled.”146 Amani’s mother 
tried to have Amani live with her, but the grandfather was against it. Also, according 
to the Jordanian Personal Status Laws, Amani’s mother forfeited her custody rights by 
getting remarried. The grandfather is from a very influential tribe, and so managed to 
obtain custody of Amani despite her maternal grandmother asking for custody. 
According to the Jordanian Personal Status Laws (JPSL), when a woman remarries, 
her mother comes second in custodial rights.  
 
When Amani was 13, her grandfather wanted to engage her to his grandson, Amani’s 
cousin. “I felt, it would be the end of my life. I was so frightened and decided to leave 
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the house.”147 Amani knew if she went to her mother’s house, her grandfather would 
find her, so she decided to go to one of her friends’ houses. The family of her friend 
called Amani’s grandfather, who came with Amani’s uncle to bring her back home. 
“When I saw them I was very scared. I started running in the street. My uncle caught 
me and started beating me. My friend’s family intervened and took me back inside the 
house.”148 Amani stayed three days at her friend’s house until the police came to bring 
her back to her grandfather’s house. At the police station, the grandfather refused to 
take Amani and asked the police to send her to the jail. As Amani recounted, “My 
grandfather told the police: ‘I want her to be punished so next time she does not think 
of running away’.”149 The police referred the case to the governor, who ordered 
Amani to go to the Al-Khansa Centre, a prison for female young offenders. 
 
It was striking that the governor sent Amani to Al-Khansa rather than one of the child 
abuse centres. I asked Amani if she knew the reason, and she told me that one of the 
police officers told the governor to send her to Dar Al-Aman, a safe house for 
children. The governor, according to Amani, replied: “This is a different case.”  The 
reply is meaningful to understanding the grandfather’s reasons and why the governor 
agreed that Amani is not abused by the system but is, rather, an abuser and should be 
punished. Also, it shows that there is agreement between the governor and heads of 
households, particularly when they come from an influential tribe. 
 
The family of Amani’s friend informed the Family Protection Department (FPD) 
about Amani’s case. The FPD had Amani removed from Al-Khansa and sent her to 
the Reconciliation House (the national shelter for women). When the grandfather 
learned that Amani was no longer in Al-Khansa, he threatened the shelter’s manager 
and they relocated her. They sent Amani to the JWU’s shelter, as its location is 
unknown, where she was enrolled at school and now feels she is getting her life back.  
 
When I interviewed Amani, she was very determined to continue her education. She 
told me she would not accept any marriage offers unless she had finished university. 
On my next visit to Jordan, I asked Mukarram about Amani. Mukarram told me that 	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Amani’s mother came to the shelter and asked to take her for the weekend: “Amani 
did not come back as had been agreed with her mother. We called the mother and she 
told us that: ‘The problem with Amani’s grandfather is solved, there is no need for her 
to stay at your centre.’”150 Apparently, the problem was solved at the expense of 
Amani’s plans for the future. She was engaged to a cousin who lives in Dubai. A few 
weeks later, Amani got married and travelled to Dubai with her husband.  
 
This is not an ordinary case; it is very rare that a grandfather asks for the 
imprisonment of his grandchild. What is not unique about the case, however, is the 
judicial system’s recognition of the grandfather’s right, as her wali, to request 
Amani’s imprisonment. What is also not exceptional is that the legal system is 
constructed as an entity that secures and legitimates wilaya over women. Muslim 
family law provisions, which do not often work in women’s favour in many Arab 
countries – such as regulating polygyny, dower and divorce – are well studied and 
documented in feminist literature.151 However, feminists’ approaches have addressed 
such discriminations in family laws by exhibiting how these laws discriminate against 
women,152 or by proposing reinterpretation of Quranic verses from a feminist lens.153 
Few approaches, however, have examined the ways in which family law constructs 
and defines gender roles.154 I agree with this analysis and aim to take it a further step 
through my examination of wilaya over women, as one of the core provisions of 
family law, to show that this provision aims to construct masculinity and femininity, 
which in turn has implications on gender roles and relations.  
 
In this chapter, I examine wilaya over women in contemporary Jordanian Personal 
Status Laws, firstly, in broad terms; I shed light on the logic and interpretations of 
fiqh pertaining to wilaya over women and the existing representation of this logic in 
wilaya provisions in the JPSL, judges’ perceptions of women, and their understanding 
of women’s guardianship. I draw on scholars who researched interpretations of wilaya 
in fiqh literature, whether that of Islamic or feminist scholars. I then map out the ways 
in which fiqh interpretations of wilaya correspond to the state’s epistemological 	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political project and are, thus, used as a justification to produce and naturalise a 
specific knowledge aimed at maintaining women’s subordinate position.  
 
Finally, I examine the implication of wilaya over women in practice, which treats 
them as legal minor subjects, by discussing four shared motives beyond the rationale 
of provisions of wilaya provided by judges of shari’a courts, tribal sheikhs and policy 
makers, who perceive wilaya from a viewpoint of gender difference: as a protection 
mechanism for women; a way of compensating for women’s perceived lack of 
rationality; a way of ensuring family and community interests; and a mechanism that 
responds to ‘misbehaved’ and ‘bad-mannered’ women. By examining whether wilaya 
in the JPSL impacts the production and constructions of normative femininity, it is 
possible to show whether its primary intent is to perpetuate women’s subordinate 
positions in relation to men. 
	  
The	  Construction	  of	  the	  Ideal	  Feminine	  in	  the	  Fiqh	  Interpretation	  	  
The definition of wilaya in most of fiqh literature is: “The legal authority vested in a 
person who is fully qualified and competent to safeguard the interests and rights of 
another who is incapable of doing so independently.” The word wilaya is defined as 
“the carrying through of a decision affecting a third party whether the latter wishes or 
not.”155 In this definition, wilaya means complete authority over a person regardless 
of that person’s opinion. The “carrying through of a decision” is equivalent to 
indicating power over another person’s decision. In holding such a meaning, wilaya 
notably signifies the power of someone over another without the consent of those who 
must submit.   
 
In fiqh literature, wilaya is used to mean al-sulta – signifying power, ability, and force 
– for those who hold responsibility over others;156 it has both moral and material 
implications as it embraces the enforcing aspects of power. The pertinent point here is 
the capability and incapability of persons, which determines who is the guardian and 
who should be under guardianship.   	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 156 Syafiq Hasyim, 2006. Understanding Women in Islam: An Indonesian Perspective, Solstice 
Publishing: 103. 
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In the two definitions, wilaya is depicted as a type of power, as the term used is: 
“legal authority over.” This understanding shares with the first the obligatory aspect 
of wilaya, that it is not optional, and that those identified as incapable should not be 
allowed to freely choose what is right for them. Furthermore, it has legal authority, 
which means guardianship is enforced by law in cases of disobedience. The fiqh 
literature assumes the power signified by wilaya to be vested in mature Muslim 
males. The meaning of being female is implicit in the second part of the definition, 
namely, “incapable”, “dependent”, “irrational” or “having some sort of deficiency.” 
These characteristics were seen as the basis for wilaya over women, as they are 
related to fitrat al-mara’ah (naturally created inclination of women), which is 
grounded in God’s will of creating women with different biology than men and inborn 
inclinations that do not qualify them to have control and authority over themselves. 
The logic of fitrah then assumes that there are specific biological features of men and 
women, which God has created in each differently, and found within his/her natural 
tendency to like and dislike what contradicts these acts. Consequently, for women to 
have, or demand, wilaya over themselves is against the natural disposition of women, 
which is, in turn, against the will of God and against women’s natural tendency to 
accept this authority.	  	  
The phrase ‘wilaya over women’ is not mentioned in the Quran,157 which is the 
primary source of Muslim laws.158 The two hadiths (reported sayings of prophet 
Muhammad) cited by the four Sunni schools of thought state, respectively: “There is 
no marriage without a wali and two witnesses” and “The marriage of any woman who 
married without the permission of her guardian is null and void.”159 There are other 
Quranic verses cited, but these do not explicitly mention wilaya over women, such as 
the verse relating to qiwama (husbands’ authority over wives).160 The expression of 
“no marriage without a wali” has been interpreted by scholars like Zaydan, a senior 
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scholar of Islamic fiqh whose books are widely read and cited, as a powerful linguistic 
indicator of the invalidity of a marriage without a wali.161 
 
Looking again at the issue of capability in the definition, one sees two categories: the 
wali (guardian), who is the “fully qualified” person; and the person under 
guardianship, the “incapable” person, the person who lacks the capacities to be 
recognised as a full legal person. The characteristics of the wali in the four Sunni 
schools of thought, according to Uthman (1995), are conditioned by being a mature, 
sane Muslim male.162 Being a male is the first condition for a person to serve as a 
guardian – according to Zaydan, “masculinity reflects integrity” in the fiqh and is an 
essential condition for wilaya over other persons. It is deemed that males who have 
reached the age of maturity have recognised personalities, no guardianship is required 
over their decisions and, hence, they can serve as guardians of others. On the other 
hand, the Hanafi school differs from the Shafi’i, Hanbali and Maliki schools in 
recognising certain circumstances in which women can be guardians,163 while the 
three other schools reject female guardians regardless of their age or status. As 
Zaydan stated in his analysis of wilaya in the fiqh, “as women are under male 
guardianship how they can be guardians of others?” The power signified by wilaya is 
seen as only to be held by males. In this view, females signify the other part of the 
definition, coded as “incapable”, “dependent” “irrational” or “having some sort of 
deficiency”. 
 
The word wali is used in the Quran in the plural (awliya’) to describe those who are 
close to God. In some instances in the Quran, awliya’ is used to describe both men 
and women:  
The believers, men and women, are protectors, one of another: they enjoin 
what is just and forbid what is evil: they observe regular prayers, practise 
regular charity, and obey God and his Apostle. On them will God pour his 
mercy: for God is exalted in power, wise. (Surah al-Toubeh: 17) 
  
The statement “protectors, one of another” is the translation of the statement in the 
original Arabic text “awliya’, one of another.” However, when I interviewed Sheikh 	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Sartawi, the head of Sweileh Shari’a Court in Amman, he made a distinction between 
men and women in his interpretation of this Surah. While he sees men are to enjoin 
good and forbid evil in public life, he sees that women were ordered to enjoin good 
and forbid evil only amongst other women or in their households,164 although this is 
not mentioned in the verse. He further argued:  
This verse came in a time of sedition (fetnah), when the hypocrites tried to 
seduce Muslims and take them away from their faith. So God brought it to 
ensure that all Muslims regardless of their sex support each other. The 
context of the Surah is clear and we cannot assume that women were given 
the role of a wali in this Surah.165  
 
In the interpretations of Islamic fiqh, there are three grounds for a person to be placed 
under wilaya: in the cases of minority, insanity, and the state of being female.166 This 
gendered precondition was expressed in some of the schools’ literature as “females 
being inexperienced people who need care and protection.”167 According to Abu 
Zahra, an influential Egyptian scholar in the field of contemporary Islamic studies, in 
cases of minority the wilaya over a person ends when the person is matured.168 If the 
reason for wilaya over a person is insanity, given the state of insanity was 
intermittent, wilaya then expires at the end of the state of madness; wilaya is only 
required when the madness is present and should disappear in the case of the demise 
of insanity. For the state of being female, wilaya over women should be continuous as 
long as the female is not able to protect herself from deviation – in terms of wilaya 
over women in marriage, there would be no end as men’s marital guardianship over 
women is deemed not just to be in the interest of women but in the interest of the 
community as a whole. Wilaya over women, for Abu Zahra, protects the community 
from any deviation that might be caused by women’s irrational behaviour.  
 
In fiqh, there are two types of wilaya: wilaya ‘ala al-nafs (power over oneself), which 
is the issue of concern for this research, and wilaya ala al mal (power over wealth). 
The Maliki school also recognises two kinds of wilaya: ‘ala al-nafs: wilaya amma 	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(general) and wilayat al-jabir (guardianship of compulsion), the latter is accorded by 
the Maliki school to the father and grandfather only. The second type of wilaya is the 
amma (general), which is practised by any Muslim man. This general wilaya is only 
used when a woman has no male relatives, so she can assign any Muslim man to be 
her wali. According to the Maliki school, general wilaya can also be used when a 
woman has no beauty or wealth.169 The Shafi’is agree with the Maliki school about 
general wilaya but differ concerning the question of who has the right of wilayat al-
jabir: they see the father as the only person who has complete authority over a female, 
while the grandfather and other male agnates have wilayat al-ikhtiyar (wilaya with 
consultation or choice).170 
 
The Hanafis accorded this authority to a range of male relatives in marriage, but the 
ward could seek dissolution of her marriage once she reached puberty (khiyar al-
bulugh) if married by anyone other than her father or grandfather.	   For the Hanafi 
school, wilaya al-jaber is lawful only in cases of minority.171 Any competent person, 
male or female, should be capable to decide on their marriage and should not be given 
in marriage without his or her consent. The Shafi’i school holds the view contrary to 
the Hanafi: wilaya of compulsion is applicable when the woman is a virgin, regardless 
of her age.172 For the Maliki, wilaya of compulsion is considered either in cases of 
virginity or youth. For Shafi’i, a thayyib (a divorced or widowed woman who has had 
sexual intercourse) regardless of her age can get married by her own will, but only 
with the consent of her guardian. The Hanafi school does not condone wilaya of 
compulsion for women of full legal capacity. 
 
There are two pieces of evidence from the Quran and hadiths brought by scholars of 
the Hanafi school that counter wilayat al-jaber over a woman of legal age: “...then do 
not prevent them from marrying their husbands if they have mutually agreed to it” 
(Surat al-Baqarah 2:232)173 and “Any ayam174 has more authority over him / herself 
than his / her guardian”.175 Some examples were also brought as evidence, such as the 	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woman Leila Bint El-Khatim, who came to Muhammad and asked to marry him.176 
Such evidence was not enough for the other three schools that stipulated wilaya over 
women as a condition of a valid marriage.  
 
Nonetheless, the Hanafi school recognises the right of the wali for the purpose of 
ensuring a suitable and equal match (kafa’a): though a woman can conclude her 
marriage in case of maturity, the wali can oppose or dissolve the marriage if it does 
not meet the kafa’a conditions.177 The requirement of kafa’a, which largely concerns 
social class and wealth, is only applied to the man, not to the woman: 
Kafa’a was a one-way street in the sense that the requirement of suitability 
could only be applied to a groom; the jurists assumed that a woman’s 
marriage to a man of a lower status would lead to her degradation but her 
marriage to a man of higher status would raise her to his level.178   
 
This also affirms the subordinate status of women within the interpretation of fiqh that 
assumes women follow the status of their husbands. It is also a matter related to class 
arrangements, as Mona Siddiqui posited, and of keeping wealth within particular 
groups in society, as women’s inheritance could lead to a change of the social 
hierarchy and structure.179   
 
The different interpretations of wilaya over women by Muslim jurists have been 
justified on the basis of presumed gender differences and, therefore, “the doctrine of 
wilaya is a social construction.”180 Men and women in fiqh literature are treated based 
on the “two sex model”, almost as two different species.181  In this view, sex 
difference not only determines men and women but also, in Toril Moi’s words, 
“Everything the person touches….Every habit, gesture, and activity is sexualised and 
categorised as male or female, masculine or feminine”.182 In this sense, the sex 
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dichotomy of male/female in fiqh literature aims to produce and construct different 
connotations of the feminine and masculine as opposites.183  	  
Can Different Interpretations Work for Women?	  
The divergent interpretations among the four Sunni schools have been, for the last 
few decades, the focus of feminists to demonstrate how religion was [ab]used to 
legitimise state authority, for different political purposes in different contexts.184 A 
basic argument often made by Islamic feminists, such as Ahmed (1992), is that 
women’s equality is recognised within Islam, and that women are dignified, protected 
and empowered in Islamic principles.185 The domination of male interpretation as 
presented in the fiqh, they argue, is behind all the injustices and practices of 
discrimination against women.186 Ziba Mir-Hosseini (1997) posits that it is not 
shari’a law that does not do justice to women in courts it is rather the conservative 
interpretations of shari’a law. In her book Marriage on Trial: A Study of Family Law, 
she examines family law cases from Iran and Morocco between 1985 and 1989. She 
argues that women used the law effectively and developed strategies to make the law 
serve their advantages within shari’a laws in Iran. Mir-Hosseini further posits that 
when the law is fully based on the shari’a, as in the case of Iran, women were able to 
achieve their rights to financial maintenance, claim divorce, and annul marriages 
made against their will.  
 
However, the arguments of Mir-Hosseini, while putting an emphasis on women’s 
legal empowerment in the shari’a-based courts, has not shown clearly whether such 
an empowerment has any significant weight in changing the structural unequal gender 
power relations in the society. This is not to suggest that women’s manoeuvring 
within the shari’a courts and the opportunity such experiences give to women through 
developing strategies and tactics to achieve their rights within family is without 
significance, but rather whilst it could empower individual women it has no 
transformative power, as wilaya over women establishes mechanisms of control 
through the adoption of normative femininity. Changes at the level of individual lives 	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of women is not enough, there is a need to challenge the entire essentialist masculine 
discourse through unmasking and challenging these basic concepts that subordinate 
women and place them in an inferior position.  
 
Claiming possible women’s rights from within Islamic traditions is seen by Kandiyoti 
as only going in one of two directions: “denying that Islamic practices are necessarily 
oppressive,” or “asserting that oppressive practices are not necessarily Islamic.”187 To 
ask for an interpretation of shari’a from a feminist perspective would not challenge 
the established natural biological account of women in the fiqh interpretation  or  the 
current state’s approach of marginalising and discriminating against women under the 
claim of culture and religion. The examination of different interpretations of Islamic 
schools of thoughts related to wilaya over women show that although there are 
differing viewpoints pertaining to women’s guardianship, all schools of thought 
ultimately agree on the principle of the necessity to supervise women’s decisions 
because of women’s nature. It is women’s biological destiny. The use of shari’a as a 
source for legislating women’s rights then limits women to the categorised sex model 
that addresses women as minor subjects. 
 
The recent development in Jordan regarding the testimony of unveiled women is a 
good example that shows judges’ interpretation of shari’a is based on their 
understanding and views on women. In March 2014, the Shari’a Court of Appeal 
accepted a lawyers’ objection of a Shari’a court’s decision that divorced a couple 
based on a testimony of unveiled woman. The Court of Appeal adopted the statement 
of the lawyer that was based on a fatwa, which deems any woman who is not wearing 
the hijab as a ‘slut’ and thus her testimony in the court is void. The Court only found 
basis for this fatwa in the introduction of the book of sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who 
is an Egyptian Islamic Theologian. The Court’s decision included a statement that 
“the fairness and honesty of the testimony will be affected if women are not wearing 
el-hijab.”188 The House of Ifta’ (the official department for issuing religious opinions 
in Jordan) issued a statement saying that they will not have an opinion in this matter 
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in order to preserve the independence and justice of the judicial system.189 By this, 
state’s opinion represented by the House of Ifta’ has not just condoned the decision of 
the Court of Appeal but also paved the way for other judges to follow and, more 
dangerously, for the use of extreme religious opinions in the Jordanian shari’a courts.  
The discussion of judges’ understanding and perceptions of wilaya, to which I shall 
return in greater detail, will also show that judges will use all available interpretations 
at their disposal to maintain the subordinate position of women, whether under the 
claim of women’s interests, protections, or irrationality, which are found in the fiqh 
literature either under the justification of women’s dependency as in the Maliki, 
Shafi’i and Hanbali schools, or under the claim of kafa’a in the Hanafi school.  
 
Laws	  on	  Wilaya	  over	  Women	  and	  the	  Construction	  of	  Femininity	  
Discriminatory provisions against women in Personal Status Laws – such as 
polygyny, dower, and divorce – are well studied and documented in feminist 
literature. A wide variety of literature suggests that the codification of Muslim family 
law in the Middle East, which was first based on the Ottoman Law of Family Rights 
of 1917, 190  was the process through which women’s rights were limited and 
controlled. Before this time, qadis (judges) had the authority to use different 
interpretations of their adopted school of thought. 191 Tucker (1999) discusses how the 
qadis, during this period, were more flexible in interpreting shari’a, before its 
codification in the Ottoman Law of 1917. She shows how women within such a 
flexible context benefited by achieving some rights that were not clearly defined in 
the shari’a. Moors also sees that such flexibility led to integrating local customs not 
seen as incompatible with Islam, which, in some circumstances, also favoured women 
over men in the court rooms.192 Messick (1992) and Tucker (2008) also argued that 
before codification, shari’a laws were characterised by flexibility and fluidity. This 
does not, however, mean that Islamic laws were not patriarchal and favoured men 
over women, it rather means that there was a space for women to manoeuvre, as the 	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relationship between the qadis and individuals was not rigidly governed by specific 
texts and interpretations.193  
 
Asma M. Abdel Halim (2011) argues that religious norms and rules in relation to 
women were not accommodated by the legal system, rather the state has used religion 
and given a legal authority to the interpretation of fiqh (and manipulation of that 
interpretation) in order to accommodate cultural values:  
The vast differences in family law legislation in Muslim countries indicate 
that shari’a is neither immutable nor divine. They further indicate that 
Islamic legal systems are mainly produced to accommodate local cultures and 
power relations.194  
 
Mounira Charrad, in her book States and Women's Rights: The Making of 
Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (2001), shows how state formulation 
within intersectional structural forces (colony, tribe, religion) generated different 
trajectories of women’s rights in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. She posits that it is 
the “political origin of state policies”195 and formulation that determined the “fate of 
family law.”196 She states: “the choices embodied in each new Code of Personal 
Status or family Code were an outcome of the structure of political power in each 
society.”197 By this, she challenges the cultural explanation of the discriminatory 
provisions of PSLs, where discrimination is based on religion or the society’s culture. 
Therefore, as Kandiyoti suggests, “the nationalist histories of states and their politics 
of national identity can shed considerable light on the nature and transformation of 
gender regimes.”198 
 
In the case of Jordan, as discussed in Chapter 1, the adoption of a family law with 
shari’a as its main source was a mechanism through which the regime, in cooperation 
with the British colonisers, intended to attain its legitimacy and unite different 
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identities of Bedouins under a collective, masculine, national identity.199 It was also a 
way in which the regime, which was perceived as a product of colonialism, aimed to 
interlink Jordan’s national identity with the Arab masculine discourse of nationalism, 
which used women to preserve cultural authenticity. The law here, as Massad (2001) 
posits, “is not a mere repressive manifestation of the political, but it also plays a 
central productive, albeit regulatory, role: it produces and regulates identity.”200 By 
this, Massad suggests that the culture of the Jordanian people is invented through the 
codification of a masculinised national identity. There are several manifestations of 
this identity in the law, such as the treatment of women married to non-Jordanian men 
as foreigners in the nationality law until 1987, voting and candidate’s rights only 
being given to men in the electoral law of 1961, and the superiority and authority of 
men over women in the JPSL of 1951. Despite many reforms made to the JPSL in 
1974, 2002, and 2010, this masculine authority continues unchanged.  
 
The JPSL is based on the interpretation of the Hanafi school. However, in relation to 
wilaya over women, the law has adopted the Maliki school’s interpretation, which, as 
discussed, is more restrictive and stipulates that the wali’s concluding of a marriage 
on behalf of his female ward is a condition for the validity of the marriage. The 2010 
JPSL’s section three on guardianship in marriage, Article 14, states: “The wali in 
marriage is according to the order of al-­‐`asaba	   (males of direct blood relatives) as 
established by Hanafi school.” Conditions set for the wali to perform guardianship in 
marriage in Article 15 are: sound mind, maturity, and Islam. Article 15 does not 
mention being male as a precondition for performing the role of wali in marriage, 
(neither was it mentioned clearly in Article 14) it, however, requires the wali to be a 
Muslim only if the fiancée is a Muslim.  
 
Whilst Jordan has adopted the Maliki school’s interpretation regarding wilaya over 
women, it has embraced the Hanafi principle of kafa’a in Article 21 (a) of the JPSL of 
2010. The two grounds for suitability as stipulated in this article are: religiosity and 
financial ability to pay the dower and wife’s maintenance. The kafa’a condition of 
religiosity, as Sheikh Fadi Alawaishh, a judge of West Amman Shari’a Court, 
justified, is related to the number of divorce cases and mistreatment of women based 	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on the lack of faith and understanding of religion.201 However, it was not clear how a 
father would prove that a man is unsuitable for his daughter based on the groom’s 
level of religiosity; for example, whether the groom prays, fasts, and generally 
adheres to roles perceived to be Islamic.  
 
The vagueness of such a condition is meant to give more power to fathers, and other 
guardians, as it could be explained and demonstrated differently. The right of the 
father to petition the dissolution of his daughter’s marriage based on unsuitability – 
regardless of whether he previously agreed to the marriage or not – is overruled only 
if the woman is pregnant or if the father has known about the marriage for more than 
three months. This combination of different Islamic schools of jurisprudence 
demonstrates how the Jordanian state’s legal and religious institutions can pick and 
choose from within shari’a that which best suits their objectives.  
 
The JPSL allows women to conclude their marriages in cases when they have 
previously been married, as Article 19 stipulates: “The agreement of the wali is not a 
requirement in the marriage of a thayyib woman of sound mind who is above eighteen 
years of age.”202 Also, in cases when the wali has no legitimate reason for objecting to 
the marriage, the judge can allow the marriage to be concluded if a woman raises a 
case in court claiming her father’s objections to her marriage are illegitimate (Article 
18 PSL 2010). However, as in the case of Palestine discussed by Welchman,203 
women rarely manage to represent themselves in marriage and make use of these 
legal articles.  
 
Lynn Welchman, in her article “A Husband’s Authority: Emerging Formulations in 
Muslim Family Laws”, suggests that “legal postulates” contribute to areas of law 
without specifically being mentioned in the laws’ provisions, and “they may be 
difficult to disentangle from the overall web of relationship structure.”204 In this 
sense, Welchman posits that concepts such as of qiwama and wilaya do not 
necessarily stand alone in the law, but rather epitomise or inform other law 	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provisions. The story of Amani confirms that civil and shari’a laws intersect around 
the notions of women and men and the identified roles for both within these notions. 
Wilaya over women, then, also impacts on women’s other rights beyond choice of 
spouse and authority over children. It is also necessary to differentiate between two 
sets of laws: there are laws that have a role of construction – like provisions of wilaya 
– and laws that are meant to reproduce and maintain gender roles. Therefore, we must 
examine the absolutely intertwined relationship between the two forms of laws.   
 
There are different examples of how men’s authority over women impacts marital 
relationships and the organised roles of men and women in the JPSL. One clear 
example are the conditions that men and women can add to the marriage contract in 
accordance with Article 37 (a). While conditions women add to the marriage contract 
can grant them some rights to exercise after marriage – like the right to work, continue 
education, and not to relocate – either to a new city or country – after marriage – this is only 
possible if these rights are explicitly stipulated as conditions in the marriage contract. 
In this way, the law establishes that these rights are tied to men’s acceptance and 
authority, unless women have made specific, agreed-upon conditions in the marriage 
contract men have no obligation to respect women’s choices of work, education, and 
place of residence.  
 
Furthermore, the conditions women can demand in the marriage contract are related 
to themselves, but the conditions men can make, by law, are related to women not 
themselves; examples include, not allowing one’s wife to work or requiring her to 
move to another country. In cases where women have not submitted to these 
conditions, they may lose their rights to maintenance and compensation.	   
 
Another example is that of child custody provisions, which grant women the right to 
custody (child custody is limited to care taking of the child in terms of meeting his/her 
needs of food, cleaning, etc.) as they are deemed more suitable than men for 
childcare. The right of custody is given first to mothers and then to grandmothers. 
Paragraph (c) of Article 173 in the 2010 PSL of Jordan states: “child custody can be 
granted to women for a longer time if the child is sick with an illness that needs the 
care of women unless it is otherwise in the ward’s interest.” Therefore, the extension 
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of the period of custody for women is conditional upon whether the child is still in 
need of care and services that can presumably be provided only by women.   
 
On the other hand, guardianship over children is vested in fathers and grandfathers.205 
Guardianship is related to decision-making and the representation of the child, which 
is deemed to be more appropriate for men than women. Article 170 of the 2010 JPSL 
places the father as fourth in the order of potential custodial parents of children, but 
first in the guardianship of the child in Article 223. As women are themselves under 
guardianship, the laws of guardianship over children deprive women of rights to 
guardianship; as Zaydan’s interpretation of fiqh literature indicated earlier, “(h)ow can 
someone who is not trusted to protect herself be reliable in protecting others?” 
 
Article 62 of the 2010 JPSL provides women with a legal basis to file for divorce if 
the case involves marital violence, physical or emotional, and defines disobedience 
(nushuz) as solely relating to cases of a wife abandoning the marital home for no 
legitimate cause. Though marital violence is recognised, the maintaining of concepts 
like nushuz reinforces the principle of wilaya over women, as the illicit cause may be 
going to work, university, or travelling without the permission of a husband or father. 
The affiliation that the law establishes between women’s nushuz and husbands’ 
financial maintenance, or as Welchman puts it “the formula of maintenance and 
disobedience,”206 defines gender roles within the family as women’s duty to obey and 
men’s duty to maintain financial matters.207 
 
These examples show how provisions of wilaya over women conceptualise a fixed 
model of femininity with an idealised image of women that constructs normative 
femininity. Such a model suggests not only that women’s secondary status is based on 
their nature (fitrah), but also that men’s authority over women stems from their bodily 
differences. By defining the ideal feminine and masculine based on natural 
inclinations of men and women, wilaya over women establishes gender identities and 
roles for both; this model creates conditions of dependency, where women have to 
seek the approval of a male relative in order to engage in many activities. Provisions 	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of wilaya over women are, thus, meant to maintain women’s subordinate positions in 
a way that appears intrinsic to the deemed nature of feminine characteristics. In other 
words, the normative construction of femininity in the JPSL is an essential condition 
for the reproduction of gender roles and the preservation of gender relationships. This 
is manifested and justified through the fixed models of feminine and masculine that, 
as Connell puts it: 
Express widespread ideals, fantasies, and desires. They provide models of 
relations with women and solutions to problems of gender relations. 
Furthermore, they articulate loosely with the practical constitution of 
masculinities as ways of living in every day local circumstances. To the 
extent they do this, they contribute to hegemony in the society-wide gender 
order as a whole.208 
	  
Judges’	  Perceptions	  of	  Wilaya	  over	  Women	  	  
The head of Sweileh Shari’a Court in Amman, Sheikh Ghaleb Al Sartawi, ended our 
interview by saying:  
If someone has a diamond jewel, and it is so expensive, would he who has 
such a jewel leave it for people to steal and to look at, or rather would he try 
to protect it? It is, for sure, that he will make all efforts to keep his jewel safe 
and beautiful. I guess this summarises our topic: we need to protect women 
because they are diamonds.209  
 
When Sheikh Sartawi explained the rationale behind wilaya in Jordan, he proposed 
three arguments. The first was related to the fitrah account, he supposed that women 
are less qualified than men in terms of mental and physical abilities, which is “God’s 
will of giving different characteristics to men and women.”210 His second argument 
was that wilaya is a symbolic measure of dignifying women in Islam; hence, the 
wali’s role is to ensure that women are protected from deviation. Third, he added that 
wilaya is not just about laws that organise people lives, it is also related to the stability 
of one’s community: “If women are left on their own they might take decisions that 
do not only affect them but rather might endanger the social relations of tribes.” 
Therefore, ensuring societal harmony is of the utmost importance, which is why, he 
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continued, “We [judges] need to make sure that women’s choice of marriage is not 
endangering our society’s values and rules.”211 
 
Sheikh Sartawi’s statements encapsulate the shared perceptions amongst judges with 
regards to wilaya provisions in the JPSL. Echoing the third point, another judge 
stated: “If women are left to their own devices they might take decisions that do not 
only affect them but might also endanger the social relations of the tribes in Jordan.” 
Ensuring the harmony of society is of utmost importance and keeping tight control 
over alliances, and the exchange of women in marriage, is seen as central to this 
harmony.  
 
This understanding is very much tied to discussion of women and national identity, 
where women are treated as followers rather than full-fledged citizens. Women’s 
dependent status in both the family law and nationality law places them in the 
position of foreigners. This status implies that a woman’s decisions, gestures, and 
activities must be supervised and authorised. Women’s subordinate status in the 
family law corresponds with the nationalised masculine identity. Family law, as 
Moors (2003) suggests, is “central to the reproduction of the social and cultural 
order.”212 The position of women within this order is tied to the established gender 
relations in the overall system of power relationships. This is why debates on reforms 
to family law or granting women equal rights have always shifted towards a 
discussion of national harmony – granting women equal rights is perceived as 
threatening the authentic national identity. The judges’ perceptions that I discuss next 
– in relation to claims of women’s irrationality, society’s interests, and protection of 
women from themselves – show that it is necessary to configure femininity as a 
secondary space in the law to maintain women’s subordinate position and justify the 
established gender roles and relations within law and culture.    
‘Women’s Irrationality’ and the Claim of Protection 
The six judges I interviewed in Amman’s shari’a courts justified laws on wilaya and 
other practices related to the presence of a wali by reasons of intrinsic difference 
between men and women. “It is God’s will to give women an emotional nature and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Ibid 
212 Annelies Moors, 2003. “Public Debates on Family Law Reform: Participants, Positions, and Styles 
of Argumentation in the 1990s” in Law and Society, Vol. 10, No 1 pp. 1-11: 2. 
74	  	  
men a rational one,” Sheikh Ghaleb Al Sartawi stated.213 The Head of West Amman 
Court, Sheikh Jamal Rahamneh, further said: “Wilaya is God’s way of perfecting a 
woman’s mind, by attaching her to that of a man’s, which also would protect her from 
herself and those who might try to deceive her.”214 These arguments, as both judges 
stated, are based on God-given features of men and women. By this, Sheikh 
Rahamneh continued: 
Women have the privilege of not being responsible for their actions. The 
biological nature of a woman does not qualify her to do so. The wali only 
serves women’s interests through his rational decisions. Wilaya should not be 
understood or used to control women’s choices, it is rather to direct women 
to the right ones.215   
 
In her analysis of the guardianship articles in the legislation of Arab states, Lynn 
Welchman comments: “The justification for continuing authority tends to be made in 
terms of protection of women against predatory and dishonest suitors, through 
involving the greater experience of men.”216 Welchman posits such an argument in 
accordance with legal analysis of amendments made to articles of wilaya in different 
Arab states, in which she shows that – despite some changes made in relation to 
forced and early marriages – most Arab states have not made any substantial changes 
to wilaya over women in the PSL. The only exceptions are Morocco (2004), where 
the father’s presence is considered as a third witness; Tunisia (1956), where in cases 
of minority the presence of the mother and father is required; and Algeria (2005), 
which stipulates the presence of the guardian is still required in particular 
circumstances.217 The restriction of women’s choice in marriage was justified – as 
Welchman discusses in the case of Palestine, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates – 
as being “primarily protective of women.”218  
 
Sheikh Ghaleb Al Sartawi referred to women’s protection when stating: “Men need to 
know that there are other men involved in the marriage, so in case they abuse the 
relationship with their wives and mistreat women, they are aware of the 
consequences.” He added, “Islam favours protecting women to the extent that men 	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will not take advantage of them, thus, wilaya over women serves as a tool to keep 
men in check.”219 Other judges interviewed also put major emphasis on the protective 
aspect of wilaya. Some argued that wilaya over women discourages divorce and 
mistreatment of women by their husbands, as Sheikh Ziad Arabiyat of the Shari’a 
Court of West Amman posited: “A man who knows that there is a family behind his 
wife will never divorce her or mistreat her, in cases of dispute with his wife he will 
resort to her family to assist.” This argument is self-defeating, as Jordan has one of 
the highest rates of divorce in the Arab region and statistics show that one in three 
married women in Jordan have, at least once, experienced physical violence by their 
husbands.220 This argument also means to keep women’s issues negotiated and 
managed through their families and tribes, rather than assigning the state a 
responsibility to combat violence against women and ensure their security and well-
being.  
 
This argument also does not explain why practices of wilaya over women extend to 
women’s choice of divorce, where judges commonly require the presence of the wali 
when women initiate a divorce case. This issue was justified by judges under the 
argument of protecting women from being deceived by their husbands. Ironically, the 
husband chosen by the experienced, wise wali can eventually be the one who is 
believed to mislead the wife. In the end, women’s choice of marriage or divorce 
should always be supervised, which is justified as providing protection from other 
men. The wali’s role, hence, is seen to ensure that a woman’s decision in marriage 
and divorce is rational.221  
 
Different interpretations brought by Abu Zahra and others – like Ibn Hazm222, 
Mohammed Rif’at Uthman, and Zaydan – are also in agreement with the preceding 
discussion; such interpretations also base wilaya on the female nature of being 
incapable of protecting herself. It is also because of the idea that the emotional nature 
is greater than the logical side of the female, and the wali’s role, consequently, is to 
protect the woman from her emotions and decide according to her best interests.223 As 	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Abdar-Rahman Doi puts it: “The overriding power of compulsion granted to the 
father in the Maliki school is a safety measure in the interest of the girl herself.”224 In 
Zaydan’s interpretation of the Hanafi school, which is totally agreed upon by the five 
judges in Amman, he argues that although Abu Hanifa allows the mature girl to 
conclude her marriage, it is preferable that she assigns her wali to do so on her behalf 
for reasons related to protecting women and shielding them from “vulgarity.”225 
 
The claim of women’s irrationality, which justifies the need for women’s protection, 
led some judges to conclude marriages for girls under 18 years old – according to the 
JPSL, this should only be done under very restrictive conditions – and in cases when 
the woman was clearly not in favour of the marriage. Salma, a woman I interviewed 
in Amman, said:  
I was 16 years old. I did not want to marry. When the judge asked for my 
consent to the marriage I remained silent. I could not say anything. My eyes 
were red and swollen as I cried for a week. The judge asked me once. When I 
did not reply he left and concluded the marriage. It was obvious that I was 
against the marriage. I wished he would come back and ask me one more 
time, or if he remained a longer time; I think it only took the judge a few 
seconds after he asked me and then he left the room.  
 
The judge, according to the law and shari’a, is required to ensure a woman’s full 
consent to the marriage, as a marriage without consent is void.226 However, on many 
occasions, they do not as they perceive women’s interests to be based on the family’s 
view. Therefore, judges’ perception of protection and the female’s supposed 
irrationality is very much interlinked with their understanding of interests, which I 
turn to next. 
The Claim of Women’s Interests  
Judges have noted that their decision is usually informed by women’s best interests. 
However, determining the interest of a woman does not mean that her views are taken 
into account, as demonstrated by the case of Salma and Amani; as explained earlier, 
Amani was imprisoned instead of her abusers being punished. This story also 
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involved concluding a marriage of a 13 year-old girl, where her best interests were 
based on her wali’s interests.  
 
Tahani Siam, who publically challenged laws on wilaya and shared her experience in 
the court with the media, shows how women’s interests were the last to be considered 
by judges of shari’a courts. Tahani explained her story and narrated how her ex-
husband brought a case to court for custody of the older girls, as they were 16 and 14. 
The court transferred custody to him, as their father. The girls refused to be with their 
father and, therefore, lost their right to financial maintenance according to the JPSL. 
The father then asked for a court decision to affirm his guardianship of his daughters, 
and requested from the shari’a court, accordingly, to ban his daughters’ travel without 
his permission.  
 
The request of the father is based on Article 184 of the PSL (2010), which stipulates:  
Subject to the provisions of the custody, the wali has the right to supervise 
the affairs of the ward, provide him / her with financial maintenance, choose 
the kind of education and its location, which should be in the same place of 
residence of the custodian, and ward shall not be moved from her/his 
residence without the consent of the custodian unless it is for the ward’s best 
interest.227 
 
The father is Palestinian and his daughters, according to the Jordanian citizenship law, 
could not obtain their mother’s Jordanian citizenship. After the older girl became 18, 
she received a scholarship to study in the United States, but could not travel as the ban 
was still in effect. The mother tried to challenge the shari’a court’s decision to ban 
her daughter from travel without the father’s permission, but it did not work. Tahani 
stated that the judge who was dealing with the case told her, “The father is the wali 
and knows better what is best for his daughter.” 228 
 
As the mother is from a wealthy family, she has managed to get her daughters into 
private university despite the father’s refusal to pay the fees, as he claimed in court 
that he would only pay if his daughter studied Islamic studies at the University of 
Hebron in Palestine. Tahani stated that she told the judge: “He wanted to control us. 
He is neither religious nor concerned about Islam.” The judge replied, as Tahani 	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recollected in our interview, “we can only legally bind him to pay what he can afford 
and what he realises as the best for his daughter.”229 Tahani tried to advocate for the 
judges to remove the travel ban using the Jordanian Women’s Union’s lawyers. 
Maram Maghalseh, the lawyer following Tahani’s case, stated: 
We have talked to different judges so Tahani’s daughter can be allowed to 
travel to continue her studies. The response from the judges was hostile and 
they have all emphasised that there is not a reason for her to travel without 
her father’s permission, even if this would be against the girl’s interests.230   
 
The travel ban on Tahani’s daughter, which applied to both travel for educational 
reasons and family vacations, made Tahani question her decision to divorce. At the 
end of the interview, Tahani stated: 
Sometimes I wish I had not asked for divorce so my daughters’ lives would 
have been less complicated, but then I know things would not have been 
better if we continued to live together. I also wish I had sons not daughters, 
so nothing stands against their future.231  
 
Tahani’s words confirm that wilaya over women, and the deprivation of women from 
having wilaya over their children, leaves no room for women to make free decisions 
related to her life or her children. Despite the fact that Tahani took responsibility for 
her children, including supporting them financially, she had no decision-making 
authority over her daughter’s very basic rights.   
 
Although Tahani is from a wealthy family, who stood beside her and supported her 
daughters, she and her daughters suffered a great deal from wilaya laws that deprive 
women of power over their children’s basic affairs, the vagueness of the statement of 
‘best interests’ in the law, and judges’ intolerant practices. Though Tahani did not 
succeed in achieving her goals, class was crucial in determining her ability to try to 
publically challenge the courts’ decisions and provide her daughters with the financial 
means to continue their education. She, however, could not challenge the status quo 
of the legal system, and thus her daughters remain banned from travelling. 
 
Lawyer Maram Maghalseh shared various legal cases of women from poor areas who 
were unable to get their children into schools or universities when the wali objected to 
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the location of the school or refused to pay university fees. She told me the story of a 
girl who was living with her mother, in her last year of school, and getting ready for 
university when her father took her to his house and concluded her marriage without 
her consent or her mother’s knowledge. Maram stated:  
When the mother objected the marriage, I went with her to take advice from a 
judge at the shari’a court. The judge told the mother: “you will realise, later, 
that what the father did is for the interest of your daughter, so you should not 
be complaining.”232 
  
She continued: “We talked to the girl to raise a case to annul the marriage, but the girl 
saw no point in doing so as her mother could not afford to pay her university fees, and 
if she had challenged her father he would not support her financially anymore.”233 I 
met with the mother, Mariam, in May 2012 at the Jordanian Women’s Union office in 
Amman. Mariam is only 36 years old. She refused to remarry after her husband 
divorced her, and she wanted her daughter to have a better future. 
I was 19 years old when I got divorced. My daughter was one year-old and I 
was afraid to lose her if I got married again. I had to challenge my family to 
reject all marriage offers. It was not easy. Each time, I had to remind my 
father of his mistake of concluding my marriage while I was 16. Sometimes, 
when the marriage offer was so good, I had to show the groom’s family that I 
had some sort of deficiency, like closing one eye all the time, or blinking 
rapidly.234  
 
Giving her life for her daughter was not enough for the judge to see Mariam’s 
viewpoint. This shows how paradoxical the determination of the ‘best interests of 
women’ is between her guardian and a judge who defines her interests solely in 
relation to the father’s interests. In the cases of both Tahani and Mariam, the women’s 
interests were not a matter of concern for judges, who see men as the only ones 
capable of determining the interests of women.   
 
Again, in defining interests, the law and judges have not just banned women’s right to 
wilaya over their children, they have also done so in accordance with conceptions of 
women that align with the established normative femininity, which connotes women 
as half-citizens, dependents, deceitful, untrustworthy, and whose interests must not be 
decided upon without the wali’s approval. If it was not in Tahani’s daughter or 	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Amani’s interests to give up their choice of study, or in Mariam and her daughter’s 
interests to give up education, then the question that remains unanswered: whose 
interests do the laws on wilaya over women serve?  
Tribal Interests	  
In Hai Al-Ajarmeh in Naour, I was introduced to women through a small women’s 
charity, the Women of Naour Society. The first day I went to the Society, there was a 
group of men sitting in the president’s office; they were apparently burglars who had 
broken into the Society’s office and stole its equipment a month earlier. They were 
having a discussion about the Society’s president and board members dropping the 
charges in exchange for these men’s tribes compensating the Society. The women 
rejected the offer, as they wanted a court’s decision rather than a compromise with 
thieves. The president of the Society said: “Even if we will drop our right, there is still 
the public right of the state, so you will be charged anyway.” The burglars responded, 
“We have sorted everything out with the police and the court, you are the only 
problem now.”  
 
After men left, the president of the Society told me: “In the end we have to drop the 
charges against them. We cannot confront the whole tribe; there is no a rule of law 
here.” This incident shows how powerful the tribal connection to the state is in 
Jordan. If this is the case with a well-defined crime in the eyes of the law, then how 
would it be in cases of violence against women (VAW) or any conflicts between men 
and women? The president of the Society mentioned in this regard: “No case of VAW 
reaches the police or court. The policemen are mostly from the Al-Ajarmeh tribe so 
women do not dare to go to the police.” She also mentioned that all issues of divorce 
and marriage go to court just as a formality. The decision is usually taken beforehand 
inside the tribe.  
 
Through the process of Jordanian state-building, tribal leaders were transformed to be 
subservient to the central government o act as intermediaries between the state and 
their tribes. 235 This system has influenced the creation of wasta (use of kinship ties as 
a connection for personal gains) as a system between state officials and individuals 
through sheikhs, or leaders, of the tribes. Wasta is a practice thus resulting from the 	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relationship between the state and society created to preserve the mutual interests of 
state and tribes.236 As Caroline Ronsin (2010) posits, “Wasta is in fact deeply 
intertwined with state development in Jordan, and plays a decisive role in shaping the 
political elite in Jordan.” It is the price the state pays for acquiring legitimacy amongst 
the tribes and ensuring their non-intervention in issues of foreign policy, military and 
national security. On the other hand, social affairs are left to tribes to be managed 
through their own various structures. Formal relations between individuals and the 
state are largely exercised through the arbitration of the sheikhs rather than through a 
direct relation with the state. Such a system, as I demonstrate in Chapter 4 through 
women’s stories, is the main barrier between women and the state’s legal institution, 
particularly when women are in conflict with their families and tribes.    
 
During my fieldwork, I was surprised to learn that in Jordan tribal attributes are still 
operating through the role of the sheikh al-Diwan el-Malaki, or ‘the Royal Bureau 
judge.’ I came to know about this mechanism through Khadija, who I met in Jwaideh 
Jail. Sheikh Muhammed Al-Naimat, a Bureau judge, was assigned by the Royal 
Bureau to deal with conflicts between tribes. He inherited this role from his father, 
who was a tribal judge for the tribe of Naimat in al-Mafraq (a city in northwest 
Jordan). As Sheikh Al-Naimat explained to me, his mandate expanded to serve 
different tribes because there are no longer many tribal judges. In the whole country, 
only four tribes’ judges remain, and they all work closely together and refer cases to 
each other.   
 
Sheikh Naimat, as he explained for me, usually receives cases related to disputes over 
wilaya from the Governor, who refers the cases of women who belong to tribes to him 
and then enforces Sheikh Naimat’s decisions on the families.  Sheikh Naimat said that 
he received 10 cases this year of women who resorted to him due to their guardian’s 
refusal to conclude marriages to their chosen person. Most such cases were related to 
old conflicts between tribes. Sheikh Naimat stated that when the case involves tribes, 
the Governor or shari’a judges cannot make decisions over the case, as this could 
endanger the lives of both women and men involved, and thus referred the case to him 
to decide within the tribal traditions.  	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In Chapter 5, I present the case of Khawla, a 38 year-old woman whose decision to 
marry a person from another tribe led to her imprisonment. Khalwla’s imprisonment 
was to avoid a tribal dispute, as her and her boyfriend’s tribes were in conflict. In her 
case, the judges did not recognise that a woman who reached the age of 38, and 
whose father has no reasonable justification to object to the marriage, are the two 
grounds in the JPSL upon which a woman can ask to marry without the consent of the 
wali. Instead, they refused to conclude the marriage and referred Khawla to seek the 
assistance of a tribal sheikh. In the case of Amani, the marriage was concluded 
despite the fact she was 13 years old. Khawla, who is 38 and a works, did not have 
her marriage concluded and was sent to jail. Whether a woman is mature or still in 
childhood, decisions are driven by the wali. Judges’ performance in the courtrooms is, 
thus, directed by reasons other than enforcing the rule of law. In response to a 
question about other similar cases of Khawla that I dealt with during my work at JWU 
shelter, Sheikh Arabiyat stated: 
We are sons of tribes; we know how it is going to be if a woman stepped 
outside the tribe’s consent, it might turn a small dispute between tribes to an 
endless war. We have a role in preserving our community from decisions that 
could endanger our national harmony.237 
 
The referring of women’s cases to tribal authorities demonstrates that the existence of 
legal institutions, including those based on religion, in Jordan has not wiped away the 
informal tribal legal systems. It is also not a matter of reinterpretation, as in these 
cases religion was not a determinately important factor in disputes involving tribes. 
Conflict resolution and customary law continue to operate through tribes, which 
regulate social relations and inform legal procedures that have tribal interest as an 
overriding factor. As Mounira Charrad (2001) shows, kin groupings are central to the 
analysis of states’ and women’s rights238, as well as being central in determining 
whether or not the state has the capacity to enforce the rule of law in the society. The 
existence of a tribal judge, despite the abolishing of tribal law in the 1970s, 
demonstrates that the state still has interests in keeping the tribes powerful in Jordan, 
particularly in managing issues related to social affairs.  
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The performance of judges in shari’a courtrooms is largely influenced by the power 
of tribes. Some judges have told me that they ask for the father’s permission when a 
woman from an influential tribe either asks for permission to marry without the 
consent of her father or divorce. This is not a legal requirement, but as Judge Sartawi 
justified: 
We have to ensure that a woman’s decision is not going to cause a conflict 
between tribes. Women are not always rational in their decisions and 
sometimes they ask for divorce for silly reasons. So by consulting the father 
before accepting the case, we protect women from themselves and maintain a 
good relation between the tribes, which in turn preserves the harmony of our 
community as a whole. 
 
Judge Fadi Alawaishh stated in relation to the same point: 
Women need to be aware of the consequences before they take any legal 
procedures. Our responsibility as judges in such a tribal community is to 
ensure women’s best interests within the interest of the community as a 
whole.239   
 
Lynn Welchman (2000) underscores practices of wilaya over women in Palestine, 
where, under the JPSL, previously married women are allowed to conclude their own 
marriages in family laws based on shari’a,240 while the guardian’s presence and 
representation is still required by judges. Welchman concludes that “customary rules 
frequently constitute a stronger controlling force than ‘law’, particularly over matters 
involving women and the family.”241 
 
In literature on fiqh, the father’s representation of their daughter’s best interest in the 
marriage contract did not refer merely to the interest of the woman. Wael Hallaq 
(2009) demonstrates how the collective interests of the tribe were ensured through the 
role of the father as wali.242 He relates this to the notion of marriage in Islam, and how 
it is a key element to the stability and harmony of the society: “The marriage 
institution thus became key to maintaining social harmony, the cornerstone of the 
entire Islamic order.”243 Control over the decision of marriage, therefore, is “intended 	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to serve a single, ultimate imperative: social harmony.”244 In this sense, marriage is 
considered by some jurists as a ‘public affair’ rather than an individual matter, where 
the father represents the interests of family and the community at large. Guardianship 
by the father and male relatives, according to Hallaq (2009), “ensure[s] conformity to 
a sexual and social morality that set the priorities governing both social status and the 
well-being of the community.”245 Women who seek to represent themselves in 
marriage were seen – even by scholars of the Hanafi school like Marghinani, who 
allowed a sane woman to conclude her marriage – as “insolent and impudent” 
(waqaha).246  
 
Sonbol (2003) notes that Jordanian personal laws draw from the Maliki school 
regarding wilaya, where a correlation is made between the Maliki tradition and the urf 
(customs) practised by the tribes before the establishment of the legal codes.247 As 
discussed earlier, the Hanafi school allows any competent person, male or female, to 
conclude their own marriage; the Maliki school, on the other hand, recognises such a 
right for males but not females, who have to be under male guardians as long as they 
have not married previously. Judge Ghaleb Al-Sartawi confirmed this point by 
saying: 
Islam is a flexible religion. It gives authority to ulama to choose from within 
the interpretations of shari’a the best interests of the community. We do not 
assume what we have adopted in Jordan pertaining wilaya is suitable for 
every community. The Maliki school of interpretation of wilaya suited us 
more than the Hanafi’s, as it preserves the right of the family and community 
over individuals.248  
 
Ziba Mir-Hosseini (1997) also agrees that social customs and practices have played a 
major role in the interpretation of fiqh: “it was customary practices that provided them 
[jurists] with the raw materials upon which their Islamic ideal was constructed.”249 
 
However, the explanation of cultural influence appears to be less significant regarding 
interpretations and practices of wilaya over women, particularly when cases of 
dispute intersect with class and tribe, where judges’ decisions are often characterised 	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by contradictory and inconsistent arguments. For instance, judges of shari’a courts 
stated that they referred women to seek the support of tribal sheikhs. They did so in 
cases where women belonged to influential tribes, because they did not want to 
conduct a marriage without the consent of the wali, despite the fact that the women in 
question were over 30 years of age, with established careers, and their guardians had 
no valid reasons to object the marriage, as in Khadija’s case. In Amani’s case, the 
judge concluded the marriage even though Amani was very young. This evidence 
confirms that the protection of tribal and familial interests is a higher priority for 
judges than applying the presumed religious values or the rule of law in the country.  
 
Sheikh Arabiyat also shared examples where he dealt differently with women seeking 
to marry without the wali’s approval. He told me the story of a woman from a poor 
area, over whose marriage there was no tribal conflict: 
The woman was 40 years old, there was no time for her to marry or bear 
children, so I had to react but at the same time I had to ensure that nothing 
bad would happen to her. I decided to conclude the marriage even if the 
father rejected it, but I first brought the father, had a talk with him, and he 
then agreed to conclude his daughter’s marriage.250   
 
The woman in question here was not referred to a tribal sheikh. Her age and social 
class worked to her advantage. Sheikh Arabiyat felt he had power over the father, 
“who was poor and uneducated,” and hence the class of the family was of significance 
in Sheikh Arabiyat’s decision. His reaction to the case was also somewhat 
sympathetic to the woman, which was on the grounds of women’s gender role of 
bearing children: “If every father prevented his daughter from marriage, then this will 
affect the reproduction of children, and endanger society’s growth.”251 In this way, it 
was not the interests of the woman that were upheld, but rather the interests of the 
community. Sheikh Arabiyat and Al Sartawi both, interestingly, justified the change 
made in the 2010 JPSL – women now being able to marry without the wali’s consent 
at age of 30 rather than 40 – by positing that “women cannot get pregnant after this 
age”252, which is a matter related to performing a reproductive role and seen as in the 
best interest of the community.  
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The claim of interests is, consequently, very much tied to the structure of power and 
class and tribe arrangements in the country, rather than the interests of women. The 
case of Amani shows that provisions of wilaya do not grant those under wilaya any 
right other than submitting to the wali’s control. Amani, like other children, had no 
option within the system but to concede against her will and wishes. Her case, and 
other cases discussed here, questions the system of wilaya and shows how state, tribe, 
and family have all failed to address women’s interests – in the case of Amani, the 
interest of a child – and prioritise the wali’s power and control. This is the case even 
when this right holds no reasonable grounds, is in conflict with other provisions in the 
family law, or is even against the rules of shari’a. 	  
The Claim of Supervising” Misbehaved” and “Ill-mannered” women  
Fadi Al-Alawaishh, a judge of the Shari’a Court of West Amman, replied to my 
question of why wilaya is exercised over women and not men: 
It is clear that men can be responsible for their decisions, they can hold the 
consequences of any actions, and their actions would not endanger the 
society, as a woman’s acts would do. If a man is divorced then he can marry 
again easily, ma fi shi bea’ebo, “nothing can shame him.” If he does 
something bad his reputation can be restored when he does something good. 
It is not the same for women, once something bad is done it is then a lifelong 
shame. We have an obligation to supervise women so they do not get 
involved in any shameful acts.253   
 
In Chapter 5, I show the practical implications of Sheikh Al-Awaishh’s statement. I 
discuss how women who run away from home and are caught by the police are 
directly referred to forensic medicine departments to undergo virginity tests. This 
procedure is ultimately related to the idea that when left without supervision, women 
could engage in immoral acts and behaviour. The supervision of women’s decisions is 
thus perceived to protect the morality of the community. All six judges interviewed 
perceived the supervision of women’s morality to be of great significance for 
maintaining wilaya provisions in the JPSL.   
 
However, some legal cases related to wilaya have not involved women running away 
from home or rejecting their family’s marriage arrangements, but instead concern 
very basic matters, like registering a child’s birth. According to Article 14 of the 
Jordanian civil law (2001), those who are responsible for reporting the birth of a child 	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and issuing a birth certificate are first the father and then the mother. However, 
practices within the department of civil affairs usually require only the father to do so, 
or anyone authorised by the father. This practice is supported by Article 223 of the 
2010 PSL, which stipulates that the father is the wali of his children. Amal Hafez’s 
story of registering the birth of her daughter, which took three years in the court, is an 
example of how civil and personal laws interrelate in practice. Amal was married to 
an Egyptian man who left the country when she was pregnant. She waited for her 
husband to come back and did not register her daughter, as she was told her husband 
should do so. When her daughter turned six, Amal wanted to enrol her in school but 
was not allowed to do so, as the child did not have a birth certificate. Amal spent three 
years in the courts trying to get a decision that would give her a birth certificate for 
her daughter: “The girl reached the age of nine without being in school, which broke 
my heart as she was not just deprived from her father but also from enjoying her 
childhood at school.”254 
 
At the shari’a court, Amal first had to provide ‘proof of filiation’ by demonstrating 
that she was pregnant with her daughter while her husband was in the country – 
hence, the girl is not bint haram, “a girl born out of wedlock” – in order to get 
wisaya255 over her daughter, which was requested by the staff of the department for 
civil affairs in Zarqa. Although a man can register his children without any proof 
other than the marriage certificate, women must find ways to prove that they have not 
committed zina (adultery). Amal was only able to get the wisaya over her daughter 
after her father, the mukhtar (neighbourhood official representative), and other male 
friends of her husband testified in court that Amal was pregnant prior to her 
husband’s departure to Egypt. To determine her wisaya over her daughter, Amal first 
had to show that she was a faithful and trustworthy wife, which cannot be done unless 
approved by reliable men.  
 
The idea that women can pose a risk to themselves and are, hence, not trustworthy is 
clearly stated in the JPSL. Section 3 of Article 185 of the 2010 JPSL gives the wali 	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related to the representation of a minor and the management of his / her financial affairs. The wasi can 
be assigned by the guardian of a ward or the court in the absence of the guardian to manage specific 
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the right to take custody of the children of women under the age of 30, and extends 
the custody to children of women over 30 if they are deemed to pose a risk to 
themselves. Judges’ interpretation of this article in cases related to wilaya over 
women in marriage, like that of Sheikh Sartawi, demonstrates that there is no 
obligation for the judge to conclude a woman’s marriage without the presence of her 
wali when she reaches the age of 30.256 By this, judges refer to the second part of the 
article, namely that women ‘are not safe to themselves’ and, therefore, that wilaya 
over marriage should not be limited to any age.  
 
All judges shared the idea that women by nature are untrustworthy, and therefore 
could harm themselves. They recognised the significance of Article 185, where 
women are characterised as having an emotional nature that triggers them to engage 
in bad behaviour; therefore, the law should not counter the fact of women’s need to be 
under guardianship. Such arguments confirm that judges’ are based on the constructed 
and configured space of femininity in the law, as well as the ways in which women 
are conceived as incompetent, followers, foreign subjects, and defined in relation to 
capable men, who have the right of and bear responsibility for supervising, guarding, 
correcting, and disciplining women.  
 
Conclusion	  	  
In this chapter, I examined wilaya over women in both fiqh literature and the 
contemporary JPSL as it relates to gender relationships within the state’s institutions 
of law, religion, and tribal customary laws and practices. I argued that wilaya is not 
merely a discriminatory legal ‘provision,’ which confers the authority of male 
guardians to conclude the marriage of a female relative. It is rather a wide-ranging, 
dynamic, multi-stranded discourse that reproduces femininity and masculinity. The 
process of constructing women through connotations given to femininity aims to 
differentiate them, as Others, in order for their roles to be maintained as subordinate. 
Without a clear dichotomy between the values that are assigned to men and women in 
the law and reproduced socially, gender roles cannot be maintained and reproduced 
within the larger gender relationships and political order. 
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I have shown how judges’ practices in relation to provisions of wilaya over women in 
the JPSL serve particular interests and the overall system of power relationships. 
Therefore, we cannot treat family law as “a neutral instrument, which can serve 
diverse or convicting interests equally.” This is, as Weisberg describes, a ‘legal 
positivism’, which understands law as “an autonomous, self-contained system” 
uninvolved in the production and reproduction of power relations.257 Charrad (2001), 
likewise, argues that Muslim family law “in effect contain[s] within itself a blueprint 
for social order. Policy choices with respect to national family legislation unavoidably 
brought to the fore the divisions and alliances of national politics.”258 She posits that 
the choice to adopt new codes for family laws in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco were 
“an outcome of the structure of power in each society.”259  
 
Therefore, choosing to determine women’s rights from within the system that 
designates them as ‘naturally’ subordinate to men, through approaches such as that of 
religious reinterpretation through a feminist lens, will, to some extent, agree with the 
principle of women as dependent legal and social subjects. The explanations or 
motives of judges in relation to wilaya discussed in this chapter make it evident that 
women will not benefit from minor or even substantial changes to the family laws, or 
from reinterpreting shari’a laws. This is because wilaya is not legalised to preserve 
religious values, but rather that the epistemological project of normative femininity in 
fiqh literature has corresponded with the masculine state project in constructing and 
reproducing values and characteristics assigned to femininity and masculinity in the 
JPSL. The contradictory procedures and inconsistencies in practice between law, tribe 
and religion reveal that the protection of tribal interests is a higher priority for the 
state than preserving religious values or the rule of law in the country.  
 
Provisions of wilaya in the JPSL construct normative femininity and serve the 
purpose of assigning different interests and needs to women, and the defining of 
gender roles is in turn perceived as a natural response to the needs, interests, and 
characteristics of women. Thus, laws on wilaya naturalise discrimination in the law; 
wilaya’s logic makes discrimination an inevitable necessity to preserve social 	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harmony and interests against women’s perceived irrationality and the potential 
danger they pose to the community. By doing so, defined gender roles in the law are 
justified as corresponding to women’s nature and the interests and needs of the 
community, which inescapably require male supervision and guardianship. 
 
In this process, the state is a “homogenising agent”260 that, as Connell suggests, has a 
central role in defining and organising gender relations and order.261 The femininity 
established within this process, as Braidotti underscores, is a political project; the 
“virtual feminine”262 is an effect of conceptual and political projects through which 
women are constructed as “Others” through negative illustrations of difference in the 
predominant view of subjectivity in the Western phallologocentric discourse.263 This 
discourse is manifested in Jordan’s colonial experience and the ways in which British 
colonialism influenced the creation of a masculine national identity in the pre- and 
post-independence periods, as I discussed in Chapter 1.264  
 
This nature/fitrah logic, as discussed above, goes so far as to argue that women are 
not just lacking something, hence they are placed under men’s authority, but that 
women are also satisfied with their subordinate position; this logic argues that it is 
self-evident and common sense that women cannot be in positions of authority. In 
what follows, the question I try to answer is to what extent do women consent to, 
comply with or resist the ideal femininity as naturalised in the legal provision of 
wilaya. To engage with this question, I turn in Chapter 3 to examine how the system 
of guardianship and its legal and social mechanisms of control impact women’s 
subjective experiences of femininity.  
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Chapter 3 
 The Gentle Hidden Construction of Femininity 
	  
Introduction	  	  
During my fieldwork in Jordan, in the summer of 2012, the government was 
preparing for the end-of-year parliamentary elections. The Al-hirak al Shababi (Youth 
Movement) in Jordan and several political parties were against holding elections 
without first making changes to the electoral law. In particular, people were opposed 
to the one-person-one-vote system that, since 1993, has limited people’s choices and 
aided tribal candidates in obtaining seats in Parliament at the expense of 
representatives from political parties.265 
 
During this time I met Sahar, a long-time human rights activist who hails from a 
wealthy family in Amman and has worked on issues of human rights and democracy, 
but has never been active around women’s issues. Sahar’s husband belongs to a very 
influential tribe in Jordan; as she explained to me, she has not experienced any 
interference in her life by the tribe since she has been married. Sahar lives in Amman 
and describes her husband as “well-educated and liberal.”266  
 
Sahar, like many Jordanian political activists, decided not to register to vote in the 
elections. Her husband’s tribe took another position and was working hard to register 
everyone in the tribe. Her husband’s eldest brother called her to ask for her identity 
card so that he could register her to vote. Sahar explained that she was boycotting the 
elections and he angrily responded, “Who are you to take such a position? You are a 
woman and must follow your husband who is supporting his tribe’s choice.”267 She 
said that, in a way, she was told that she had to decide between her principles and her 
marriage: “I cannot put my marriage at stake, but I also feel like I would be betraying 	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my principles if I did what they were telling me to do.”268 She was in shock, and could 
not believe that she was not recognised as having the basic right of choice, 
presumably afforded to all human beings and all citizens:  
I never felt, to this extent, that being a woman is something bad. This is the 
first time I experienced the meaning of being nothing. I cannot forget my 
brother-in-law’s words, “Who are you?” He questioned my whole existence 
as a human.269   
The position Sahar’s husband took also shocked her. He tried to convince her to 
register for the elections first and to figure out what to do later, when the voting 
period came around. He told her: “I cannot confront my family on such an issue. 
Also, my tribe will think I am not a real man, and this would jeopardise my 
relationship with my brothers and cousins.”270   
 
Sahar wondered how her choice of whether or not to vote would jeopardise her 
husband’s reputation. She could not understand why her husband needed to appear as 
if he controlled her decisions in order for him to be respected and considered 
‘masculine’. When I met Sahar, she was in the process of discovering a new fact 
about herself as a dependent person and, in turn, that made her question herself as a 
woman. She was caught between whether to determine her independence, even 
though it could entail her paying the high price of ruining her relationship with her 
husband and his family, or to obey her husband’s tribal decision and register for 
elections. The important point for Sahar was not whether to register or boycott the 
election; rather, it was the limitations placed on her ability to make her own decisions 
as a woman.  
 
In this chapter, I scrutinise a variety of understandings of the performance of 
normative femininity. Through women’s narratives, the chapter examines how 
women develop a set of understandings and attitudes, as well as whether these 
correspond with the constructed normative femininity in the legal, religious and tribal 
institutions or provide alternative forms of femininity. Sahar’s dilemma of 
questioning herself as a woman seems a good starting point for this chapter. The story 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid. 
93	  	  
of Sahar, on the one hand, shows that authority over women is about determining 
forms of both femininity and masculinity. Her refusal to register for the election, 
against her husband’s and his family’s wishes, meant that not only was Sahar 
embracing values other than those assigned to her as a woman, but also that her 
husband was lacking one of the important attributes of masculinity: the ability to 
control his wife.  
 
On the other hand, Sahar’s shock at her brother-in-law’s words might come as a 
surprise and raises question of where her astonishment came from. Is it not that a 
woman is raised to accept her secondary status and make sense of the position of 
subordination from an early age? Was Sahar’s shock related to the fact that her 
brother-in-law did not have direct authority over her but tried to exercise power over 
her? If so, does this mean that women’s femininity depends on the relationship to 
those who are in the authoritative position? And/or is women’s submission to the 
constructed normative femininity developed by means of voluntary acts and a hidden, 
gentle way rather than force? In the following section, answering these questions 
leads me to consider a central point: how is the gendered subject constructed within 
power relationships where coercion and force are not the sole means by which the 
normalisation of submission is conceded, but rather where forms of gentle and soft 
power could have more essential roles in inducing a state of compliance and 
internalisation of femininity.   
Naturalisation and Socialisation of Normative Femininity 
Early in 2012, a public debate had begun in Jordan about the government’s proposal 
to cancel Article 12 of the 1969 Passport Law, which stated: “Women and minors can 
obtain regular passports only after the husband’s or guardian’s agreement.” This 
debate carried on for eight months before the Parliament approved the government’s 
proposal and cancelled Article 12. During this period, the debate mainly focused on 
how the cancelation of this article would ruin familial relations and disempower men. 
The government had already withdrawn its reservation to Article 15 of CEDAW 
(referring to women’s rights to movement and mobility)271, a reservation that included 
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the statement “A woman's residence and domicile are with her husband,”272 and been 
under pressure from civil society groups and the CEDAW committee to cancel Article 
12 of the Passport Law and its reservation to Article 15 of CEDAW. The proposed 
change was defended by the government in a parliamentary session by stating that 
men’s authority would not be threatened, the guardian’s authority rather, as the 
Minister of the Interior, Ghaleb Al Zoubi, said: “is protected under other articles in 
the civil and family laws.”273  
 
The media in general, and mainstream media in particular, played a negative role in 
this debate by publishing headlines that played on Jordanian society’s notions of 
masculinity and femininity. On 15 January 2012, Rum Press, an online news website, 
posted the headline “The new passport law leaves a woman temshi ala hal sha’raha 
(to act loosely without morals or boundaries).”274 As I read the article, I saw a huge 
number of angry comments, mainly from women. One such comment stated: 
“Jordanian women do not need a law to preserve their modesty.” Several other 
comments, from both women and men, said that Rum Press should be ashamed for 
publishing a headline that degrades women’s morality. Rum Press conceded and 
changed the headline to: “Passport law: Men are no longer a reference for women.”275 
The second headline elicited many comments from men, who mostly condemned the 
change in law with arguments about the threat it poses to Jordanian men’s 
masculinity. One such comment stated: “If this law is passed, it will mark the death of 
masculinity in Jordan.”276 Another commentator tried to alleviate men’s fears by 
saying: “A wife’s obedience is commanded by God and law. This law changes 
nothing.”277 While a few comments were in favour of the change, the majority asked 
the Parliament to stand against it.278  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Jordan’s reservations upon the ratification of CEDAW, 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec>, (accessed 9 March 2014). 
273 Ghaleb Al Zoubi’s speech at the Jordanian Parliament session on 29 August 2012 (accessed on 
15/1/2013), <http://www.assabeel.net/local-news/local/104382>.  
274 I have a saved copy of the article and comments, but it can no longer be accessed online as Rum 
Press deleted it. 
275 Rum Press, <http://www.rumonline.net/more.php?this_id=66448>, (accessed 15/1/2012).  
276 Ibid, comments below the article.  
277 Ibid. 
278 Ibid. 
95	  	  
The public debate around the passport law shows that men’s attainment and 
achievement of masculinity relies heavily on controlling women. As one man stated: 
“This is a farce. How would I be a man if I could wake up in the morning to find my 
wife had left for America?”279 But, is men’s reliance on control over women to 
preserve or achieve masculinity? Their masculinity, as Connell (1995, 2001) suggests, 
stands in inherent relation to femininity. Femininity and hegemonic masculinity exist 
and survive in and through social difference, justified under the order of nature, which 
defines men and women’s positions in the space of gender relations. 
 
The configuration of femininity and masculinity is produced, thus, within the order of 
what Bourdieu calls ‘the field of power’: “The space of the relations of force between 
different kinds of capital.”280 In this case, that field is the field of gender power, where 
positions of femininity and masculinity can only subsist in relation to each other.281 
Therefore, the construction of femininity and the creation of a dominant culture that 
accepts “the taken for granted” position of women as subordinate is a necessary 
condition to guarantee the normality of women’s subordinate position. Since the 
experiences of the ideal feminine are configured from within the dynamics of gender 
power relations, which work to maintain the power of males over females, the field of 
power thence works itself through the gendered political power that configures both 
men and women, gives a particular legitimacy to both notions and, consequently, 
places each in a different position.  
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed how religious texts, laws, and urf (customary laws) define 
femininity in relation to the existing social rules and laws on wilaya, as well as how 
femininity is defined in contrast to masculinity, in that femininity represents 
‘deficiencies’ that disqualify women from freely acting. Shari’a court judges’ 
arguments about women’s incompleteness went so far as to justify laws on wilaya 
through scientific ‘facts’ about women natural weakness. The wali, according to this 
logic, takes an active role over the passive female, who needs discipline and 
protection due to her ‘natural’ physical and mental weakness; qualities that are seen to 
entail an inherent lack of certain social privileges. In this way, law, urf, and religion 	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are institutions of gender hierarchy that essentialise women as weak and deem it 
imperative for women to remain subordinate to men. Judges and lawmakers’ 
invocation of the differences between men and women, as grounds for wilaya over 
women, serve as a ‘natural’ reflection of female deficiency and male superiority. 
Within the context of provisions of wilaya over women and social rules, there is an 
ideal image of femininity that is configured as natural. The wali’s supremacy and 
roles, which represent masculinity, could not be legitimised, defined and treated as 
norms unless done in relation to women’s perceived deficiency, which represents 
femininity. Consequently, within the framework of male authority over women, it 
begs the question of whether there is possibility for other types of femininity.   
 
Analysing femininity as normative does not entail treating femininity’s traits and 
characteristics as “pre-existing norms which are passively internalised and 
enacted”282; rather, such analysis requires the examination of the “making and 
remaking of conventions in social practice itself.”283 This should lead to, as Connell 
(1995) suggests, an exploration of the “politics of norms: the interests that are 
mobilised and the techniques used to construct them.”284 In Bourdieu’s sense, the 
construction of normative femininity is one of the forms of “state-sponsored 
doxas,”285 defined as:  
The framework through which domination is practised, but practised so 
subtly that it cannot even be questioned. In line with structuralist 
perspectives, doxa involves processes that undergird the everyday world. But 
in a more materialist vein, doxa is fundamentally contingent on what happens 
in that everyday world. Doxa is arbitrary and interest-serving. Yet, since it 
can only be sustained by its everyday acceptance, it is open to change.286   
 
Doxa is “(that) which is taken for granted”287 within a social system. The doxic mode 
is a societally accepted nuance of “how the world works, so natural and unspoken that 
it is unthinkable,”288 and thus not open to opinion or negotiation. I explain how 
normative femininity is internalised and contested, often simultaneously, through 
three accounts and perceptions of women: first, women’s compliance with normative 	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femininity; second, the pragmatic form of femininity; and third, the exceptional 
and/or masculine sense of femininity.   
 
The	  Invisible	  Reality	  of	  Constructing	  Femininity	  
Wafa’, one of my research participants, told me how difficult it is to define herself or 
know exactly what she wants without considering her father and brothers’ views. She 
stated: “What I lack as ountha (female) is completed by what my brothers have as 
zokour (males), so I have to think of them when I make any decision.” I asked her: 
“What if you woke up in the morning and found that there was no one responsible for 
you and you could make choices on your own?” She replied, “I would get lost.” She 
paused a little, and then continued: “I would need to learn how to think freely first. 
My mind is automated to think of my father and brothers’ reactions whenever I make 
a decision.”289 Here, Wafa’ suggests that ounotha (femininity) is a way of thinking of 
the self in a relational sense, one which is tied to masculine perceptions of women.  
She stated: “As ountha (a female), I always have to think of how my actions might 
affect ikhwani lerjal (masculine brothers).”290 This relational sense, hence, does not 
mean a woman’s femininity is only thought of in relation to familial relationships; 
rather, it is in relation to those distinguished as masculine and in a position of 
authority. But how does such a way of thinking impact women’s femininity? Wafa’ 
responded that thinking of actions beforehand, and whether they will pose any threat 
to her masculine brothers, adds a rationality that women generally lack. She further 
explained: “It makes you wise and sensible. It reduces the possibility of making 
mistakes.”291  
 
To understand Wafa’s attitude and understanding of femininity, I give a brief 
description of her upbringing to clarify how a well-educated and middle-class worker 
internalises the normative understanding of femininity. Wafa’ is the only daughter in 
her family and has five brothers, who “all love and try to protect her.”292 She has 
never been beaten or physically abused, on the contrary, she was spoilt and loved by 
her parents and brothers. Wafa’ feels that she is greatly indebted to her brothers, who 
paid for her education and continue to support her. In return, Wafa’ believes she 	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should respect their views and decisions. The respect Wafa’ mentioned is related to 
her actions, meaning that she does not place her brothers in a position where they 
could be embarrassed or ashamed by her practices. She was, therefore, constructed to 
be aware of what kinds of female practices might jeopardise her brothers’ reputations, 
resulting in her own understanding of femininity as irrational.  
In Wafa’s case, femininity is also defined through the position she occupies and 
within the “sense of limits” created by the legal and social conditions. In this reality, it 
is common sense for women to obey men. There is no coercion or force used, so 
Wafa’ can think of herself as irrational. However, there are different layers to Wafa’s 
compliance with the beliefs and values of normative femininity, such as her brothers’ 
love, respect, and support. The conditions through which Wafa’ situates her 
femininity create, more or less, a sense of satisfaction with her brothers’ authority. 
From Wafa’s own description, I understand that – based on her realised femininity 
and understanding of masculinity as superior and rational – she cannot think without 
considering her brothers’ reactions.  
 
It was also interesting to see how Wafa’ insisted on using the word masculine to 
describe her brothers. She kept repeating “ikhwani lerjal”, meaning that her respect 
for her brothers is not merely due to their familial relation, but also to their 
masculinity; her brothers’ authority stems from their masculinity, not only their 
sibling relationship. This means that the relationship between femininity and 
masculinity should be understood as based on the type of authority. Wafa’ was clear 
that her brothers are her protectors and guardians, but stated that her husband should 
not have the same authority over her: “Those are my brothers, they have the right to 
discipline me if I make a mistake. But my husband does not have this right, our 
relationship should be equal so that we can make a family together.”293 Wafa’ does 
not see her position as subordinate, rather she feels empowered by her brothers’ 
protection and support; for her, this support allows her to reject the authority of other 
males, such as her husband.   
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Wafa’s last statement also resonates with Sahar’s shock at her brother-in-law’s words 
and her husband’s passive position. She told me: “Who is he to tell me what to do, 
even my father and brothers have never intervened in my activism or political stands.” 
Although Sahar’s upbringing differed from that of Wafa’ – who was raised on equal 
footing with her brothers, was allowed to make free decisions related to her marriage 
and education, but still acknowledges her brothers and father’s authority, although not 
that of her husband or his family – both women see femininity that represents 
obedience, dependency and irrationality as relational to brothers’ and fathers’ 
authority, but not in husband-wife relationships. This suggests that women, in such 
cases, make sense of their supposed irrationality based on grounds that justify male 
authority, not on men and women’s pre-existing traits or characteristics. This also 
means that symbolic and material interests exist that determine when and under which 
conditions women accept normative femininity and, thus, submit to male authority. 
Another significant point, in Wafa’s case, is that the father and brothers’ authority 
provides the means by which women can resist other authorities.  
 
Wafa’s case suggests that normative femininity, as a doxa, is taken for granted as it 
pertains to relationships with her father and brothers; however, this femininity is open 
to challenge in relationships with men other than those in positions of authority. Doxa 
can be challenged through orchestrated preferences, calculated interests and adjusted 
actions to the division of the gender order, which, by all means, contributes to the 
reproduction of femininity as a “realised myth.”294 However, women experience doxa 
in a variety of ways, and embrace, internalise and contest their positions not through 
force but through soft and gentle means of power. Such is the case of Wafa’, where 
her upbringing to respect her brothers – and her brothers’ love and support – meant 
that she internalised a form of femininity that does not challenge her masculine 
brothers’ authority.  
 
For other women, particularly those who are not employed or greatly rely on their 
families’ financial and social support, femininity is linked to men’s superiority in 
general – whether it be husbands, fathers, sons, or brothers – as they are in need of 
support. As Dema stated: “A woman cannot live without the support of her men. She 	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will lose a lot. She needs a man to protect and take care of her.”295 In return, women 
should behave within their cultural context; otherwise, according to Dema, “men have 
the right to discipline them.” 296  Based on this argument, women need men’s 
protection due to their emotional nature. As Dema further stated: “Women do not 
know what is best for them. Their emotional nature makes mistakes inevitable.”297  
 
Dema’s attitude might also be better explained in relation to how she was raised to 
obey not only her brothers, but male relatives more generally. She thinks of men as 
superior because they are strong, rational and the providers of the family’s finances. 
The economic capital of distinction is produced in a context where the father and 
brothers are the decision makers, who are also responsible for supporting the family 
financially. Though Wafa’ has been working for a few years, she is not obligated to 
support the family like her brothers. She said: “My father told me whatever you get is 
for yourself, we are not in need of your money.”298 Her father’s refusal to allow her to 
contribute to the family’s finances is part of both maintaining the power structure 
within the family and undermining Wafa’s sense of herself as equal to her brothers. 
 
However, the perception of men as providers is not always why women think of men 
as their protectors or guardians. Huda, a well-educated, middle-class woman with a 
good career, narrated how her upbringing defined her relationship with men as a 
whole, not just those in a position of authority over her. She told me that her family, 
in particular her mother, put a great deal of effort during her childhood into teaching 
her how she should talk to her father and brothers. She recounted her mother’s word: 
“Do not look up when talking to your father or brother. This is waqaha (rudeness). 
You always have to talk with eyes fixed on the ground. This is your passport to a 
good life later with your future husband.”299 These were Huda’s mother words for her 
from the age of seven, at least as far as Huda recalls, and this was when she started to 
feel different from her brothers: “I did not know why I should focus my eyes on the 
ground.” Huda continued: 
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I understood that it was out of respect to do so when my father was talking to 
me but I did not understand it in relation to my brother. It took me a while to 
understand that and practise talking to my brother with my eyes down. I was 
hit twice for being waqha (rude) just because I confronted my brother with 
my eyes. Since that time, I find it difficult to talk to male colleagues when 
looking them in the eyes, the same for any male, whether in the market or in 
the street.300   
 
It was not just that Huda was taught to respect her father and brothers; in fact, her 
femininity is constructed in relation to obedience to male authority. However, while 
Huda’s case shows a learning from a young age of men’s absolute authority over 
women, regardless of the kind of relationship – be it husband-wife, father-daughter, 
brother-sister, male cousin-female cousin, and so forth; in other cases, however, such 
recognition only materialises in specific relationships, such as merely in relation to 
the father and brothers or, in some few cases, just to the father. It is clear that there is 
a variance in the types of authority that impact women’s sense of femininity, 
compliance to masculinity, and the ways in which masculinity is perceived to 
represent authority in a general state – based on the constructed ideal feminine image 
of women – or in relation only to those who have a legally authoritative position over 
them. The differences between women who internalise the normative understanding 
of femininity are closely tied to upbringing; thus, such appropriation of the self takes 
place in the context of a recognised form of male authority in the family. The family, 
as an institution, thereafter plays a significant role in the process of the socialisation 
of normative femininity and the practical applications of the guardianship system on 
the ground. 
Normative Femininity in Exchange for Security and Protection 
The role of family seems to be more significant in a case like Jordan, due to the 
emphasis on the security and protection that the family provides. Wafa’ told me how 
her parents have always emphasised to her that her brothers will be the only people 
she can rely on after they die. She explained to me: “I think of my future, when I get 
married, and as you know, you cannot trust men. My husband may remarry or abuse 
me. My brothers are my only source of security.”301 Consequently, one of the most 
important ways in which Wafa’s understanding of femininity is produced is through 
the emphasis on security that familial relationships provide. As Wafa’ explained, 	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unrelated men are not seen as trustworthy, which means that competent men are 
required to deal with them. This entails depriving women of having power over their 
own decisions, as such will protect them from a future husband’s abuse. Using this 
logic, women enter a marriage mistrusting their husbands and doubting their security. 
On the other hand, this mistrusted Other is a source of security for his female 
relatives. Ironically, depending on whether his relationship with a woman is based on 
blood or marriage, the same man could be a source of trust or mistrust for a woman. 
Men, therefore, represent the only source for women’s inner’s sense of security and 
insecurity. For some women, femininity is produced not only in relation to family 
ties, but also through emphasising the risks and dangers that other relationships could 
present to women, particularly wife-husband relations.   
The majority of the women I met, and with whom I had multiple discussions, shared 
Wafa’s view and did not trust state institutions, such as the police or judicial system, 
for reporting abuse. They mostly preferred for the problem to be solved within the 
family. There are various reasons for this disengagement with the state, including: 
relations with the state are usually managed by male relatives; state institutions’ 
inadequate recognition of violence against women as a crime; and, the established 
legal basis for the family, not the state, to protect women.  
Deliberate state policy of maintaining the family as an intermediary between women 
and state institutions, has largely informed the NGOs’ strategies of how to deal with 
cases of abuse. Various social workers at the Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU) stated 
that it was necessary to work within the framework of the family before reporting 
abuse to the police. Najieh Al-Zoubi, the director of the JWU shelter, stated: “We 
cannot ignore the fact that women have to go back to their families. If they do not 
have their families’ support, we might endanger women’s lives.”302 I address this 
issue later in my discussion of women prisoners in “safe custody” in order to show 
how women, who seek solutions to their problems outside the family and resist their 
family’s control, could end up in prison. This is the only way available for the state to 
protect women from a family threat. 
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In such a system, the naturalisation of femininity as inferior to masculinity is not only 
established by family relationships, but is also protected and legitimised by state laws; 
such laws place a further burden on women’s ability to escape the constructed 
normative femininity. Under these laws, women’s relationship with the state is 
identified and managed through family and regulations of male relatives as women’s 
guardians, where women cannot continue education, participate in the workforce or 
politics, marry, or travel without the permission of male kin. Charrad (2000) further 
underscores, through her comparative analysis of kin-based patriarchy in three 
countries, that family laws are a construct of self. The main issue for Charrad is 
whether the individual is defined as largely autonomous or as a member of a 
patrilineal line.303 By regulating individuals’ rights primarily through kinship relations 
and patrilineage, Charrad sees family laws in the Middle East as regulating familial 
relationships and determining individuals’ social position and status, whereby men 
and women are defined as “two different classes.”304   
 
For the state, regulating family relationships is to serve and protect gender structures 
and order through the role that such relationships play in establishing gender rules of 
normalcy.305 By this, the family becomes one of the core political institutions in 
Jordan, as elsewhere in the region. Diane Singerman (2006) argues that giving family 
a political role is not related to the endorsement of family values, rather it “implies 
recognition of the modalities of power that structure the society and the polity.”306 
Charrad (2000) argues that when Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria promulgated family 
laws, the differences between their constructions of the “ideal family” were related to 
the use/non-use of family and kinship ties as instruments in state-building. 307 
Femininity is then tied to a political order that does not provide alternative sources of 
protection and security, and has vested interest in keeping male power within the 
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structure of the family. Women’s femininity is influenced by a system that favours 
and protects family ties and relationships.  
Pragmatic	  Femininity	  	  
Amira El-Azhary Sonbol (2003) makes a central point in relation to Jordanian 
women’s changing position in education and employment. Sonbol suggests that, as 
long as urf, law, and other state institutions set the basis for women’s expectations of 
their societies and the rules guiding marriage and family lives, a real transformation in 
women’s positions will be very slow indeed.308 She illustrates her point through 
several examples, one of which is the role of the father as wali throughout of a 
woman’s life and how this role is never given to the woman; even if the father’s dies, 
he is replaced by another wali. As a result, as Sonbol suggests, a woman is “never 
completely independent or fully legally competent.”309 
 
Despite the entrenched gender gap in Jordan, female illiteracy is the lowest in the 
region, women occupy various positions in public administration, and women 
participate actively in the formal and informal labour force.310 Women have also 
become a source of financial stability for the family. These issues necessitate 
analysing how women, within new changes in the familial structure and affiliation, 
are realising themselves within the normative perception of femininity and the values 
it entails. While practicing non-traditional roles in terms of work and education, 
women’s lives and rights are still simultaneously determined by their families and the 
principle of guardianship over them.311   
 
The conflict between what women do in public and what they ought to be in private, 
as well as how relationships in the private sphere might determine their public 
activities, is then key to seeing how women’s femininity is a site of contestation that 
includes complex, strategic combinations of compliance, resistance, and 
accommodation. In this context, femininity cannot be seen as fixed by either 
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definition or practice; it is rather a combination of the two. Such a combination has 
entailed discrepancies between practices and the normative ideals of femininity 
endorsed by women. 
 
Women in different parts of the world face the dilemma of how to be competent in 
particular domains and still fit, simultaneously, within the idealised image of 
normative femininity, as “being competent and feminine is contradictory.” 312 
Therefore, there is a question of how competent a woman can be and still fit within 
the ideal image of normative femininity.313 This situation creates paradoxical forms of 
what could be termed ‘known and done’ femininity. Such a paradoxical position of 
women also reflects women’s responses to the complexity and disparity of power 
dynamics and relations.314 Several feminist scholars who work on different categories 
of women within Arab and/or Muslim contexts also emphasised this inconsistency of 
women’s positions.315  
 
Homa Hoodfar analyses Egyptian women’s responses to changing economic 
conditions, such as inflation, the removal of subsidies, and migration, with emphasis 
on how women’s strategies within the household economy in Cairo are influenced by 
both culture and economy.316 In this sense, she examines the linkage between private 
and public policies in constructing gender ideologies and roles. In discussing the ways 
in which women resist, manipulate and negotiate traditional gender roles within the 
household economy, she underscores women’s human agency within cultural 
production as well as in relation to economic change. Although Hoodfar does not 
provide an account of how the change in women’s roles in the household economy 
impacts women’s perceptions, or whether such changes have any impact on gender 
roles, she does provide – through empirical data – an analysis of how, in certain 
contexts, women’s choices of using marriage and kinship ties to maximise economic 
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chances are determined in an ambivalent manner, where a compromise between 
modernity and traditions is made.317  
 
During the course of my fieldwork, well-educated, working women in particular 
tended to present discrepancies between their practices, which included departures 
from traditional gender roles, and the realisation of themselves as women within the 
normative femininity. As a result, the perception and experience of femininity were at 
odds. The multiplicity of women’s roles created a combination of either valuing 
femininity and practising traditional roles or devaluing femininity and challenging 
traditional roles. And, conversely, the practices of challenging views on femininity 
and practising different roles does not necessarily imply that women’s perception of 
femininity is determined outside of the normative framework of the institutions of 
gender hierarchies.  
 
Among those I interviewed, there were women who believed that they were not equal 
to men and, therefore, needed guardianship due to women’s incompetency. In 
practice, some of these women have challenged the roles assigned to them, but not the 
normative femininity. Ahlam, a middle-class worker with an undergraduate 
education, said: “Maintaining our femininity is no longer possible since we have to do 
male roles.”318 In saying this, she speaks not only to the contradiction within herself, 
but also to the hold that society has on femininity as a result of women’s changing 
position: from only a housewife to both a housewife and a worker in the public 
sphere. Ahlam thinks that it is not her role to work, and that working desexualises her 
identity as a woman. She said:   
I try to keep the feminine aspects. But, when I have to make decisions at 
work or at home, or when I have no time to take care of myself, I find myself 
behaving similar to men. This is not good, because a woman should be a 
woman and a man should be a man. This is sunet al hayyat (the rule of 
life).319 
Barbara Weinstein (2006), in her discussion of working-class women in Latin 
America, concludes: 
In Latin America, and perhaps elsewhere, images of femininity / 
respectability typically reflected the gendered norms of an emerging middle-	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class, and thus tended to undercut working-class political identities for 
women. To negotiate proper images of femininity, working-class women, by 
and large, had to play down the “class” aspects of their identities, and 
disassociate themselves, as much as possible, from the world of work and the 
streets. Whereas working-class men could draw on longstanding images of 
masculinity that emphasized hard work, strength and independence.320  
 
Due to accusations, such as working women lack virtuous feminine aspects, women 
have to consciously demonstrate that they are not masculine; they have “created their 
own distinctive style that implicitly denied that labour made them masculine, 
degraded or alien.” 321 Kandiyoti (1988) also discussed how women who work, 
because they are exposed to different forms of knowledge outside the home, have no 
option other than to use every available symbolic means to “signify that they continue 
to be worthy of protection.”322 Kandiyoti posited that this is a deliberate, conscious 
bargaining strategy for women to survive patriarchy.323  
 
In a context where male authority is legalised and men’s financial prowess is seen as a 
significant connotation of masculinity, working women have to invest in maintaining 
every feminine feature at their disposal so as to guarantee that they are not left 
without their family’s protection,324 which is essential to their existence. While this is 
a strategic and deliberate position, it is not totally voluntary, as it is conditioned on 
rules and laws that limit women’s other options and choices. As Kandiyoti says: “The 
implicit promise of increased male responsibility restores the integrity of their original 
patriarchal bargain in an environment where the range of options available to women 
is extremely restricted.”325   
 
Ahlam made it clear that men were created to take care of women, not the other way 
around. She further explained that it is men’s responsibility to protect women, as well 
as why women should not be in positions of authority. What Ahlam said, however, 
contrasted with what she does and practises in her daily life. At her workplace, she is 	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a manager and oversees nine workers, including five men. She also holds a very 
respectable position in her family and is usually consulted on all family matters. She 
spoke to this contrast: “Yes, it is true. I have a good position at work and in my 
family, but this is not what you ask for as a woman. Since I was a kid, I dreamt of a 
better life, of my kingdom, where I am the queen of my family.”326  
 
What Ahlam expressed is also tied to the ways in which women and men’s roles are 
defined and naturalised within some civil laws, particularly those related to retirement 
and family allowances. Ahlam looks forward to when she reaches retirement age, so 
she can stay at her home and take care of her children. She added: “This is the only 
way for a woman to be a good wife. Even if you reach the position of minister, if your 
household issues are not well-taken care of then you fail as a woman.”327Ahlam’s 
position is also supported by the Civil Service Bylaws and labour laws. For example, 
Article 25 of the Civil Service Bylaws (CSBs) of 2007 stipulates that “family 
allowance is given only to male employees,” and may only be given to a female 
employee if she is a widow or married to a physically disabled person. Hence, the 
CSBs reaffirm that men hold the financial responsibility within families, and that 
women’s economic participation is recognised only in men’s absence or inability to 
work. In this way, the CSBs resonate with laws on wilaya, as they recognise men and 
women’s different roles within the family. Also, provisions of the Civil Service 
Bylaws and Social Security Laws encourage women to retire five years earlier than 
men, which is urging women to leave work at the time when they could be promoted 
to leadership positions.328 The retirement age gap is one of the reasons women in 
Jordan remain at the middle and lower management scale in the public 
administration.329 This also necessitates that women not reach a state of financial 
independence; they continue to be dependent on their families as their position within 
the economy rarely reaches a stage where their income or retirement is enough to 
enable them to enjoy a valuable productive status.  
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In the course of our discussion, Ahlam revealed contradictions in her views on 
femininity: on the one hand, she believes femininity represents weakness, and thus 
men must protect women; on the other hand, however, she likes her position as a 
strong woman. She feels that being a worker and a decision-maker at home gives her 
more space and freedom than other women. The discrepancy between Ahlam’s 
knowledge of herself as a woman and her actions makes it difficult for her to clearly 
define what femininity is. For Ahlam, femininity should be about emotions and 
women lacking the rationality to act freely in general; from the specificity of her 
position, however, she believes that she is quite eloquent and makes rational 
decisions, but that she is an exception. Ahlam does not see being different than other 
women as favourable, because her feelings of being judged by men and other women 
for lacking some feminine features is of great importance to her. Ahlam was also 
different in her attitude towards women’s responsibility to share their salary and 
assets with their husbands. Unlike some women, who were either obliged to do so or 
kept their salaries for themselves, Ahlam believes she must contribute to her family’s 
finances, like her husband.  
 
Whilst Ahlam does not view herself as weak or dependent, this did not change her 
attitude and perception of normative femininity. Instead, she feels the difference is 
related to the job she does, not the values assigned to her as a female. For Ahlam, 
performing a traditionally male job brought the additional burden of needing to prove 
herself trustworthy as a mother and wife, while, simultaneously, the laws recognised 
her non-responsibility to financially support the family. Femininity is then not what 
she is, but instead what she feels she ought to be. 
 
Ala’, a middle-aged, middle-class woman, said: “A woman is nothing without her 
men, they are the minds of her body.”330 Ala’ believes that a woman is “like glass, 
easily broken unless she has a man beside her; if she does, then she becomes a solid 
stone.”331 However, notwithstanding these views, Ala’ has challenged her family on 
several matters in her life. She married a man of her choice, despite her family’s 
refusal. After five years of marriage, Ala’ decided to go to court and ask for a divorce. 
Although none of her brothers supported her decision, she managed to obtain a 	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divorce. She also refused to go back to her family’s house after the divorce, and 
rented a house for herself and her two children. She has been challenging her family’s 
attempts to arrange a new marriage for four years. All of what Ala’ did, and is doing, 
contradicts her views on women. She thinks that she is challenging her weak 
personality: “deep inside, I know I am weak. I am trying to be a man not a woman. I 
believe I made unreasonable decisions in my life because of my irrational thinking.” 
332 However, Ala’ has clearly stated that she gained her freedom and choice of 
marriage and divorce not through resisting her family overtly, but rather through 
convincing her father and brother and, sometimes, “made them feel it was their 
decision.”333  
 
Ala’s last statement reminded me of a woman who had reached a position that had 
traditionally been a male job in Jordan and was invited to speak about her experience 
at one of the conferences. During the course of her speech, she advised young women 
not confront their husbands and male family members; instead, she recommended that 
women figure out how to do what they want without making men feel like they are 
losing control.   This example, and Ala’s defying of the authority over her through 
false-compliance rather than direct conformation, shows a form of covert resistance. It 
shows a choice being made due to, as Scott (1990) suggests, the subordinate groups’ 
vulnerability, which “has rarely permitted them the luxury of direct confrontation.”334 
 
There is certainly a value in the paradox and duality of women’s position in the 
structures of gender inequality.335 Whether or not women acknowledge this as a value, 
they certainly, as Abu Lughod (1990) puts it, “take advantage of these contradictions 
in their society to assert themselves.”336 As long as women are conceptually in 
agreement with and do not publically challenge society’s values, the consequences of 
their actions can be contained. In Ala’s case, though she managed to get both married 
and divorced against her family’s wishes, she did not do so by confronting her family. 
Instead, she persuaded her father and brothers: “It took lots of time and energy from 
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me to make them agree to what I wanted.”337 She also mentioned that she never said, 
“it is my right to choose.”338 She continued: “In the end, women cannot live on their 
own, they need the protection of their men.”339 Ala’ is a working woman with a good 
salary. Such a condition has provided her with a different gender role and, thus, the 
opportunity to make her own decisions, but it did not empower her enough to think of 
herself outside of the normative framework of femininity.  
 
By not publicly or overtly challenging normative femininity, women like Ala’ and 
Ahlam have been able to undermine the social rules of wilaya and “generated a 
paradoxical power.”340 To borrow from Foucault, this paradoxical form of power can 
be called “techniques of existence,”341 where a disconnection of experience from 
established knowledge is a condition of survival. Interestingly, the majority of 
educated, working women I interviewed, who perceive femininity as incompetence 
and incompleteness in relation to masculinity, think of themselves as different from 
other women. At the personal level, women seemed to perceive themselves as capable 
of controlling their behaviour and knowing what is best for them. However, the 
knowledge they have about femininity and what they have been told about themselves 
is deeply structured in their minds, so they can only see their own experience as the 
exception rather than the norm.  
 
However, a noticeable response was given in relation to women’s fear of defining 
femininity outside the normative framework; they said that such would endanger their 
lives and place them under more restrictions. It is not only about women thinking of 
themselves as weak, for some, rather, it is about the interests they have in not 
challenging the values assigned to femininity. Halima, a middle-aged worker from a 
poor class, articulated this very clearly:  
When I think of myself as independent and capable then I have to take 
decisions on my own. If I do so, then I might endanger my relationship with 
my family. I do not know what the reaction of my father and brother will be 	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if I challenged their views. They believe they know what is best for me. I 
doubt this, no one knows more than I do, but at the same time I have to show 
respect to decisions made by my father and in so many occasions to my 
brother (who is younger than me and I support him financially) so I can keep 
the space of freedom I have right now.342  
 
It is fear of the unknown or the consequences of her actions or beliefs that makes 
Halima adhere to her family’s views of what she should be doing, not pre-assigned 
female characteristics. She believes in her ability to take care of and protect herself as 
a woman, but at the same time cannot challenge the idea of the male’s right to protect 
women, as that might jeopardise her freedom:  
I see myself as equal to my brother but I do not say it out loud to him. I do 
not have to do that. I am confident and the privileges my brother has as a boy, 
do not have any negative effects on my freedom as it is the case on my 
younger sisters. I hate it only when my father asks me to take permission 
from my brother before going out, or when I have to bribe my brother so I 
can be late after work.343  
 
It seems that women like Halima have deliberately veiled their differing personal 
traits in order to retain certain privileges. They show compliance with the ideal 
feminine, even when very critical or sceptical of it, for reasons related to either the 
fear of unknown threats or protecting their interests and the spaces and freedoms they 
have already achieved. This also reveals that women may make a strategic choice of 
embracing a form of femininity that has a combination of compliance, resistance, and 
accommodation. Consequently, challenging normative femininity does not mean a 
total departure from the doxa; as the case of Halima, who did not object to the 
restrictions on or treatment of her younger sisters, shows. This might indicate that 
some women only object and have reservations to normative values when these 
values contradict with self-interests, not at the level of the collective sense of 
femininity.  
 
I discuss survival or coping techniques in detail in Chapter 4. However, I think it is 
important to address here that confronting normative femininity by revealing different 
values other than those assigned to women could be more dangerous for women than 
practising non-traditional gender roles within the power structure. By this, I mean that 
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when women do not challenge the structural normative framework of femininity, even 
if they decide to engage in non-traditional roles, they will not be seen as dangerous or 
punished for posing a threat to the community or undermining male authority. 
Women’s realisation of the inherent danger in revealing connotations other than what 
was assigned to them has created a pragmatic form of femininity, where “doing and 
saying” femininity are at odds; a state that seems to be necessary for women to exist 
and counter threats to their social and financial insecurity. Nonetheless, there is a limit 
to the extent to which women can stretch their gender roles; that limit being the law 
and state policies towards women. This is clearly manifested in the gender equality 
gap at the levels of economic and political participation, where women still constitute 
23% of the workforce344 and only 10% of the Parliament seats.  
 
This pragmatic femininity is nothing but an elastic form of doxa. Women embrace a 
pragmatic femininity under different conditions and circumstances. As discussed, 
education and work, whilst increasing women’s confidence in their capacity to engage 
in non-traditional gender roles, also contribute to intensifying the potential of 
ambivalent selves; this is particularly acute when non-traditional roles are practised 
under the supervision and permission of a male authority, and in a context where 
different laws interplay to maintain women’s subordination.  
 
Social class also appeared, in my respondents’ accounts, to be significantly important 
in increasing women’s pragmatic sense of femininity. Women from wealthy 
backgrounds, who often preferred to conduct interviews in English due to their weak 
expression in Arabic, seem to live in two separate worlds. One world is riddled with 
the consumption of what they called a “modern” style of life in relation to femininity, 
which consists of freedom in the way they dress, travel, study, and mingle with 
friends. The other world is tied to traditions that govern their choices of marriage, 
divorce, and financial matters. Maysa, a young woman from a wealthy family in 
Amman, stated:  
We are usra motahaderah, a ‘modern family.’ My father or brothers do not 
intervene in my life or my sisters’ lives. They support us and provide us with 
everything we need…. I am a very independent person. I do not ask for my 
brothers to tell me what to do, I know that out of respect for them I have to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 Department of National Statistics, 2012, Jordan Statistical Yearbook, DOS 
114	  	  
inform them of my activities and decisions, but not to take their permission 
unless it is something related to the entire family.  
I asked Maysa what she thought were personal or family matters, to which she – in 
part – replied:  
Marriage is a family matter. The person I am marrying is going to be part of 
the family. It is not only a relationship between him and me. He has to be 
from a similar background, this is all that my father asks; he does not impose 
a particular person or family. I agree with him and that’s why I am so careful 
of who I date.  
So, being from rich class furnishes women with opportunities to see themselves 
outside the epistemic frameworks of femininity, opportunities such as education, 
travel and exposure to different cultures. However, these opportunities do not 
inevitably influence women’s values of femininity to stand in opposition to the 
masculine-produced one, particularly in seeing themselves as independent of males in 
determining issues of marriage and divorce and being responsible in managing their 
financial affairs.  
 
 Kandiyoti argues, “women’s attachment to and stake in certain forms of patriarchal 
arrangements may derive neither from false consciousness, nor from collusion but 
from an actual stake in certain position of power available to them.”345 Consequently, 
Women’s pragmatism is induced by both privileges that change what gender roles 
offer them and the potential risks of challenging the normative framework of 
femininity. Through this structure, women’s preferences, interests, and choices 
encompass a discrepancy between being and doing, a form of doxa that endures the 
structure of power and aims at superficial change at the level of roles, which holds no 
power of subversion or transformation.  This discrepancy appears to suit women as 
well as correspond with the state’s ‘double speak’ policies of engaging women at the 
state-building level while maintaining their inferior position in the private sphere. 
Consequently, pragmatism reflects a complex combination of compliance and 
resistance, where, on the one hand, women are critical of the doxa, and on the other, 
conform to some of its aspects. 
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“Masculinised” and Exceptional Women 
One of women’s noticeable responses was self-association with masculinity rather 
than femininity. Several reasons were articulated by those women who described 
themselves as masculine, not feminine, due to their embracing of masculine 
characteristics – such as, gaining forms of power, hatred of women’s world with too 
much perceived emphasis on makeup and shopping, and less responsibilities for 
domestic household work. These reasons appear to be relevant to masculine women in 
different parts of the world, as Carr’s (1998) study on tomboy girls in the United 
States shows that gaining power and accessing more freedom are two important 
reasons for women to turn themselves into “tomboys.”346 However, in my research, 
the freedom and power gained by being ‘tomboys’ were constrained when girls 
reached maturity, and behaving in a masculine way meant more supervision and in 
some cases harsher disciplinary measures.    
 
Nadia, a young, upper-middle-class, single woman working as an engineer, said: “I 
guess I have a hormonal problem. I do not act like women. I tried to show shyness 
and softness, but it is not working.”347 She told me that she got into trouble because 
her personality was stronger than her brother’s, and she was beaten several times 
when caught playing football with boys: 
I was described as crazy when I was a kid. They used to call me names such 
as Abu-Ali or Hassan Sabi (the boy Hassan).348 Making me into a female 
was an impossible mission for my family. They did not succeed totally, but I 
certainly have something feminine now.349 
Nadia did not like being a female, even though she tried hard to show that she 
had some feminine characters. She told me that she wishes she could be a 
woman and a man at the same time:  
There are good things in being a female but I also wanted to have something 
masculine in me. I like being tough not weak. I like walking in the street 
without being harassed or supervised.  
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Therefore, the rejection of femininity is related to the construction of women as weak 
and the violence women face in both private and public spaces.350 Also, there are 
consequences for women who embrace masculine traits or behave in a manly manner. 
Rand, a single young woman from the middle-class, used to dress like a boy. As she 
described: “I had very short hair. I used to walk very fast and speak loudly.” 
Apparently such characteristics did not attract men, as they perceived such women to 
be ‘masculine’:  
It hurts when somebody tells you that you are a man not a woman. Of course, 
it was supposed to be a compliment. However, it makes men run away from 
you. I used to be considered a brother of my male friends at university. They 
liked and trusted me very much as a friend, but not as a girlfriend. I had to 
live with the idea that I am not suitable for marriage for quite a long time…I 
have also had to handle the fact that I am more under supervision of my 
family than my sisters who were feminine.  	  
There are two issues at stake for Rand here. The first is that she is seen as a masculine 
woman, but without the privileges associated with masculinity. The image applied to 
her disqualifies her from being female, but does not empower her enough to have 
authority over herself. This matter demonstrates Connell’s theory (1995): masculinity 
is not what men are, it is the constructed patterns of “what men ought to be.”351 The 
established standards and connotations of femininity and masculinity are the 
configurations of gendered practices, where masculinity is the symbol of authority 
and femininity is the symbol of submission. 352  The symbolic images of both 
femininity and masculinity can only be understood within a linked system of gender 
power relations.353  
 
For Rand, the second issue relates to her fears of not getting married due to her 
‘masculine’ personality. She sees marriage as a sign that the community has a sense 
of her as a decent feminine woman, and therefore respectable. In order to get marriage 
offers, the conditions placed on women relate to obedience, lack of competitiveness 
and weakness, which are expressed as layers of femininity for some women. Several 
women, from different class backgrounds, emphasised that women with strong 
personalities are not favoured for marriage. In Jordan, the discourse of female 
spinsterhood (o’nouseh), which is only used to refer to women over 25 but not men, 	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symbolises women’s “wrongfulness” or deficiency in their inability to marry.354 
Marriage, therefore, symbolises women’s dreams and abilities, and is a “dominant 
discourse with which a girl lives.”355  
 
Efforts to make women ‘feminine’ and fit within the normative framework of 
femininity demonstrate that women do not ‘normally’ match and display the image 
and standards of the normative femininity, such as softness, fragility, dependency and 
passiveness. As Connell (2005) suggests, “(t)he efforts to maintain strong divisions 
are themselves strong evidence that the boundaries are not too stable.”356 In addition, 
legislating men’s authority over women based on the argument of natural difference 
also demonstrates that these differences are neither natural nor static. If the standards 
and characteristics of femininity and masculinity are fixed, then there would be no 
need to create laws and rules to protect such well-established norms. If such were 
really the case, would not men and women’s nature be enough to maintain gender 
relations? Nonetheless, this account also reveals another form of doxa that women 
experience. On the one hand, these women reject the order of nature that categorises 
them as feminine; on the other hand, in their attempt to escape gender classification, 
they submit to broader gender normativity by embracing characteristics that bring 
them closer to masculinity and further removed from femininity.  
The Activist: The Exceptional Alien Woman  
I was visiting one of the women’s NGOs, sitting in the reception and waiting for the 
woman whom I would be interviewing. While I was waiting, there was much laughter 
and the employees gathered to discuss a story that happened the day before. I joined 
the employees to listen to the story, which was narrated as follows. 
 
The previous day had been the conclusion of a workshop convened by the 
organisation at the Dead Sea. The drivers were supposed to be ready to pick up 
participants and drive them back to Amman. The director went to check if all was 
going well, but found that none of the drivers were there and became very angry. The 
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employees spread the news of her anger, and after the director failed to find the 
drivers in the lobby, she went outside again and saw all of the drivers in their cars. 
She was surprised, as five minutes prior no one had been there; she had been standing 
in the main entrance and did not see anyone leave the hotel. After they arrived in 
Amman, the chief of operations told her that when the drivers knew she was angry 
they could not bear to walk in front of her, so instead they had lain down on the 
ground and started crawling to the hotel’s main gate. The interesting thing was that 
one of the drivers’ wives had directed them to the main entrance so they could escape 
without being noticed.  
 
As I was listening to the story from different people, including the drivers who were 
relating it with pride, it was very interesting to see how the drivers and other female 
and male employees did not see this behaviour as in any way degrading to their 
masculinity. It was also important to note that the driver, who was with his wife, did 
not take into account his position as a man for whom such an act might risk his power 
or authority. It is also vital to know that one of the drivers is a former military officer, 
hailing from a tribal family. The position of authority of the director, who is a 
women’s rights activist, obliterated the position of masculinity in relation to 
femininity. In this example, the drivers viewed the director as a person of authority 
and not as a woman; therefore, their act was not a degrading in any way to their 
masculinity. This perception entails a shift in the thinking of what is acceptable for 
men to do in the presence of women. The status of the director and her personality, as 
described by the employees, as a strong, fair, nice, unique, and exceptional woman, 
reworked the relationship between men and women. One of the male employees said 
of her: “She is different. You cannot find a man or a woman in her manners and 
morals.” Here, the exceptionality given to her character also meant that this is an 
individual case; it is not the norm to have this kind of personality associated with a 
woman. By talking about the exceptionality of the director’s personality, the drivers 
also meant to justify their action based on her personality, as someone they love and 
respect, not based on her position of authority. Also, to make sense of their act, they 
had to place her in an alien position, someone who does not belong to the category of 
men and women.  
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The women feminists and activists I interviewed shared similar stories with me, how 
they have been seen as different from other women and categorised as either 
masculine or a third gender. It was apparent that some enjoyed this kind of 
exceptionality and did not challenge it, while others did not accept it. However, 
regardless of their position, a common trend was that such categorisations did not 
come without a social cost or sanctions on some women activists. Sana’, a well-
known and very successful lawyer, told me: 
Look Afaf, sometimes I regret that I rejected all the marriage offers I got 
when I was younger; then I think, if I had gotten married I would not have 
managed to develop my career. I am very satisfied with my life, but we 
cannot ignore the status that marriage gives to women. Every day I hear 
statements from male and female colleagues: “She is successful but not 
married” and “She is beautiful but not married.” Sometimes, they say even 
harsher things like “You have no feminine features, so how can you expect to 
get married?” or “You need to change if you want to get married.”357 
 
Sana’ has been very affected by these statements, but reached a level of self-
perception – she is confident in her status as a successful and competent lawyer and 
activist – that makes it impossible for her to change to match normative perceptions 
and prescriptions. She is a respected lawyer and politician, but also feels the 
community’s pressure because she is in her mid-thirties and still unmarried. The 
characteristics contradict the dominant perception of femininity, disqualifying her 
from being seen as a good potential wife. So, there is a linkage between the criteria 
for women to be good, obedient wives and feminine characteristics. In the case of 
Sana’, she is not under the conditions of other single women; many have to remain 
under their brothers’ control after their parents’ death, as there is no social security 
provided by the state, and must accept and internalise normative femininity to ensure 
that they are not left without means of support. Therefore, Sana’ has the possibility to 
escape the internalisation and the pragmatic senses of femininity, but not the 
exceptional.  
 
Reem, a young, middle-class activist, told me: “Ounotha is the opposite of me. All 
that I learned about what ounotha entails, I proved to be wrong.”358 Reem started 
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questioning her identity as a woman when she was forced to study a subject not of her 
choosing at university:   
I really felt angry when I could not decide on my subject of study. My father 
wanted me to be a teacher, so he filled my university application with Arabic, 
geography, history, etc. I told him I want to study business, but he would not 
listen. So I changed my subject during my first term of university. It took my 
father one year to learn what I had done. He was very angry and I was not 
allowed to go to the university for a week. However, I believe the 
confrontation with my father made me who I am now, and opened my eyes 
about women’s rights and the women’s cause.359 
 
Reem stated that she hated being a girl when she was a child; she wanted to be a boy:  
Girls were weak, but I could feel the strength of my personality. Everything I 
was told about being a girl did not make sense to me. I used to dress, behave, 
and act like a boy. When I was young this was okay for my family. It used to 
be a source of joy, as they would make fun of me when I carried heavy stuff 
or held my older brother. When I grew up, my family tried to tame me to be a 
female.360 
 
Reem’s family was not only trying to get her to realise her gender identity as a 
female; taming her to recognise her feminine traits was a method of controlling the 
so-called masculine features of her personality, which should only apply to males. 
Understanding that women are not normally weak and can escape categorisation 
defeats, as Bourdieu (2003) suggests, the order of things, as it would be against that 
which is normalised and irrevocability naturalised.361 This is why the drivers had to 
view their director as exceptional, and Sana’s colleagues blamed her for not getting 
married. The exceptional sense of femininity means that examples that do not fit in 
the dichotomy of femininity and masculinity exist; these characters, thus, must remain 
extraordinary or alien so as not to have any transformative power or contribute to the 
production of norms that challenge the very basis of normative femininity. The 
perception of women who are not identical to the dominant norms of femininity and 
masculinity as exceptional, by both men and women, contributes to the reproduction 
of the gender order and power, and recognises the legitimacy of the symbolic order of 
nature.  
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It was observable that women who managed to challenge normative femininity, in any 
way, have been supported by factors outside the state’s modalities of power. In Sana’s 
case, her well-educated, activist parents were supportive of her self-development 
outside the normative framework of femininity. For Reem, the support she received 
through being part of women’s groups provided her with alternatives to family 
support that were lacking in the state institutions. However, alternative means of 
support, which I discuss in Chapter 4 in detail, when created and corresponded with 
what could provide women with a sense of security, opens doors for women to 
question and resist normative femininity. As long as these alternatives do not exist at 
the state level, women’s knowledge about themselves cannot be produced 
independent of the knowledge established in the gender hierarchal institutions. 
Women who resist the produced knowledge, while, on the one hand, show that 
normative femininity is fallible and contestable, will on the other hand continue to be 
exceptional, alien or extraordinary, which does not contribute to producing alternative 
knowledge about women. 
 
Conclusion   
In this chapter I showed that male authority over women, and its social rules and 
control mechanisms, defines both masculinity and femininity. However, the different 
forms of femininity of which women spoke show that, even within such a particular 
context, gender institutions and structures are not essentially capable of producing 
women as a homogenous, incompetent group in comparison to men. As Connell 
(1995) puts it: “Hegemony does not mean total control. It is not automatic and may be 
disrupted.”362  
 
Whilst gender institutions may contribute to reproducing the discourse of women as 
weak, as in the case of wilaya over women, where the law presumes the need for all 
women to be protected at the individual level; as I discussed, women have different 
ways of internalising, reconciling, disrupting or challenging the normative femininity. 
This means that there is not total submission to or utter rejection of normative 
femininity, rather women’s perception of femininity is situated in relation to 
masculine institutions that construct, produce and give legitimacy to normative 	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femininity – such as law, religion, and other institutions that have further 
responsibilities in managing and organising women’s activities within the framework 
of normative femininity, like family, juridical institutions, and tribe. These institutions 
also play a role in relation to how women’s femininity, to some extent, intersects with 
class, educational background, the existence of alternative formal and informal 
networks (like women’s NGOs), and connection to or detachment from their tribe’s 
power and structures. 
 
The ways in which women understand and try to make sense of or reject normative 
femininity, or some aspects of it, are explained in relation to three forms. The first 
form is women’s compliance with normative femininity. This is based on the 
understanding of who has authority over them and their potential gains from the 
institutionalisation of laws on wilaya, where their account of femininity is thus based 
on the same rationale and motives explained in fiqh literature, judges’ perceptions, 
and customary tribal rules. This is partly related to these women’s dependency, either 
financial or social, on male relatives to manage their affairs, as well as on the state’s 
insufficient, or lack of, recognition of women as full citizens, where women’s 
protection is only secured through family and kinship networks.  
  
Therefore, women who rely greatly on male support, be it financial or social, and 
have internalised and submitted to male authority as a condition of their existence, 
tend to make more sense of normative femininity. These women’s compliance with 
normative femininity resulted from a complex set of relations that are legally and 
religiously legitimised by laws on wilaya, and politically structured and managed by 
various institutions such as the family, the tribe, and the judiciary. The fear that 
women hold, as Sonbol (2003) puts it, is “in itself a source of instability, especially 
when what is feared or imagined is not only legally possible but occurs frequently to 
others.”363 These fears are, as Sonbol (2003) suggests, a “source of power in the hands 
of men who could make them a reality.”364  
 
I suggested in this chapter that the construction of femininity is often produced and 
constructed in relation to women’s responses to the authority of men over them. 	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When this authority is clearly defined in law and social practices, and when there is 
an absence, lack of alternatives and the state intervenes in protecting individual’s 
interests, women think of femininity from within the broader context of legal, 
economic and political structures. Thus, the sense of the Self differs amongst women 
based on their relations with multiple kinds of authorities, their positions within the 
institutions, their consciousness of consequences, available opportunities and 
alternatives, fear, and the danger imposed by the institutions that govern their 
activities. These factors are essential in looking at how women influence and are 
affected by normative femininity, and how, in turn, a woman engages in practices that 
contribute to the naturalised femininity or contest some parts it. 
 
The lack of alternatives, and indeed the state’s deliberate policy of leaving women’s 
issues to be managed by the family, implies that women have a limited choice in 
challenging the existing power structure. This is clearly manifested in the statistics on 
gender-based violence in the Jordanian Population and Health Survey (2012), where 
86.3% of women who experienced violence only sought help from family members, 
and less than 2% of women reported violence to state institutions, like police and 
health centres.365  
  
The second form of femininity discussed in this chapter is the pragmatic form, which 
is a demonstration of how women practise and perceive normative femininity not in a 
fixed, static way but in a discrepant sense. At this level, women’s pragmatic sense, 
which demonstrates that women’s total departure from the normative perception of 
women is difficult in a context where the system of guardianship continues to exist. 
The pragmatic sense is a reflection of either a woman resisting some norms and 
accepting others, or practising non-traditional gender roles while at the same time 
accepting their “naturally inherited” dependent status. In this account, I also discussed 
how the change in women’s traditional gender roles in Jordan have, on the one hand, 
opened the possibility for women to experience and engage in non-traditional roles; 
on the other hand, this change also produced paradoxical and pragmatic modes of 
femininity. Women’s contradictory, pragmatic form of femininity is a result of the 
understandings and attitudes produced through the combination of women’s learnt 	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incompetence in comparison to men and their practical experiences and achievements 
on an equal footing with men. The conception of the Self, then, becomes a 
combination of theory and practice. Hence, as I have shown, this paradoxical form of 
self-conception can be related to, in Foucault’s words, “techniques of existence,”366 
where a disconnection of experience from established knowledge is an essential 
condition of survival. 
 
The analysis of women’s pragmatic embodiment of femininity also poses a question 
in relation to transformation of knowledge and women’s changing positions. Several 
scholars have emphasised the significance of women’s conflicting positions and 
perceptions of changing gender roles. Hoodfar (1997) posits that women’s position 
within the household economy, and strategies of manipulation and negotiation, would 
ultimately lead to a change in gender ideologies. The case of pragmatic women in 
Jordan, on the contrary, shows that women can only stretch their gender roles to some 
extent, so long as they are not challenging normative gender identities and 
relationships. Consequently, while the change to gender roles might open the door for 
challenging gender hegemony at the individual level, it does not necessarily allow 
women to collectively and publicly challenge the gender orders that rely on certain 
notions of femininity and masculinity. There is a supportive environment for women 
to engage in activities and roles that are traditionally defined for men as long as 
women learn the principles of obedience to male authority. This is also a 
manifestation of the ways in which women try to make sense of the existing order 
through finding or defining their own interests within that order.367 This is in addition 
to reasons related to fear of unknown threats to their well-being and survival in cases 
where women have demonstrated perspectives not in line with the established order. I 
will discuss this matter further in Chapters 4 and 5.    
 
Exceptional and masculine women are the third central account, showing that there 
are women who managed to escape the normative sense of femininity. I divided 
women’s attitudes in this account into two: the masculine account and the exceptional 
account. For the first, associating their sense of self within the powerful position of 	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masculinity meant, for some women, that they could achieve more freedom and 
mobility, as they would be viewed as trustworthy. However, this association does not 
come without any contestations and attempts to return them to the “ounotha world.” 
This process includes restrictions or sanctions, as in the case of Sana’, who did not 
have the option of marriage unless she changed her personality.  
 
For women who expressed a view of themselves as exceptional, their personalities 
were either attributed to masculinity or viewed outside of the category of men and 
women. In order to undermine their efforts to escape normative femininity but remain 
women, they have been alienated and kept as exceptions. Even when described as 
extraordinary humans, such description implied these women’s disassociation from 
other women, ensuring their personalities do not challenge the normative notion of 
femininity or pose any threat to masculinity. One important point that may need 
further examination is the perception of men who are under the authority of women. 
While I addressed this issue briefly, as it appeared coincidently in my research, it is 
quite significant to see how men make sense of their masculine status under 
conditions that do not correspond with hegemonic masculinity, and how in turn that 
might open doors to challenge gender hegemony.  
 
Consequently, the three forms can be seen as a result of the doxic mode of knowledge 
production. Normative femininity can only be sustained when it becomes self-evident, 
when women perceive it as a common sense.  Thus, women’s praxis and ideology is 
fundamental to the creation or rejection of the doxa. However, for Bourdieu, this does 
not mean that no tension exists between the state’s ideology and those who are 
controlled by it. The three perceptions of women demonstrate the difficultly of 
arguing that women’s sense of self is only generated through the system of 
guardianship that limits their options to that of merely adhering to male power. 
Rather, the extent to which the domination structure is able to impose its own values 
and normative views on women’s sense of self and views of femininity varies, and is 
very much tied to material conditions and symbolic interests. The system of 
domination is not rigid and, thus, women’s taken-position determines the extent of the 
doxic mode.    
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The symbolic work of constitution or consecration, which is necessary to creating a 
unified group, is more likely to succeed if the social agents on which such work is 
exerted are more inclined – due to their proximity in the space of social positions, as 
well as the dispositions and interests associated with those positions – to mutually 
recognise each other and recognise themselves in the same project.368 
 
The three positions taken by women also cannot be understood in isolation from what 
Bourdieu calls “the sense of limits”, commonly seen as the “sense of reality” and the 
ways in which this sense of reality or limits corresponds to the objectives of the 
structure of domination. 369 Here, it is crucial to understand that, in a system like 
guardianship, women recognise themselves in a variety doxic forms that neither 
completely correspond with the dominant classification of men and women nor mark 
a departure from it. The social conditions of domination, established sense of reality, 
and material and symbolic interests aim, on the one hand, to create a united vision 
amongst women but, on the other hand, result in the creation of divergent positions; 
under very restricted conditions, women are agents who situate and rework the system 
based on their own preferences and interests, meaning they can apprehend, reconcile, 
and even reject normative femininity rather than passively reproducing the very basis 
of their subordinate positions. This also suggests that as long as women are 
naturalised and normalised as legal minor subjects, who need protection, discipline 
and male rationality, they have more or less chances to rework their femininity in a 
way that does not completely subvert the system, but instead minimises its effects and 
consequences on their lives. 
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Chapter 4 
Everyday Tactics of Defiance and Compliance  
 
Introduction	  	  
At the end of one of my days of fieldwork, Shireen, a journalist who joined me in 
some of the interviews in Jabal al Nadhif, one of the poorest areas in Amman, invited 
me to have a cup of coffee at her house in the area. When we arrived, there were 
several women sitting in the living room: Shireen’s aunt, grandmother, mother, 
sisters, and sisters-in-law. Shireen introduced me to them and we started talking about 
my thesis. The ensuing discussion was so important I asked them if I could record it.  
 
It was very interesting to see how, in the same family, women hold differing views 
about what a “proper woman” means and, consequently, what this entails in the 
practice of how women should behave, dress, speak, think or do. Shireen’s 
grandmother kept repeating that women in their family are very respectable and do 
not do anything without men’s authorisation: “Women are silly and can bring shame 
to the family so they need to be supervised.”370 Samar, the youngest sister, disagreed 
with her grandmother on some points, but also disagreed with Shireen’s position that 
women are capable of protecting themselves and do not need a man’s protection:  
Let’s face it, we need men’s protection. We do not live on our own in this 
society. You [directing herself to Shireen] are working hard and if my father 
decided to stop you from work then you would lose all of what you have 
achieved, so what is the point of doing this in the first place.371  
 
Samar’s words encapsulated the two important factors that some women take into 
consideration and determine whether women’s everyday practices are in line with or 
against the rule of wilaya. First, the assumed fact that women are in need of men’s 
protection; and second, that men have the authority to prevent women from working 
or making any other decision related to their own lives, and consequently women’s 
established status is that of dependency in relation to men. It was also important to see 
the differences between Shireen and her sisters. Shireen, as the eldest sister, has more 
scope for movement than her sisters. But that is not the only reason why she holds 	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371 Samar in the group discussion with Shireen’s family, April 2012, Amman. 
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such a position: as she explained to me, she challenges her father and brothers when it 
comes to issues related to her independence, which she defines as “my choices over 
marriage and work.”372   
 
Shireen went through very difficult times until her brothers and father accepted that 
her job requires being out late, conducting interviews at police stations or courts, and 
participating in demonstrations. For her sisters, their issues are totally different; for 
them, matters such as attending parties, going to the cinema, and ways of dressing are 
central. On the other hand, unlike Shireen, they find it appropriate for their father to 
decide on their marriages or for their brothers to decide on their jobs. Ahlam, another 
sister, mentioned that her brother asked her to leave her job and so she did: “He 
knows better than me. Men can figure each other out easily. When he met my director 
he felt something wrong about him. So I left work.”373 The perception of women’s 
independence is viewed differently between Shireen and her sisters.  
 
The next day I met Shireen, we continued our discussion of her sisters’ views. She 
told me how she struggles to convince her sisters to do things in public rather than in 
secret: 
Whenever they wanted to go to party or cinema they tell my father they are 
with me visiting a friend, which I do not like. I threaten them to tell my father 
the truth but then I do not want to hurt them. They find it less of a headache 
to just hide things. Once my brother discovered that Ahlam was not at my 
aunt’s house and she was with her friends. He hit her brutally. When I tried to 
prevent him from hitting her, he slapped me. My father got mad at him for 
slapping me but he did not try to stop him hitting Ahlam.374 
 
Shireen’s different position in the family than her sisters, as she explained to me, is 
due to the family’s need to send her to study outside Amman, as she did not manage 
to secure a place at the Jordan University. Her father also could not afford to send her 
to a private university. She is the oldest daughter and, therefore, the first one of the 
family to graduate. She was the first in the neighbourhood to get high marks in the 
Twajihi’s results (high school exams), which made her father very proud of her: “I 
lived four years in a girls’ dorm, I guess they became used to the idea that I am not in 	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the house and I am used to the idea of being on my own.” She told me that her father 
once firmly said to her brother, when the latter was questioning her late hours at work, 
“She had lived in the desert [referring to the area where Shireen studied in the south 
of Jordan] on her own for four years. If she wanted to do something wrong, she would 
have done it at that time.”375 
 
I chose to start this chapter with Shireen and her sisters’ arguments, as I aim to 
examine women’s everyday practices within the constructed notion of normative 
femininity and rules of wilaya over women. I choose the aspect of women’s 
dependency that is addressed in fiqh literature, the JPSL, and judges’ conceptions as a 
core aspect of normative femininity in order to examine how women live and 
experience this aspect in their daily lives. I discuss whether women’s practices aim at 
reaching a state of independence that challenges the very basis of normative 
femininity and, thus, reconfigures the space within which they have been positioned, 
or if they attempt rather to simply undermine or survive control mechanisms. I also 
examine whether it is necessary for women to situate their practices in agreement with 
normative femininity, as well as whether some practices – while appearing to 
correspond with normative femininity – can instead subvert the normative and lead 
women to achieve an independent state.     
 
Conceptualising Women’s Tactical Practices  
 
Norms cannot be embodied without an action of a specific kind, and they cannot 
continue to enforce themselves without a continual action. It is in the thinking 
through of this action that change can happen, since we are acting all the time in 
the ways that we enact, repeat, appropriate and refuse the norms that decide our 
social ontology.376 
 
In this section, I show the changeable, overlapping and ambivalent nature of everyday 
practices that incorporate styles of bargaining, accommodating, co-option, subverting, 
and secretive actions.377 As I discussed in the introductory chapter, it is not, by any 
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means, possible to locate women’s everyday practices within one theoretical 
framework. There are countless, variant practices discussed throughout women’s 
narratives, which themselves vary from one woman to another. Some practices, like 
those of Shireen’s sisters, take the discussion to Scott’s (1990) analysis of the 
“infrapolitics of the powerless”, which encompass forms of “hidden transcripts”. 
These hidden, disguised everyday practices, as Scott posits, are the means by which 
the powerless can threaten the power without publically challenging it.378 Some of the 
practices discussed, particularly in the context of the kinship system, touched on poor 
and tribal communities’ reemphasis on and reproduction of the doxa; within such 
systems, women’s abilities to push the limits of the unquestioned aspects of women’s 
acceptable social practices are very restricted and, thus, these tactics reveal forms of 
internalisation and accommodation of the family’s and tribe’s interests and desires. 
Other women’s practices accentuate the “bargaining power”379 that women develop 
and practise as both a strategy and tactic within and beyond family relationships.  
Women’s bargaining strategies appear predominant in a context where multiple forms 
of domination exist, and involve not only gender but also systems of kinship and 
class. This necessitates analysing women’s practices in relation to their position 
within different types of dominations, the power and opportunities available for them 
to gain power over life decisions,380 and the material consequences and discipline 
mechanisms imposed on women who attempt to subvert the system.	   In discussing 
these practices, I make a distinction between practices that, on the one hand, have a 
solely tactical nature – i.e. their aim is to cope with, survive, and trick the system and 
take advantage of a situation – and, on the other hand, practices that have a strategic 
character, even if appearing to be tactical or practised in a “disguised form”381, and 
somewhat geared towards realising strategies of independence.   
In other words, I locate women’s everyday practices within two sets of tactics: the 
first are single events aimed at merely surviving or reducing the effects of power and 
its control mechanisms; the second is a combination of practices directed at 	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challenging and subverting control mechanisms, which can later materialise into a 
systematic strategy of resistance. By framing women’s practices as tactics, I can 
explain some of the impasses and	  unresolved conceptual questions pertaining to the 
ambivalent and manipulative nature of women’s practices. Explaining women’s 
different tactics also has the advantage of detailing how women, who are meant to be 
dominated by the power of wilaya and the normative construction of femininity, can 
also somehow make use of the structure and, on some occasions, redefine the 
constructed gender relationships.382 Through examining women’s tactics, I challenge 
the victimisation/passivity account and aim to extend the discussion of women as 
agents and active subjects, while at the same time recognising the context, limits and 
consequences that play a crucial role in women’s situated practices within the power 
structure and order. Analysing women’s practices in terms of tactics also helps us to 
understand women’s lived reality, as well as the material and symbolic consequences 
for women if they overtly resist power. This is particularly true in a context where, as 
I discuss in Chapter 5, public and direct resistance could lead to life imprisonment or 
death for a woman. In this chapter, I discuss and analyse women’s tactic of soft, 
gentle means of surviving, coping, and, sometimes, contesting power without risking 
their lives or endangering their existing rights and freedoms. In Chapter 5, I discuss 
forms of women’s direct and public resistance.  
Women’s	  Tactics	  and	  the	  Aspirations	  of	  Independence	  	  	  	  
Siham, who is 27 years old and working as an engineer in one of Dubai’s big 
companies, told me: 
I could not sleep or eat for two weeks thinking of how I could present to my 
father that I want to apply for a job in Dubai. The idea of me travelling on my 
own was impossible so I had to find the right ways to convince my father.383  
 
For Siham, the opportunity that a good job in Dubai offered was not only related to 
the job’s salary. Siham thought of it as a way to experience living alone. She told me 
this is one of her dreams, and “maybe the most important one.”384 To make sure 
nothing went wrong, Siham first convinced her mother and then engaged her help in 
persuading her father to accept Siham’s travel to Dubai. The plan was for Siham’s 	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mother to speak to her father first and tell him later that she did istikharah385 and saw 
that travelling to Dubai was the best option for Siham. Siham is not religious, she 
thinks of herself as a bent motahaderah, a ‘modern girl’, but she knows that her father 
has strong faith in religious rituals. She told me that her mother actually performed 
istikharah so as to not be dishonest.  
 
Siham’s tactics were determined in order to achieve her independence, which she 
defined as “being independent from family’s interventions”386 in her life. With such a 
goal in mind, her tactics were well-studied so that she could guarantee results without 
risking her status or position within the family, as she is an elder daughter with 
relative freedom of movement. Siham knew that she could not travel or make a work 
contract without her father’s agreement. It seems that if such is justified in relation to 
the Islamic order and God’s will, then women – like Siham – may have to use the 
same power order that restricts them to reach their ends; if, in the logic of wilaya, God 
ordered men to control women, then women have to find ways in which God stands 
on their side, which was the istikhara option in Siham’s case. Therefore, her 
awareness of the law and her father’s beliefs enabled Siham to find tactics that, while 
appearing to be from within, actually aimed at countering the system.  
 
Siham’s aim was to gain independence, but she selected tactics that did not challenge 
traditional norms. Freeman (2005) has shown that, in relation to Moroccan women’s 
notion of freedom, women sometimes adhere to gender norms in order to not 
jeopardise their already obtained mobility and elude the negative consequences of 
their actions.387 Siham, however, did not adhere to gender norms; rather, she used 
what was available to achieve her goals. She still does not believe that her tactics 
worked. She was visiting Jordan when I met her. It was only her first week there, but 
she could not wait to get back to Dubai:  
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You know how it is when you live on your own. Although my father used to 
call me every day after work and ask me directly if I have made any 
mistakes, still, living and working in another country made my father less in 
control of my life. He tried to get me back to Jordan after six months of 
working in Dubai because he called twice and did not find me home on time. 
I told him if I would come back to Jordan, I would imprison myself at home 
and not work anymore; he answered me: “that would be better.” He has not 
mention that to me after I told him so because my family are already used to 
the amount of money I am sending to them. My father is a retired man and I 
have two sisters at private universities, and two young brothers still at school, 
and you know how costly universities and schools are in Jordan.388  
 
However, Siham did not stick with these tactics, she later moved from within the 
system to confrontational tactics, threatening to deprive the family of a good source of 
income. She is now more empowered and her salary makes a difference in the 
family’s finances. The economic power she has, which she recognised, enabled her to 
not negotiate or seek her mother’s intervention; rather, she used her financial support 
tactically to continue enjoying an independent life. In this transformation, Siham’s 
adherence to wilaya rules was a temporary tactic rather than a lifestyle or how she 
viewed herself, and is thus a practice from within the system.  
 
Diane Baxter (2007), in her analysis of the notion of honour in Palestine, concludes 
that Palestinian women view the notion in relation to the society’s values of honour, 
where they have not seen it as a set of controls but rather a responsibility that, when 
practised appropriately and “if fulfilled, (ideally) brings respect, stability, peace and 
honour to the family.”389 She suggests, “Subjectivity and agency are achieved within 
and are a reflection of structural, ideological, and experiential configurations, rather 
than as resistances to them.”390 She refutes the ways in which women are depicted in 
contradictory positions, as “powerful and subordinate, assertive and diffident.”391 This 
argument applies to other cases that I discuss later, but Siham was different. Her 
initial rejection of women as dependent impacted the way she tried to arrange matters 
in her life. This means that we cannot generalise about certain experiences of women. 
Even in cases when women appeared to adhere to the order of gender relations, they 
sometimes did so to minimise the constraints imposed upon them. For instance, 
Salam, also a middle-class working woman, told me: “I found a good way to deal 	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with my family, I tell them nothing about my life. I pretend to agree with what they 
say, while I totally disagree.”392 Salam also has to perform some roles against her will: 
I accept to see women who come to see me for marriage purposes. I smile, 
talk to them but when they leave I always manage to find reasons to reject the 
marriage proposals. If I refuse to act this way my family will force me, they 
will think I have someone else in mind.393 
 
Salam has a group of artists, men and women, with whom she meets regularly at some 
of the group’s married couples’ places or at art galleries. 
They are my chosen community, we do everything together, when I am with 
them I feel like living in a different world, no one judges me or accuses me of 
anything; we all had studied together and known each other well. When I 
leave the group I come back to reality and live within my family’s wishes. 
This is the only way I can live peacefully. I do not like troubles.394 
 
She told me that some of her friends think she must confront her family, as she is in 
her late twenties and has a good career and salary. 
I think I can but I do not want to do that. My father is a kind man but very 
traditional, the way he thinks of women and what they should do is not going 
to change, so why should I bother to try?395  
 
Salam is secretly challenging her family, although her family sees her as a very 
obedient daughter and submissive to their rules. Her tactics enabled her to avoid 
confrontation, particularly in relation to marriage, which is for her is an essential 
matter:  
I cannot imagine I am forced to marry a man not of my choice. Marriage for 
me is the only way to live my life freely. Up to now, I did not meet the 
person who I can be myself with, and until that happens I will continue to 
fake things with my family.396   
 
The tactics of showing submission and practising her independence secretly, which 
could be, as James Scott terms, “false compliance”397, is temporary for Salam until 
she finds a way out of the family’s house. Her main goal is to live a life free of family 
interventions and to be able to mingle with her friends and go to cinemas and theatres. 
She is seeking independence, but it is hidden and postponed until she meets the right 	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husband. Salam does not think of herself as dependent, she feels that she is very 
independent; however, Salam’s stated limitations on achieving her independence are 
not related to her understanding of independence as limited, conditioned or from a 
normative viewpoint, but are rather the product of consequences and challenges she 
might face if deciding to practise her activities publicly. Unlike Freeman’s (2005) 
respondents, who talked about freedom with limitations defined in relation to their 
family’s ties or gender norms, Salam’s hidden and postponed independence is more 
related to a fear of losing mobility: as long as she knows how to get away with her 
activities, she does not aim to risk what she already has. She believes in her rights to 
move freely, decide in her choice of marriage, and choose her type of job but, at the 
same time, chooses a contradictory way of living that satisfies both her beliefs and her 
family’s norms. Such contradictory practices of women are, as suggested by Abu 
Lughod (1990), related to complex and contradictory structures of power, particularly 
in cases where women live in communities that are tied to multiple and non-local 
systems.398 In the case of Salam, the contradiction between how she looks at herself 
as independent and how her family views her necessitated living two styles of life. In 
her outside life, she has studied and had friendships with men and women, and her job 
entails late working hours and travel within the country, which is an opportunity for 
her to engage in other personal activities. On the other hand, at her house she has to 
show obedience to her father and brothers, and accept to sit with women who come to 
see her for marriage propositions.  
 
For Salam, even negotiation could be a matter of risking what she already has. 
Therefore, she detaches herself from any discussion that could lead to dispute over 
her scope of activities and allows her brother to closely intervene in her life. For other 
women, negotiation was seen as a safe tactic. Rula, a young activist, stated: 
“negotiation gives skills not just to negotiate your rights but also how to truly achieve 
them.”399 She told me how much time she spent negotiating with her father to allow 
her to participate in political activities at the university. She had to cover her head and 
give up make-up in order for her father to trust her going out with male youth: “I 
made a very difficult compromise between my feminine look and things I wanted to 	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do.”400 To gain more trust, Rula had to use a “bargaining” tactic that empowered her 
at the expense of her sisters. To gain power as an elder daughter, who has power over 
her younger sisters, she had used her position to impose more restrictions on her 
sisters and censure their actions:  
It worked but I did terrible things to my sisters, I was my father’s spy, telling 
him what they were doing. This put my sisters in so much trouble. I think I 
was still at a stage where I wanted to show my father that I am different and 
thus should have his trust.401  
 
However, engaging in activism opened the doors for Rula to develop her capabilities 
and, in turn, change her views on women more broadly: “I realised not so long after 
my engagement with women’s activism that I started to be confident and feel a real 
difference in myself.”402 Rula has certainly gained power through her bargaining 
approach, as her tactics later transformed into overt confrontation with her father’s 
authority. She gave me an example of when he tried to prevent her from travelling 
and she threatened to leave the house: 
Of course, I would not have left but I knew this was the thing my father most 
feared. I had no choice at that stage, it was either I go back and continue what 
I used to do, or I move forward. 
 
Interestingly enough, Rula’s confrontation with her father worked. She told me that 
when she needs to travel now, she just informs her father a few days before: 
 
I have been through a very difficult time, particularly the few months after I 
took off the hijab, but I had to maintain my strength so my father did not take 
note of my inner contradictory feeling. I thought of surrendering several 
times.403  
 
The shift in both Siham and Rula’s tactics occurred when they gained some resources 
of power. Shahin Gerami and Melodye Lehnerer (2001) similarly showed, in relation 
to Iranian women’s strategies of negotiation, how women’s knowledge of the system 
and available resources enables them to subvert the system in a way that undermines 
its impact on their lives.404 However, the use of knowledge and resources interweave 
with other factors, such as the level of restricting measures, family affiliation with 	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tribe, and the type of authority practised over women, which may or may not allow 
women to subvert the system. 
 
The three stories of Siham, Salam, and Rula, who are all working women and belong 
to the middle class, show how women use different tactics according to the situation. 
Siham’s tactics were determined by her goal of achieving independence, and she was 
fully aware of her mother’s influence on her father, her father’s beliefs, and later his 
need for her salary. Therefore, Siham used tactics from within the system until she 
felt financially empowered to work against it: “When you practise freedom, and know 
what it means, it is so difficult to go back.”405 She also knew that her father had the 
ability to prevent her from travelling, so she tried not to confront him on what she 
called “superficial issues”406: 
My father still tries to show that he is in control of my behaviour. There is 
unimportant stuff, like not wearing tight jeans, or changing my hair colour, I 
am okay with that if it makes him satisfied. But when he asks me to meet 
people for marriage purposes or intervenes in anything related to my job, I do 
not accept it. He kind of knows his limitations now. 407   
 
Rula defined her and her father’s limitations similarly. She has also moved from 
tactics aimed at minimising her father’s control over her movement – bargaining 
tactics – that came at the expense of her sisters, to those aimed at achieving her 
independence. However, the enabling factors were different for Rula and Siham. 
While Rula also used the financial tactic, the support she gained from the community 
of women’s activists was what was most important for her. For Rula, women’s 
activism was a social backup that replaced the family’s social support: 
When I have any problem whether financially or socially, I do not inform my 
family. Actually I do not feel I need to let them know when I have people 
who can support me in more meaningful ways.408  
 
Rula’s activist community became a source of social security, a matter that is of great 
importance to women in Jordan. As I discussed in the previous chapters, the social 
security and welfare of individuals is determined by kinship and familial relationships 
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rather than by the state. In this sense, women who confront their families know they 
must first secure, alternative means of social support.  
 
In the case of Salam, she did not try different tactics in different stages of her life, but 
used tactics as a “disguise to mask the reality of hidden struggle.”409 Her tactics also 
did not mean that she identified herself from within the system, as Phillips (2006) 
articulates, but instead that the ambivalent positions of the subject could provide a 
“limited form of agency.”410 However, such agency at the same time “can be used 
against the very strategic relations of power that authorize it.”411 Phillips elaborates 
this through the case of gay people’s choice of revealing their sexual identity to 
certain groups: “Coming out among a group of close and liberal-minded friends might 
hold comparatively little risk, where coming out to fundamentalist relatives may hold 
considerably greater risk.”412 Similarly, the risks in Salam’s case are greater than 
those faced by Rula or Siham; the authority over her is practised not only by her 
father but also her five brothers, three of whom are older than her and have a position 
of power the same as her father. Rula and Siham, on the other hand, are elder sisters 
with an age gap between them and their brothers: 
My brothers are well-educated and have good positions. However, when it 
comes to women they still have backward views. They think women should 
stay at home. If I refused to do anything they want or if they noticed that I am 
stepping out of line, they would force me to leave work.413  
 
Therefore, when there is collective male authority, or as termed by Gallagher (2007) 
“collaborative male power”,414 which is not only practised by the father but also by 
brothers, cousins, and uncles, achieving independence will be more difficult. The 
risks are also greater as, in such cases, it will be difficult to determine each one’s 
responses to her actions. Therefore, achieving independence is not merely tied to the 
ability to confront power but also “the risks entailed by invoking it.”415  
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Another point of difference between Salam and Rula’s cases is that Salam’s 
alternative social safety-net remains hidden due to the potential risks of publically 
announcing her hidden community, which she thinks of as a sort of illegitimate 
sphere. This community, then, became an added fear for her rather than a means of 
support. In Rula’s case, on the other hand, the activist community is well-known to 
her family and contributed by giving her social status as an activist for a cause of 
which she is very proud. This might lead one to conclude that women’s public 
activities, which are not supervised or arranged under male rules, may contribute by 
giving women support that could modify the gender order, unlike hidden spaces that 
are more often used to shadow men’s spaces, where women’s resistance is not just 
invisible but also practised under the terms and protection of men.416  
 
In the three stories of Siham, Salam, and Rula, women all aimed to achieve 
independence. However their differing tactics were determined by the differing 
conditions, fears, risks, and opportunities; thus, the outcomes of achieving their goals 
were distinct. Another point, in the case of Salam, is that achieving independence was 
identified as a goal, but the tactics were meant to keep her gains until she meets the 
right marriage partner. By this, gaining independence was tied to a “liberal” man who 
will “free her from family restrictions.” Rula and Siham, while differing in their 
tactics, did not seek the support of other men to reach their ends or redefine what 
independence means. Their planned tactics – a powerful financial position and 
support from other members of the family, like Siham’s mother – enabled them to 
confront male authority. By achieving independence at the levels of work, travel, and 
mobility, they confronted the dependent state of women that placed them in a 
secondary status under the justification of women’s irrationality and family’s 
interests. Indeed, in the case of Siham, she redefined her family’s interests as being 
tied to her independent status. Both Rula and Siham’s tactics, consequently, resulted 
in reaching a state of rejecting their position as subordinate and aims to retain their 
independence.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 Abu-Lughod, 1985. 
140	  	  
Tactics	  and	  the	  Prospect	  of	  Survival	  	  
In Jabel al Nadhif, I met Hana’a, a 48-year-old woman with four young children. I 
first thought that she was in her late fifties. It seemed that life had drawn all types of 
lines in her face and her soul seemed taken away. She barely smiles or laughs unless 
remembering something from the past. The Nadhif area is very populated and houses 
are very dense. The residents consider it a Palestinian refugee camp, as most people 
who live there are of Palestinian origin and moved to the area after being displaced 
from Palestine in 1948 and 1967. However, the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine (UNRAW) does not recognise it as a camp and, therefore, the 
area lacks both government and UNRAW facilities. People know each other very well 
and tell each other’s stories openly. Secrets seemed to have no place there; one 
woman can tell the stories of all women in the neighbourhood. 
 
Hana’a is the eldest sister in her family. She has four sisters and one brother, whom 
she called wahidna, “our ‘one and only’.” Her father is married to a second wife and 
lives in another city. She graduated from high school in 1984 and wanted to study 
nursing. In the 1980s, nursing was not a popular profession for women in Jordan. The 
government promoted it through giving free education and allowances for those who 
enrolled in the public nursing colleges. Hana’a applied and got a place at Al-Shobak 
College in the south of Jordan. Her father refused to allow her to go and instead told 
her to study the Arabic language at one of the colleges in Amman:  
I felt part of my dreams were taken away from me. Studying nursing meant 
that I would find a job directly after graduation. My mother used to work as a 
cleaner in the girls’ school and her hands were dried out. I wanted to help 
her. My father is married to another woman and we only see him in times 
when we need a decision.417  
 
While Hana’a was talking, she felt very hot and took off her headscarf. I commented 
on her hair, which is very unique: black and thick, with some natural waves. She 
replied, “It used to be my source of pride.” So I asked her, “You did not wear the 
hijab before?” She replied, “No, I used to hate the hijab, I wore it ten years ago, just 
few months before I got married.”418 At that point, Hana’a started to describe her 
activities at school, college, and in the neighbourhood. She told me how she used to 
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be a leader, who everyone liked and admired. Since the age of 15, Hana’a was in a 
relationship with a Bedouin boy, Hassan, from the neighbourhood called. Her 
relationship with him continued until she finished her college:  
He was not black, he was brown, but my father rejected him because of his 
colour and origin. He told me, “Bedouins have different values and traditions. 
It would be like throwing you in the street if I accepted this marriage.” His 
family asked for my hand over ten times but my father told them on the last 
time, “You have no perfect pride here.” His family forced him to marry 
another girl from the neighbourhood as a response to my father’s rejection.  
 
When Hana’a finished her college, it was when Saudi Arabia had started to recruit 
women to work as teachers. Hana’a applied and was accepted. She had to find a 
mihram (a direct blood male relative) to travel with her, as that was the condition of 
the Saudi embassy for completing her recruitment. She asked her uncle, who was very 
old, and he very willingly accepted to go with her. Her father was travelling at that 
time; when he came back, he refused for Hana’a to go to Saudi Arabia, went to the 
embassy and asked for Hana’a’s application to be cancelled: 
This was the second time I saw my dreams falling apart. I saw women 
coming from Saudi Arabia with so many things, building their houses, 
supporting their brothers and sisters to continue education, while I was not 
allowed to do so. My mother was getting older, my brother was about to start 
university, we needed money and I needed to change our lives.419  
 
Hana’a could not find a teaching job, despite undertaking several educational 
trainings to widen her job opportunities. Her neighbour was working as a guard for 
one of the institutions that cares for children with disabilities, and he secured a job for 
her as a caretaker. She worked there for six years and, when her brother finished 
university, she decided to leave the job and start work at a beauty salon: “I did not 
like that job, I was doing it so that I could support my brother to finish his studies.”420 
At the age of 29, her marriage proposals started to decrease: “Actually, no one from 
the neighbourhood asked me for marriage, they all knew about my relationship with 
Hassan.”421 By the age of 35, three of Hana’a’s sisters were already married and she 
was fed up with women whispering about her as a “spinster.” An Egyptian man, who 
lived in the area, asked for her hand and she accepted. Her father refused, but she felt 
this was her last opportunity to get married. Also, her brother was a grown-up by this 	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time and was very supportive of her, so she took her decision and went to the sharia 
court with her brother and conducted the marriage.   
My father did not talk to me for years. I thought I did the right thing. I am not 
sure, actually. The man turned out to be very mean, so obsessed with 
collecting money. I live in fear he might leave one day for Egypt. My 
children are still so young. They do not have Jordanian nationality; he can 
take them away from me, or go to Egypt and leave us without support. I now 
live with the fear of losing my children.422  
 
I left Hana’a’s house thinking of how many women with opportunities to change their 
lives, similar to Hana’a, could not manage due to the combination of harsh living 
conditions and restrictions. While Hana’a had a great potential to make some changes 
in her life, her father’s power of wilaya forbade her from realising this. Her 
submission to her father’s orders did not allow her to find the right tactics to face him 
until she was empowered by the presence of a supportive brother. She accepted her 
father’s orders because, for Hana’a, losing her father was a matter that could 
jeopardise her family’s status in the neighbourhood: “We were all women with only 
one small brother, if my father stopped visiting us people would think we have no 
dhahir (back) to protect us.”423 Even if the man is invisible and does not exist in 
women’s daily lives, nor does he provide for the family financially, the idea that he is 
somewhere and can intervene in matters of urgency, or that women are held 
responsible before their males, seems important for women. This is particularly acute 
in conditions when there is no other available support system, and when women’s 
status is determined in relation to the male power in the family.  
 
Hana’a looked at independence as something insignificant and not a priority, as she 
first had to think of her family, not herself. She described her practices in a relational 
manner, and in connection to her family’s living conditions. What she wanted was 
very much tied to improving the living conditions of her family and helping her 
mother. She was very happy when she spoke of her four sisters’ improved living 
conditions because of education and the support she gave to them. She was also very 
proud that her brother is a successful engineer, and capable of supporting her and 
protecting her sisters.  
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Hana’a – as a leader at school who once, on the occasion of Palestinian Land Day, as 
she told me, mobilised other girls and managed to close the school so they could 
participate in the demonstration – was certainly capable of challenging her father’s 
power, particularly as he was not present in her life all the time. What undermined her 
capability to do so was the position of her family in the community, and fear of being 
stigmatised as women living without men’s protection.  This is in addition to the 
brutal living conditions that placed her in a position to be family’s saviour. Such a 
burden resulted in Hana’a’s tactics of surviving mechanisms of control. Therefore, as 
it was expressed by other women, gaining independence should not be at the expense 
of family ties and interests. This account is also reflected Freeman’s (2005) study of 
Morocco, where women’s notion of freedom was constructed to accommodate family 
interests. This was also discussed in Chapter 3, where I argued how women’s 
perception of the Self was developed in relation to their families’ normative values of 
femininity and masculinity. Therefore, such identification necessitates tactics that do 
not undermine women’s relationships with their family, tribes, and the community at 
large. It is also a tactic of bargaining with patriarchy in which women have 
“protection and security in exchange for submissiveness and propriety.”424  
 
As Freeman (2005) posited, the interconnectedness of individual women with family 
in Morocco did not undermine women’s ability to have individual experiences and 
identities.425 However, Hana’a’s relational independence eliminated the possibility of 
confronting power until her brother took control of family issues. For other women, 
confronting power was done either through securing alternative means of support or 
when wilaya rules contradicted other relations, particularly with regards to depriving 
women of their children, as Elina’s cased shows.  
 
I met Elina on a cold day in Amman in January 2012. I was at the Jordanian Women’s 
Union (JWU) interviewing women, when Elina entered with a police officer. All of 
her body was shaking and I could not figure out whether she was shaking due to cold 
or fear. A few days later, I went to the Jordanian Women’s Union’s shelter and Elina 
was still there. I asked her if I could talk to her and she was very keen to speak. Elina 
came to the JWU with a police officer from the Family Protection Department. Earlier 	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that day, Elina’s father had planned for her to travel with him to Palestine. The father 
had arranged for Elina’s marriage in her hometown of Hebron. She is divorced with 
three children, whom she did not want to leave behind. When she was at the King 
Hussein Bridge border checkpoint, Elina shouted to the police and asked for help. The 
police came and took her to a private room, where she told them of her father’s 
intention. The police sympathised with Elina’s story and took her back to Amman 
with her father and two brothers. “I do not know where I got the courage to do that,” 
said Elina. “I was frightened but I thought I will give it a try.”426 Elina fits the 
normative criteria of beauty: she is blonde, tall, and has blue eyes. She narrated: 
My beauty is my curse. I started to get marriage’s proposals at the age of 
nine. At the age of 13, my father arranged my marriage to a Saudi guy. He 
was ugly and old. My father took it as a business opportunity. I told my 
father I did not want to marry him but he did not listen, so I attempted suicide 
by taking all of my grandmother’s pills. The marriage was put off due to my 
mother and siblings’ pressure on my father. A few months later, another 
marriage was arranged. This time the guy was handsome and had been 
working in the Gulf for a while, so he had money. I was happy to be engaged 
to him. I lived with the man for 15 years. He was a control freak. I could not 
go out unless he was with me. I was almost a prisoner in the house.427 
 
Elina spent the fifteen years trying to survive both her father and husband’s control. 
She tried to convince her father to allow her to divorce, but he refused. Elina mainly 
relied on her siblings and mother’s interventions each time she wanted to do 
something that her father and husband refused, such as attending vocational training 
for hair and beauty. “It was a life changing experience for me, mingling with other 
girls and doing something for myself, I wanted to do that because I knew at some 
point I would need to rely on myself.”428  
 
When her husband and father had a dispute over business, Elina took her father’s side, 
and it was at that point her father agreed to take a case to the court and obtain a 
divorce for her. “I did not know that my father, within six months, would arrange a 
second marriage for me, otherwise I would have not asked for divorce. I wanted to 
stay with my kids.” Elina was now very determined to rebel against her father. She 
decided to go to court and ask for custody of her children; she is also looking for a 
job. As she stated:  	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I am not leaving here [the JWU shelter] unless I have secured some work and 
found a flat for my kids and me. I have saved some money with my mother 
that will allow me to start my life. 
 
I am not sure what happened with Elina later, but it was obvious to me that she was 
not going back to the person she had been. Elina’s actions of attempted suicide, 
negotiation with her father, surviving her husband’s abuse, and rebelling against her 
father’s decision to arrange another marriage did not challenge her father’s authority 
per se, but rather was challenging what Elina thought to be unfair. After already 
challenging her father, she started to think about how unfair this authority over her 
was, and thus questioned the entire concept of wilaya over women: “I was naïve. I 
thought the more obedient I was the more I would get the support of my father. I 
realise now that the more you give the more men want to take out of you.”429 
 
The tactics that Elina used for fifteen years included: spoiling her husband at times 
and ignoring him at others; crying whenever she saw her father to make him feel for 
her struggle; and, convincing her husband to buy valuable objects that she kept with 
her mother and sold at times when her husband punished her and the children by not 
giving any money. Such tactics can be described, in Dywer’s (1987) words, as 
“discrete and carefully veiled acts of rebellion.”430 These tactics are similar to what 
Scott (1990) termed “infrapolitics of the subordinates.”431 At this level, as Scott 
posits, there are “a wide range of low profile forms of resistance that dare not to speak 
in their own name.”432 These are “everyday forms of resistance”, which are not 
announced by the powerless but, instead, take place secretly or in a hidden domain. 
Scott’s formula of “the more menacing the power the thicker is the mask”433 assists us 
in understanding that the relationship between domination and subordination is 
dialectical instead of fixed. Even when power is excessive, subordinates do not 
submit entirely to the power but rather defer to it as long as it is present; what is done 
behind the power is different than that which is done in its presence. Scott then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 Ibid. 
430 Daisy Hilse Dwyer, 1978. “Ideologies of Sexual Inequality and Strategies for Change in Male-
Female Relations” in American Ethnologist, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 1978), pp. 227-240: 235. 
431 James Scott, 1990. Domination and the Art of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, Yale University 
Press: 17. 
432 Scott, 1990: 17.  
433 Ibid: 23. 
146	  	  
suggests that deference to power “is one of the consequences of a stratification” 
between those who give orders and those who receive them, and is “not its creator.”434  
 
In this sense, Elina was not submitting to her husband or father’s authority but was 
trying to survive through these daily practices; furthermore, Elina did not clearly 
define or see these tactics as resistance, as she did not intend to confront her father or 
husband’s authority, but was instead preparing herself for another stage of life, such 
as an opportunity for training in the beauty industry. Dwyer (1978) shows how 
women make logical sense of certain behaviours, such as a pilfering or sorcery: 
Women feel that those valuables give women a measure of security as well as 
means for fulfilling future material desires. Moreover, these protections, it is 
felt, must be kept available, for life with men, however content and giving 
those men might be at the moment, is deemed ever unsure.435  
 
However, Elina was not just making sense of these practices, she also believed that 
one day she would need to survive on her own or return to her family, so she wanted 
to gain the her family’s support as well as secure herself financially. Elina’s 
determination to confront her father has also become a goal due to the support she 
received from the Jordanian Women’s Union: “I know I have people beside me 
now.”436 While trying to explain her next steps, Elina told me: 
When I shouted to the police officer, I was petrified because I thought I am 
doing something wrong. I was terrified of what would happen to me after 
losing my dad and brothers. Knowing that there are people who can help me 
to go through this has certainly contained my fears. I know I have to face 
many things on my own later on, but at least now I know where to start. 
 
Elina was also lucky to have resorted to police officers who sympathised with her 
case, which is not regular police procedure, as I show in Chapter 5, as some police 
officers take the side of the father or brothers rather than the woman raising the 
complaint. Elina’s conditions – knowing that the police are with her, she has a place 
to stay and lawyers to help get custody of the children – are conditions of 
empowerment. I was fortunate to work with women during my time at the JWU and 
see how simple words and means of support might change women’s lives. I never 
believed that we changed women’s lives, but rather that the work we do encourages 
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women to take action because they know they have support. In such conditions, 
women can seek alternatives to the social security of the family, as in the case of 
Rula. The fear of losing familial support begins to fade when women realise they can 
gain this support elsewhere.  
 
In Hana’a’s case, the unavailability of alternatives and limited choices of work are not 
only the result of the restrictions of the community and her father, but also the limited 
work choices for Palestinian women in poor areas. The public administration’s 
reform, which started in the early 1980s in Jordan, prioritised the recruitment of 
eastern Jordanians437, which meant opportunities for teaching at public schools were 
not open to Hana’a. The only other available opportunities were at private schools, 
which were more open to women from the upper middle-class with university degrees 
and English language proficiency. These were the only available options for work, 
which Hana’a perceived as degrading her position and taking her toward the same 
destiny as that of her mother: “My mother was a cleaner. I became the caretaker of 
children with disabilities. It is the same nature of work, just a different title. I have 
nothing against it but I studied to change our lives. It turned out that my education 
was not enough.”438 
 
The stories of Hana’a and Elina demonstrate the complexity of power relations and 
structural inequality. Living in such circumstances seems to deviate from identifying 
the source of such inequalities and oppressions.439 Interestingly, some women in the 
area of Jabal al Nadhif expressed negative thoughts regarding Syrian refugee women, 
whose number started to increase in the country in 2012 due to the excessive use of 
weapons by the Syrian regime against the revolution. The negative attitudes towards 
Syrian refugees could be difficult to explain, particularly when it comes from people 
who have themselves experienced displacement and war. However, it can have some 
logic when explained in relation to how Syrian women, who are portrayed in Syrian 
dramas as perfect obedient housewives, are a source of a threat to poor women in 
Jordan who live in insecure marriages, and when polygyny is used as a threat to 
women’s social security and wellbeing. With the media propaganda about Syrian 	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women’s cheap dowers or availability for marriage, this becomes a pertinent threat for 
women in this area; thus, instead of challenging the system that places them in 
insecure positions, they have blamed Syrian women. This is in addition to the 
government’s manipulative strategy that has systematically used refugees, whether 
Palestinian, Iraqi, or Syrian, as means of restricting freedom and deferring political 
and economic reforms.  
 
Class,	  Tribe	  and	  Gender	  in	  the	  Pursuing	  of	  Women’s	  Independence	  
In Jordan, women’s practices are not only determined within family relations but also 
within the larger tribal context. Sarah, an activist who comes from a poor family but is 
affiliated with a powerful tribe, told me of her response to the tribe’s rejection of her 
marriage to a Christian man, who was ready to convert to Islam if the marriage 
proposal was accepted:  
My marriage became a national issue, everyone had a say except me or my 
parents, who were fine with my choice but could not challenge their tribe. It 
makes you question who you are not just in terms of your position as a 
woman, but also in regards to every single relation surrounding you.440  
Suzie, a young woman with a postgraduate education, shared with me how she was 
raised on an equal footing with her brothers until the age of 18. When at university, 
however, the family started to put restrictions on her movement and determine with 
whom she could associate. Suzie left the house for three days in order to force her 
family to stop interfering in her life: “I am a complete human. It was really irritating 
to see that my brother kept his freedom and can do whatever he wants and I have to 
come back home early and am not allowed to travel unless my brother is with me.”441 
Suzie finished her master’s degree in New York, where she had spent three years on 
her own. 
It was okay for my family to leave me in New York because it is normal for 
girls from my family to study abroad, but it was not okay for me to sleep over 
at my friend’s place in Jordan. I never understood this dilemma; as a girl I 
have to make sure my reputation is not affected by the people I know or 
where I go inside Jordan, but when I am abroad nobody cares what I do.442  
 
Amongst the rich, the social pressure involved in a family’s decision to control its 
daughters’ scope of activities is very significant, particularly when the family is well-	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affiliated or has strong connections with its tribe. In the case of Suzie, her father was 
very concerned with his tribe’s potential reaction: what they would say and do if he 
allowed his daughter to behave freely. Suzie was frustrated by the fact that all her 
decisions entail having to think of people that she does not know or belong to. 
However, Suzie has never thought of searching for a job. She does not feel that she 
needs to work or be financially independent: “My father and brothers do not make me 
in need of anything. I have my credit cards and they feed into my bank account 
regularly. They are very generous.”443 
 
Suzie’s views on women and tactics shift when it comes to financial responsibilities. 
Whilst she believes that independence is “women’s freedom to make their own 
decisions,” at the same time she thinks, “A woman should be taken care of financially 
by her father and brothers.”444 Even when she was not allowed to marry the person of 
her choosing because he was not deemed suitable, she did not question this as a 
limitation to her independence, but rather understood her family’s position: 
He was not from the same class. When my family refused to meet him I was 
very angry. Now, I understand why they did so; he would have never been 
able to meet my needs. My family protected me from the foolish decision I 
was about to make. 445   
 
The logic of Suzie’s accounts of independence is related to the privileges she enjoys. 
On the one hand, she rejects wilaya over women in issues related to the lifestyle of the 
rich class, in terms of dressing, travelling, studying abroad, and mingling with friends 
until late at night. Yet, on the other hand, she accepts certain rules of wilaya over 
women, such as the need for male protection, and does not question the limitations on 
her decisions while financially dependent on her family. Indeed, she justifies the 
control over her marriage decisions as rational and aimed at protecting her from 
foolishness. The compromise she makes, based on her divergent position on 
independence, is a tactic involving obedience to the family on issues that do not 
endanger class interests, particularly in relation to marriage choices, in order to 
continue living and enjoying the privileges of the upper class, which does not restrict 
her movement, way of dress, or activities as much. So, Suzie’s tactics involved 
negotiated independence, and include compliance on both issues related to marriage – 	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to preserve her class status – and other particular issues seen as part of class identity 
rather than women’s equal position.   
 
A differing example is that of Leila, who is from a very wealthy family. Leila 
welcomed me at her door by asking: “What do you mean you are doing research on 
wilaya over women?”446 She found it difficult to comprehend that such a law exists in 
Jordan: “Is this something new or it has been around forever?”447 Leila was raised as 
equal to her brothers. She continued her graduate and postgraduate education in 
London, and lived in Amman by herself. Her family understood her decision of not 
wanting to marry until she has an established career. She stated: 
I respect my brothers and father as long as they do not intervene in my life. I 
have my space and they respect that. Of course, I consult with my family on 
the important matters, but in the end I do what I think is suitable for me.448  
 
Leila is from one of the very wealthy and powerful families in Jordan,449 who all live 
in a very close community. Members of such families are rarely seen in public spaces, 
such as going to the passport department to have documents issued. Most of the time, 
there are people who perform services for them; so, Leila did not go herself to get a 
passport and was not asked about her father’s approval. She has also not been actively 
aware of what problems women have in the country, apart from some issues: “I heard 
that women cannot pass their nationality to their kids. I am so against this, they should 
be able to do so.”450 Her family comes from Syrian origins, so she also has no tribal 
pressure on her.  
 
In Leila’s view of femininity: “Women may look different in terms of the way they 
dress, but certainly there are no other differences between men and women. I believe 
femininity is an identity of sex but not an identity of roles.”451  She has also 
acknowledged that part of her personality is related to the way she was raised to be 
self-dependent: “For my family to leave me in London at the age of 18, I learned to 
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do everything by myself and experienced the essence of independence.”452 She also 
mentioned that she could not take the decision to leave her family home until she 
started to earn enough money: “It was not acceptable to tell my family I wanted to 
live on my own and ask them to support me financially.”453 Leila, despite her family’s 
wealth, knew that her road to independence lay in a financially independent position. 
She did not think of her family’s wealth as her own, rather she said: “What my father, 
husband, or brothers have are theirs, not mine, to be independent I had to find my own 
financial resources.” 
 
Leila, however, did not live away from her family’s house. She was in one of the 
family’s building on the same street. For her, it was the idea that she can afford to live 
on her own before getting married. When I asked Leila about how she met her 
husband, she answered: “Now you are going to question everything I have told 
you.”454 “Why do you think so?” I replied, and she continued:  
I am married to my cousin. It was not an arranged marriage. I think I have 
fallen for him. He was just coming from the USA with a PhD degree. He 
shared my values of a modern life. First, I did not like him much. My parents 
convinced me to go out with him. We were together around six months 
without an official engagement. Then we both decided to get engaged.455 
 
Leila also mentioned that her family was in favour of her cousin because they are a 
small family and usually prefer endogamy for marriage. She stated that she could 
have refused if she did not like him, but she did. Of course, the fact that she is married 
to her cousin did not make me question her goal of achieving independence, but it 
certainly reveals many things about wilaya over women practices in the rich class. As 
the family has an interest in keeping the wealth amongst its members without 
contradicting what Leila calls a “modern style” of living, they have to find ways other 
than forcing Leila to accept the marriage. What appeared to be a modern style is 
another way of practising wilaya rules. Being well-educated with an established 
career necessitated that Leila’s consent to the marriage had to be taken into 
consideration. Suzie also mentioned that her family introduced her to a man after 
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months of rejecting the one of her choice, but it did not work out: “I guess he ran 
away from me. I was too free for him.”456  
 
Not all working women of the rich class share Leila’s perception of independence, 
there were also views expressing that the work they perform is part of their 
prestigious status, covers their own expenses rather than contributing equally to the 
family’s expenses, or is related to gaining an independent state. For instance, Diala, a 
working woman from the rich class, told me: “The money I get is for my extras. My 
husband takes care of all the family’s expenses including mine.”457 Having a job is a 
tactic for Diala, not part of her conception of independence; it allows her to decide on 
expenses or financial matters for which her husband does not want to pay. She told 
me that her husband refused to hire another domestic worker, so she then had to pay 
the expenses and salary of the second worker: “If I was not working, I would not have 
the possibility to do things in my own way.” Although Diala has an inheritance from 
her father, she had not asked for it and was waiting for her brothers to divide it. She 
thinks of her relationship with her brothers, who are very supportive of her, in a way 
that she is dependent on them socially and needs them in case there is conflict with 
her husband. Her silence on her share of the inheritance is, then, a tactic that 
maintains a good relationship with her brothers and protects her from being abused by 
her husband. Diala also expressed views on women’s right to independence and 
making their own decisions, but also believes a woman should be protected and 
financially supported by her father, brothers, or husband.  
 
Despite the fact that Suzie, Diala and Leila come from the same class, they have 
divergent positions in relation to what independence means and involves, and thus use 
different tactics. Diala and Suzie placed more emphasis on recognising practicalities 
related to the style of life associated with their class, as both they negotiated 
independence through tactics that allowed them to live the upper class lifestyle but did 
not aim to achieve independence from their families. Leila was concerned about her 
independence as a woman. Understanding that she is capable of independence and 
does not require men’s protection, Leila managed to live independently. However, 
being part of a wealthy class meant that her actions were supported and did not 	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dishonour her family, because she lives in a close community; the opposite may have 
been the case for middle and poorer classes, where relationships are more open and 
supervised by community members.  
 
The levels of wealth and political power also differ for Suzie and Leila’s families, 
which affected their lifestyles. In the case of Suzie, the family’s tribal affiliation 
impacted some of her activities. Suzie’s family comes from a tribe in the south of 
Jordan. Her father still has connections with his tribe, nominated himself twice for 
parliamentary elections and won, as his tribe supported him in the election. Therefore, 
he is very much in favour of keeping a low profile of Suzie’s activities. Leila’s family 
are very close to the royal family, and no tribal connections are needed to maintain 
the political power of the family. Being a “minority”458 also detaches them from the 
community’s supervision. Therefore, unlike Leila, Suzie’s tactics were more focused 
on co-option and accommodation of class and tribal interests.  
 
It was interesting to discover that women’s tactics are sometimes decided upon in 
collaboration with family members. While the mother and sisters are most often the 
main supporters of ideas and tricks, in Suzie’s case, her father and brothers helped her 
find tricks to escape the tribe’s gossip, interventions, and negative statements. She 
told me how her father and brothers inform her when there are large tribal gatherings, 
of who will be there, what is the best code of dress, how she should be talking and the 
way she should act. In this way, Suzie’s father and brothers, who are caught between 
the ‘modern’ style of their class and their tribe’s ties, help her to deceive the tribe by 
showing a false adherence to tribal traditions. However, this is not done in Suzie’s 
best interests, but rather in the interests of her father, as keeping good ties with his 
tribe means that his daughter is not perceived negatively.  
 
From the previous discussion, it is important to point out that, within the upper 
classes, women are closer to each other in relation to activities and lifestyles but 
could, at the same time, have divergent views of and different tactics to achieve 	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independence, which certainly influences the level of independence they enjoy.  
Several women from the middle and lower classes shared Leila’s ideas of women, but 
their positions did not allow them to reach the same level of experiencing 
independence. For instance Reem, whose views I discussed in the previous chapter, 
tried to convince her family to allow her to rent an apartment with other women; they 
reaction was brutal, even escalating to the level of locking her at home.  
 
Unlike Suzie and Diala, Shireen, Leila, Rula, and Siham have successfully managed 
to draw a line between issues that can be negotiated and those that are not up for 
negotiation or intervention, like the choice of job and marriage. These are presented 
by those women as ‘red lines.’ However, living in a more open community than Leila, 
Rula, Siham and Shireen sometimes had to take notice of things that are not 
acceptable.  For instance, when Shireen is covering a story with a male colleague, she 
makes sure to wear her badge, or to travel by public transportation or the newspaper 
office’s cars rather than private cars: 
One of my male neighbours once saw me with a male colleague, he came 
directly to my father and told him about it. My father turned him away but I 
have to make sure it does not happen again so I avoid placing my family in 
such awkward positions.459 
 
Although Shireen, Leila, Rula and Siham each represent a different social group, they 
have similar views and understandings of themselves as independent and reliable; 
they also all experience relatively limited practices of wilaya over them, or wilaya in 
another form in the case of Leila. The practices were limited because of how they 
thought of themselves as independent, capable personalities and how this thinking 
influenced their tactics of achieving independence and the tactics they used to make 
use of the opportunities available.   
 
However, knowledge of the disciplinary methods and unknown consequences of their 
actions limited Shireen’s and Salam’s spaces and movement. The level of security 
women enjoy when deciding to take certain actions could influence their tactics. For 
Leila, in addition to the economic privileges and her understanding of herself as 
competent, her knowledge that her family’s reaction to her actions would not be 
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brutal or harsh, as well as the absence of community pressure, made it more possible 
for her to decide to live on her own until she got married. Therefore, it is not that 
“social class, education, and family’s religious orientation informed women's 
strategies,”460 it is rather women’s perception their independence, whether or not they 
make use of the opportunities within their class, the limitations placed by social and 
political powers, their ability to make use of available resources, and knowledge of 
the consequences and effects that informed women’s practices of hegemonic 
femininity in Jordan.   
	  
Conclusion	  	  If femininity is a social position, as Connell (2000) suggests, and women’s practices 
that embody the symbolic meaning of femininity are the effects of such a position, as 
well as work to reproduce the social position, then tactics sometimes offer space for 
women to make use of these meanings in ways that can confirm or challenge 
normative femininity. At other times, however, tactics merely provide women with 
the techniques to eradicate, survive, or minimise the constraints and control 
mechanisms over them. 
In this chapter, I have showed that women’s everyday practices – particularly in 
relation to one of the core elements of normative femininity, women’s established, 
dependent state – neither fully correspond to nor totally contradict the established 
knowledge about women’s dependence, which is based on the viewpoint of gender 
differences. Rather, these practices sometimes matched and roamed outside the 
gender order simultaneously. The use of tactics to achieve independence – whether at 
the level of work, marriage, travel, or code of dress – is triggered by women’s non-
conformance with the idea that they are incompetent or not capable of determining 
what is best for themselves; they must employ tactics in a situation where their 
choices are administrated and sanctioned by state laws and the kinship system.  
The redefinition of independence by some women, which shows their acceptance 
and/or rejection of particular aspects of normative femininity, also reveals that these 
women make choices that neither reject nor accept normative femininity altogether. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Shahin and Lehnerer, 2001: 570. 
156	  	  
this sense, they reuse femininity in a way that is suitable for their situations, 
conditions, and interests, which shows, as Connell (1987) suggests, that there is an 
interaction between the configured space of the subjects, their social practices, and the 
material relations of social life. In the case of Jordan, the interaction also includes the 
legalised position of women, and the established legal and customary control 
mechanisms.   
If the significance of femininity lies in the ways it legitimises and rationalises 
women’s subordinate positions and, consequently, regulates and coordinates women’s 
social practices, women’s tactics show that while this impacts women’s understanding 
of themselves – in various ways, as I have shown in Chapter 3 – it is not always 
capable of organising and controlling women’s lives in an orchestrated manner. 
Through some examples, I showed how women modify the meaning of dependency 
through their tactics, to the extent that they obtained a relative degree of power over 
their lives. However, for some tactics it was necessary that such modification be 
appropriate for both women and those in the position of power. Nonetheless, whilst 
the modification is not entirely outside the normative understanding, it has in many 
ways influenced, shaken, and adjusted gender relationships and arrangements.  
In a context like Jordan, where normative femininity is constructed in the law and has 
legalised control mechanisms that restrict women’s movement and authorise men to 
be their guardians, some of women’s everyday practices have to then be situated in a 
way that does not endanger their existence or risk the gains they already enjoy; this 
necessitates that such actions not pose any direct threat to the system of power. 
Women’s tactics that make them appear contradictory and ambivalent, thus, relate to 
the interests of both women and those in the position of power. A pertinent point in 
this regard, as long as women’s actions are situated in forms of tactics decided on 
from within the power structure, those in positions of authority could have an interest 
in turning a blind eye to these actions. Such interests might be financial; as in the case 
of Siham, her father’s need for her income required that he minimise supervision over 
her daily activities.  
None of my research participants stated that she has claimed her independence by 
publicly announcing a total detachment from her father or brothers’ authority. Rula –
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an activist who also holds a position of power within her family, as an elder daughter 
and financial provider – was able to turn her bargaining tactics into actions that 
confronted the authority of her father. However, as an activist myself, I experienced 
several times how women activists have a greater burden in situating their actions 
from within the system of power rather than in confrontation. This is because being a 
women’s rights activist is a task that demands making compromises, sometimes, so as 
not to be perceived as exceptional or as an outsider; a perception that could jeopardise 
the work and disconnect activists from their constituencies. Therefore, the tactical 
character of women’s everyday practices appears to resonate with both women and 
the political power of femininity. Such a tactical character also impacts the type of 
change and transformation women seek at either the individual or collective levels, 
which appear to be compromises.    
In the majority of cases, women have managed to survive and enhance their lived 
conditions through tactics that either enabled them to keep their privileges or gain a 
negotiated independence. In these cases women have not challenged their positions as 
subordinates but tried to rework the system to their advantage. Dwyer (1976) argued 
that restrictions placed on Moroccan women by the family law entailed women’s 
experiences being very much tied to men’s wishes and values.461 However, even in 
such situations, Dwyer suggested: “Women's narratives did not always fit neatly into 
one and only one category. Indeed, women changed strategy and reworked their plans 
as they strived to forge an identity.”462 I discussed that women’s tactics, whether 
hidden or visible, should not overlook the fact that there are women who live under 
excessively harsh power conditions, which forces them to take a shorter road to 
survival through submitting to male authority. Even under such conditions, one 
cannot label such women as ‘victims’; these women are surviving violence, authority 
and even surprised themselves with their occasional actions in certain situations, like 
in the case of Elina. For some women, postponing confrontation with authority is 
about seizing the right opportunity and momentum. Albeit some of those women 
maintained views of female dependency and protection from within hegemonic 
hierarchal gender relationships, their harsh conditions and restrictions resulted in their 
using tactics that undermined mechanisms of control whenever the possibility arose.  	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Nonetheless, women’s everyday practices, as narrated by women, sometimes reach 
beyond time and seizing the right momentum. Some women’s practices reflect a 
developed thinking to reach independence. The tactics of some women, who have 
reached a state of conflict with femininity, appear to be well thought through and not 
dependent mainly on time. The experience of developing tactics, for some women, led 
to a desire for achieving more; tactics for them are no longer related to opportunities, 
rather they find ways to make these opportunities available. This suggests that 
women’s everyday practices do not remain tactical in character; they might turn to be 
strategic, particularly in cases when women seek to transform their social positions.  
Class, education and work appeared to be fundamental elements in empowering or 
disempowering women, as well as providing them with greater or lesser opportunities 
to escape normative femininity in their everyday practices. However, these elements, 
if not interlaced with women’s self-conception as independent, would not necessarily 
result in practices that either challenge the order or reduce the mechanisms of control. 
Some educated, rich working women justified wilaya over women as a security 
mechanism, and used it for the purpose of maintaining a powerful position within the 
marriage relationship. Diala’s tactic of maintaining a good relationship with her 
brothers and waving her inheritance is influenced by her understanding of the need for 
male relatives’ protection. While Leila’s experience of independence ensured that she 
did not have to use tactics, her family had to find tactics to persuade Leila to marry 
her cousin. The interaction between women’s class and the institution of tribe is also 
of significance. Women who belong to a tribe find themselves forced to follow their 
male family members’ interests of keeping good ties with the tribe, rather than their 
own.  
 
As the configured social space is very much linked to the structure of power, 
women’s position within the power structure of the family, tribe and class is of 
significance to the practised tactic. For instance, elder daughters and workers have 
more opportunities to bargain and negotiate their spaces; however, being part of the 
power structure sometimes provides less possibilities for women to use tactics to 
roam outside of that same structure. For example, Shireen had a different view of 
herself, but was able to manipulate and make use of the system less than her sisters. 
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Women who are less visible or more distant from power structures have more chances 
to use tactics to experience new realities about themselves outside the framework of 
hegemonic femininity. This is because when women – through education, position 
within the family, or financial support – take part in the structure of power, they are 
more supervised than others. In some cases, women place further restrictions on 
themselves in order to show that they are not posing a threat to the system. These 
calculations might be less pertinent for women with no power (position, money, 
‘beauty’, and so forth) and, thus, the chance to escape mechanisms of control could be 
greater.  
 
The survival tactics, as I discussed, reveal that women do not always aim to resist, 
negotiate or submit to the system; instead, some aim just to live it through tactics that 
allow them to minimise the mechanisms of control. These women’s practices do not 
reflect any tensions with normative femininity, only with the mechanisms that sustain 
it. For some women, for example, wearing the hijab is a tactic that allows them to 
escape control over movement by making them less visible.463 In this case, women do 
not think of what it means for a woman to wear the hijab, or whether the act 
reproduces normative femininity, what is of significance to them is how they can use 
one systemic control mechanism to minimise the effects of another. Interestingly 
enough, when women lessen the effects of some control mechanisms they may also 
reverse their tactics. Such was the case of Rula, who took off the hijab when she 
developed other tactics or when she reached, as she described, “a state of confidence 
and trust that allowed me to move freely.”  
 
However, by not owning means of survival on their own, some women’s tactics could 
also be limited by their tie to opportunities, available resources, and coincidental 
events. When women have a limited possibility of using tactics, they could turn to 
merely submitting to the system and have less possibility “to push the limits of 
doxa.”464 Such was the case with Hana’a, who not only survived the system of power 
but also contributed to its production; she empowered her brother to be the protector 
and take the role of the wali, despite the fact that she was the family’s provider. Her 
perception of female dependency is influenced by women’s vulnerability when living 	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without a male presence. This vulnerability is compounded by her inability to make 
use of her education or own the resources that could enable her to change her position 
of power.  However, lack of resources and opportunities could lead women to use 
unconcealed, ‘dangerous’ tactics. This is the case for women in prison, which I 
address in the next chapter in my discussion of how women’s limited options for 
manoeuvring entails their overt challenge to mechanisms of control.  
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Chapter 5 
Rebelling against the System of Wilaya: 
Women “in Need of Correction and Rehabilitation” 
	  
Introduction	  
In 1996, the Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU) launched its Social, Psychological and 
Legal Support Hotline for women. A few days after advertising the Hotline in the 
national newspapers, I received a call from a woman. Her voice was very low and 
shaking, and I could hardly hear what she was saying. She told me that she had been 
locked in the bathroom of her family’s house for three years. The lawyer Mouna 
Zughbaba and I went and visited her the next day. Her mother did not allow us at first 
and said she was alone in the house. After we spent half an hour negotiating at the 
front door, she finally allowed us in. A few minutes later, a woman entered the room 
with a very short haircut that seemed to be snipped randomly, scars all over the face, 
and a bruised forehead. After her mother went to make us tea, I asked her if she was 
the one who called me and she answered, “Yes, but I did not expect you to come.” 
We spent ten minutes with her before her brother came and started shouting at us. He 
asked us to leave and so we did.  
 
In those few minutes, Halah told us that three years before she had decided to get a 
divorce. Her family was against her decision but she had reached a stage where she 
could no longer stand life with her husband. She had been forced to marry him at the 
age of 14. Her husband also wanted to divorce but he was afraid of Halah’s family, as 
her father is the head of the clan465 and headmaster at the secondary school in the 
neighbourhood, and her brothers are well-educated and have powerful positions 
within the clan. Halah and her ex-husband agreed that she would remain in the house 
with the children and not inform the family of their decision until after the idda period 
(the 90 days women have to wait before getting remarried, reasons for this include: in 
case their husband decides to return and ensuring the woman is not pregnant). When 
they informed her family, her brothers came and took her back to the family house. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Palestinians usually use al-hamouleh (clan) which is different than al-qabileh (tribe), used by 
Jordanians.  
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Since then, Halah had remained locked in one of the bathrooms that the family used 
as storage. She was not allowed to see her four children or communicate with anyone. 
She had seen the advertisement for the women’s hotline on the newspaper her mother 
used to wrap her food.  
 
The second day, we wrote an official letter to Halah’s father and sent it to his school. 
He came to see me the same day, carrying with him a report from a well-established 
psychiatrist in Jordan. The report stated that Halah was in an unstable mental 
condition and suffered from schizophrenia. We met the father and brothers several 
times, finally convincing them to release Halah from the bathroom. However, they 
continued to abuse her physically and verbally; Halah eventually jumped from the 
third floor when her family was asleep and went to one of her friends’ houses. The 
next day she called me and I took her to the hospital, as one of her legs was broken. 
Halah insisted at that time that she did not want to reconcile with her family and 
wanted to return to her house and live with her children. Her family refused this and 
reported her absence to the police. After Halah left the hospital, her brothers followed 
us home; there was no place to hide her but on the hotline’s premises, which was 
illegal as well as dangerous. Halah then decided to make a compromise with her 
family if they agreed to give her the basement and bring her children; a compromise 
that her family agreed to but did not implement. A few months later, Halah ran away 
again but this time during the Eid vacation, when the hotline was closed. The police 
caught her on the way to her friend’s house and sent her to jail. We tried to free her 
from jail but the administrative governor refused unless it was permitted by her father. 
A few months later, the family decided to get her out of jail. Halah called me from 
prison and said that her family was getting her released: “I am sure they are going to 
kill me this time.” The lawyer Nour El-Emam and I ran to the administrative 
governor’s office and tried to convince the governor to let us post bail for Halah, 
instead of her family.  We tried to intervene but we had no official power. When 
Halah told the governor it was unsafe for her to go with her father and brothers, he 
looked at her and said: “Your father knows what is best for his family.” Following her 
release, she was supposed to stay with an uncle for a few weeks before going back to 
her family’s house. We followed them to her uncle’s house, but then they changed 
direction and took Halah directly to the family’s house.  
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At the front door, her father was waiting and shot her with 23 bullets. He called the 
police and told them that he had cleansed his honour. Luckily, Halah had not been 
killed as all the bullets had lodged in her bones. Her father and brothers were sent to 
jail. When I visited Halah in the hospital, she told me with a big smile, “I have got 
another chance in life. I am not going to waste it.” She decided to press charges 
against her father and our JWU lawyer represented her in court. The family started to 
negotiate with Halah through us. Halah decided to drop the charges under the 
condition that she would never see any of her family members again. The father was 
released on bail a few days after the shooting, but her brothers were still in prison. 
The father agreed to Halah’s condition, he told me, “She is a witch, I saw her flying 
when I was shooting, we can do nothing more for her.” Halah left the hospital and we 
arranged for her to live temporarily in a room with an elderly lady. Later, she worked 
in a hospital as a cleaner and, soon after, got engaged to a nurse. A few months after, 
Halah and the nurse were married. We managed to reconnect her with her children, 
and she started seeing them on a weekly basis.  
 
I met Halah again during my fieldwork in Jordan in the summer of 2012. It had been 
10 years since I had last spoken with her. She is still working in the hospital, but she 
was promoted few years ago to work in the registry department after gaining a college 
degree in administration. I met her not only to ask her permission to present her story 
in my research, but also because I wanted her voice in detail the process of jailing and 
release from prison. This is a process that encapsulates how the legal and social 
powers of wilaya over women are given priority over the safety and well-being of 
women. In this chapter, I argue that women’s imprisonment in cases when they 
overtly reject family orders and authority is a measure of punishment and discipline, 
not just for women in prison but also for women in the country at large. For prison to 
be the only place available to those who refuse to go back to their family homes, 
sends a strong message of the significance of women’s obedience and adherence to 
family’s rules. Those who are imprisoned are then deliberately addressed as criminals 
of the social order, who need correction and discipline so the rules of male authority 
can be restored.  
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In this chapter, I examine the interconnection of wilaya over women with the state’s 
masculine perceptions of women as in need of correction and rehabilitation, and the 
plight of women’s protection within the framework of male authority and the interests 
of family and community. I discuss several cases of women in the Women’s 
Correction and Rehabilitation Centre/Jwaideh Jail, or what is known in Jordan as the 
place of “protective/safe custody,” to examine the state’s response to those who seek 
autonomous decisions related to marriage, divorce, inheritance rights, and mobility. I 
use women’s stories to discuss, first, how they end up in the prison and when they 
resorted to overtly challenging their families and making potentially dangerous 
decisions. Second, I discuss the state’s policies and procedures around the claim of 
women’s protection. In the process, I shed light on how different state actors (police, 
judges, governors) respond to women’s action of leaving their family’s houses. Third, 
I address the issue of class and tribe in dealing with women who run away from their 
family’s home.  
Representation of Women and the Honour/Shame Complex 
In my discussion of women prisoners in this chapter, who are mainly addressed 
within a framework of an honour/shame complex, I do not aim to engage in the 
discussion of honour and how it is conceived or contributes to the constructing of 
women’s sexuality. Rather, I seek to add another voice to the growing critique of the 
explanation of cultural-specificity in general, and the honour/shame binary in 
particular; critique of how the honour/shame binary in feminist literature has been 
conceptualised based on an extraordinarily fixed and limited orientalist approach.466 
This is because the analysis of the honour/shame binary is tied either to an ideological 
cultural explanation or the control of women’s sexuality within Muslim contexts.467 In 
the vision of honour as a cultural value, shame is assigned to women, while honour is 
an attribute of men.468 The notion is, therefore, seen as a central part of the cultural 
reproduction of gender differences. Conceiving of honour in relation to Middle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Rosemary J. Coombe, 1990. “Barren Ground: Re-Conceiving Honour and Shame in the Field of 
Mediterranean Ethnography” in Anthropologica, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1990), pp. 221-238 and Zeba Crook, 
“Honor, Shame, and Social Status Revisited” in Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 128, No. 3 (Fall 
2009), pp. 591-611.  
467 Ibid. 
468 Unni Wikan, 1984, “Shame and Honour: A Contestable Pair”, in Man, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1984), 
pp. 635-652. 
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Eastern societies through an orientalist discourse “enables and compels one to see 
such values, not as mere ideas, ideals, superstructural ideologies or representations, 
but….as deeply embedded in a ‘form of life,’ or way of being in the world. This ‘form 
of life,’ however, is incredibly static.” 469  The binary is used to represent a 
homogenous, unitary and biased culture of the region.  
 
Challenging the ideological and political frameworks of orientalists, feminists have 
questioned these cultural explanations. Nadje Al-Ali (2008) challenges the neo-
orientalist approach of cultural explanation by addressing that the main markers of 
difference in relation to the situation of Iraqi women are related to social class, place 
of origin, and political affiliations, and not to cultural or religious boundaries.470 
Johnson et al.’s (2009) study of Palestinian marriage arrangements and celebrations 
show how “lived politics”, rather than culture, impacts on the “symbolic, material, 
and social arrangements of marriage.” 471  
 
Other approaches place more emphasis on the role of the state in perpetuating 
particular discriminatory practices against women under the claim of culture.472 Beth 
Baron (2006) discusses how the legal changes made to articles related to crimes of 
‘honour’ in Egypt’s penal code were implicated in the historical process of state 
building, change to political climate and circumstances, and colonialism. In relation to 
penalising crimes of honour in Egypt, She argues: 
(The) Modern state had already moved the issue into the public domain, 
endeavouring to take over the guardianship of family honour from fathers, 
brothers, and (agnatic) uncles and cousins. Both efforts were an attempt to 
redraw communities of honour and shift loyalties to the state and / or 
nationalists. 473 
 
By this, Baron posits that the state did not challenge the notion of family honour but 
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instead sought to enforce its role as the guardian of the nation.474 Likewise, Abu Odeh 
discusses legal provisions in Jordan, Syria, and Egypt in relation to honour crimes, 
noting how state and nationalist elites aimed to give a traditional practice a modern 
face through legal procedures seen to be aimed at containing the practice. However, 
the state’s “regulation and judicial practice [was] a response to the violence and the 
sexual practices; the resistant sexual types and practices being a response to the 
balance between the two types of violence, social and official.”475 By directing crimes 
towards the concept of honour and giving lenient sentences to killers, Abu Odeh 
suggests that the state ensured women’s sexual practices were also punishable. 
Welchman and Hossain (2005) use a legal analysis to link ‘honour crimes’ to the 
broader context of violence against women, with emphasis on the basis in law that 
encourages the practice. They also both question the orientalist approach of 
associating the crime with cultural aspects of ‘honour.’ 
 
Consequently, I will add to the literature discussed in this chapter how the state’s role 
in policing women’s choices, which are made outside the guardianship system, 
perpetuates the notion of honour and female morality as the very basis of norms of 
authentic Jordanian identity; in turn, this founds the social and legal grounds for 
killing and jailing women under the claim of family ‘honour.’ 
 
State	  Sanctions	  over	  Women	  Seeking	  Autonomy	  	  
Deniz Kandiyoti (1991) argues that in a context where the state deliberately uses local 
patronage networks and sectarian competitions in its distributive system, citizens turn 
to their primary solidarities for two reasons: first, to protect themselves; and second, 
to compensate for the unequal treatment of citizens and the ineffective administration 
of citizen’s affairs. This compensation is usually performed and manifested through 
men’s control over women, and “reinforces the strangle-hold of communities over 
their women, whose roles as boundary markers become heightened.”476  
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In these systems, women make use of the opportunities available and adopt 
accommodating and bargaining strategies as a result of a lack of alternative support 
systems, apart from family and kinship groups.477 In Chapter 4, I discussed how 
women use various tactics to challenge, survive, and accommodate the value system 
and restrictions imposed on them. I argued that, although some women have used 
tactics to gain autonomy, they have done so in ways that have not risked or 
endangered the freedoms already gained. In all the cases I presented in Chapter 4, 
regardless of adopted tactic, women were aware of the family structure and hierarchy 
through which their tactics were intended to keep the lines of communication open 
with their families. In the context of Jordan, and elsewhere in the region, this is not 
optional but obligatory due the social and legal authority over women given to family 
and kinship groupings by the state.  
When the state is incapable or unwilling to represent the interests of society’s 
members, the importance of family and kinship relations is inflated. 
Consequently, any challenges to patriarchal authority in the domestic sphere 
– including but not limited to challenges to the use of violence – can be 
construed as threatening to the family as an institution.478 
 
Awareness that certain acts are punishable and have negative consequences on their 
daily lives leads women to realise tactics from within given spaces and options. 
Whilst they sometimes try to create their own spaces and options, this does not come 
without cost. Some costs mentioned by women are related to the way they dress, the 
choice of work and activities they engage in, contributing to the family finances, 
being falsely obedient, and bribing their brothers. However, when women fail to 
achieve certain autonomous decisions, particularly those related to marriage, divorce, 
and inheritance rights, they may resort to more risky forms of challenging their 
family’s orders. The most common form of challenge is running away from home.  
 
The majority of women who run away from home use this as a pressure tool to force 
their family to reverse their decisions. Most of the time, women seek the assistance of 
tribal leaders, relatives, neighbours, or close friends of the family. In some other 
cases, women hide with friends who are unknown to their families. If the destiny of a 
woman is unknown or no reconciliation has been reached through those who are 	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mediating, the family usually reports the woman’s absence to the police. When 
caught, women are asked to return to their families’ houses. In cases where women 
refuse, the police refer the case to the administrative governor, who place them in jail 
with the justification of protecting them from the threat of their family.  
 
The legal basis for these procedures is related to the administrative detention 
provisions; specifically Law No. 7 of the Crime Prevention Law of 1954, which 
provides powers to the police to make arrests. 479  This law bypasses all legal 
procedures, as the governor may order administrative detention against any person 
who may be “about to commit a crime or assist in its commission”, those who 
“habitually” steal, shelter thieves, or hide stolen goods, and anyone who, if remaining 
at liberty, would constitute a “danger to the people.”480 The Law does not specifically 
authorise placing women in protective custody, but governors have nevertheless used 
it for decades to detain women.481  Thus, under this law, perpetrators who are 
presumably about to commit a crime are left free, while women are imprisoned “for 
their own protection.” As a 2009 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report concluded, 
“Governors stand the principles of justice on their head by punishing the victims 
instead of prosecuting those responsible for such threats.”482 
 
For administrative detainees to be released from jail, a guarantor is required. 
Ironically, a woman in protective custody can only be bailed out by her guardian, who 
can act as her guarantor. Typically, this guarantor is the one who is involved in the 
threats that led to her detention. “To insist that the same male family members who 
threatened the woman with violence be the only acceptable guarantors to secure a 
woman’s release is to seal her fate of indefinite detention or expose her to violence 
upon her release.”483 This issue clearly manifests the choice of jailing women as not 
about protection, but rather as related to preserving the family’s decision over the 
woman’s destiny. When the legal guardian is the only one who can bail a woman out 
of jail, or keep her there, this demonstrates the state’s involvement in legitimising 	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violence against women through the intertwined alliance between state and patriarchy, 
as women are trapped between the two. 
These procedures regularly take place regardless of women’s choice or whether the 
threat of murder or violence exists. Jihan, a 25 year-old woman who had been in 
prison for three months, told me: 
I told the governor, there is no threat if he allowed me to stay at my 
[maternal] uncle’s house, but because my father did not want me to go back 
to my uncle’s the governor sent me to jail. I know my family. They will not 
kill me. I did not do anything wrong to be killed. I just did not want to live 
with my father and his wife. They wanted me to marry my stepmother’s 
brother.484 
Jihan’s parents were divorced when she was 10 years old. Her mother remarried and 
travelled with her new husband to Saudi Arabia. Since then, Jihan has lived with her 
father and stepmother. She ran away when they wanted to force her into marriage. 
She went to her maternal uncle’s house, who refused to give her back to her father. 
The father reported her absence and the police apprehended her. Despite the fact she 
was at her uncle’s house, the police sent her for a forensic virginity test, a procedure 
that, although it has no basis in the law, is performed on any woman reported to have 
left home without her family’s permission, even if her absence was for a matter of 
hours. The virginity test is performed ensure that women did not engage in any sexual 
relationships during their absence from home. It is designed to keep women’s 
morality in check, as well as questioning their moral behaviour. When I asked Halah 
what she remembers and how she was surviving her experience, I was surprised to see 
that her experience of the virginity test was more horrific than the shooting: “My 
body was invaded. I felt very cold. I still shake when I remember that horrible 
moment.”485 Halah, as a previously married woman, was not supposed to have a 
virginity test, but the test was performed to check if she was sexually active during 
her absence from the house.  
 
Both procedures of detaining women in the name of protection and virginity testing, 
as Shahnaz Khan (2003) and Jahangir and Jilani (1988) argue in relation to detaining 
women under zina (adultery) laws in Pakistan, are examples of the state’s power to 	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regulate the morality of women who do not comply with male authority, which as 
Khan states, “contributes to the growing incidence of state-sanctioned violence 
against women.”486 By performing virginity tests, state officials aim to divert attention 
away from perpetrators and give a ‘valid’ reason for incarcerating women as due to 
the threat from their families. It is also a matter that relates to how women who do not 
comply with male authority are perceived by the state as immoral and, therefore, need 
to be checked and punished.  
 
When women are found not to be virgins or to have been sexually active during their 
absence from home, the result is that they either stay in prison for the rest of their 
lives487 or could be killed when their family bails them out of prison. Therefore, this 
procedure aims to find grounds for women’s murder or imprisonment when they 
challenge the power delegated by the state to male members of the family.  
 
The other option available for women to be released from detention is marriage. 
Governors have been known to suggest marriage to unknown men.488 Lawyer Elham 
el-Showa told me that the men suggested are usually either old and in need of care, or 
are married to more than one woman and wish to take advantage of the cheap dower 
of women in prison.489 Interestingly enough, when a woman proposes to the governor 
to marry a man of her choice, the governor, as I will show shortly in the case of 
Khawlah, can reject this offer unless the guardian’s approval is guaranteed. The 
pertinent point then is that a woman cannot decide on her fate and her choices are 
limited to those decided upon by family and state authorities. Marriage here is a 
practice of punishment and cleansing, and therefore women’s choices are not 
considered. 
 
Punishment	  under	  the	  Name	  of	  Protection	  	  
By failing to protect women from crimes or abuses, the state defines the notion of 
protection according to the normative framework of gender order that favours 
protecting family and kinship relations over women’s interests and protection. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486 Ibid: 77. 
487 The Human Rights Watch’s 2009 report indicated that HRW knew of cases where women remained 
confined in detention for more than 10 years.  
488 HRW report, 2009: 3. 
489 Interview with lawyer Elham el-Showa, March 2009, Amman. 
171	  	  
brings us back to the issue of interests and protection discussed by judges in Chapter 
2, which are part of the motives that judges raised in relation to wilaya over women. 
If wilaya provisions are meant to protect women and their interests, then how would 
incarcerating women in the prison do so? The connection between women’s interests 
and their protection on the one hand, and imprisonment of women on the other, was 
explained by Sheikh Muhammad Al-Naimat, who reasoned that women cannot be left 
without male supervision, no other options are available for those women, those who 
run away are risking negating the community’s values, and if left unpunished, those 
women could influence others negatively:  
What else can one do when you find a woman running away from home, not 
just doing so but also refuses to go back with her family. The governor in this 
case is placed in a very vexed position. He cannot let her out there in the 
street doing whatever she wishes. More dangerously, other women might 
follow her example. If this happens what morals are then left for us? Families 
have to react outside of state’s jurisdiction, which will increase crimes in the 
country.490 
The issue of protection stems from the state’s interests of preserving the rights of 
male members of the family to supervise and manage the affairs of their women. 
Therefore, women who fail to adhere to their family’s orders should be punished. 
Again, incarcerating women in the prison, as Sheikh Naimat argued, is also used a 
security measure for the community through which women are kept obedient, a sword 
of discipline and punishment. When asked why they were sent to jail, several women 
stated the governor and police officers told them it was due to their immoral 
behaviour. Jihan told me that the Governor said to her, “You are either crazy or a bad 
woman to leave your father’s house without his permission.”  
 
The state policy of punishing women who step outside its normative framework is 
commonly practised in the region. Hoodfar and Ghoreishian (2012) argue, in relation 
to morality policing in Iran and Saudi Arabia, that state authorities are angered not by 
actions that are seen as against religious norms, such as driving in the case of Saudi 
women and women’s claiming public spaces in Iran, but rather it is the “civil 
disobedience” nature of these actions that angers them. The imprisonment of Manal 
al-Sharif by morality police, after she posted a YouTube video of herself driving, was 
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due to the fact that her act was seen by authorities as “deliberately inciting civil 
disobedience” and “inciting other women Saudi women to drive cars.”491 Hoodfar and 
Ghoreishian, therefore, argue that women who are defined as minor legal subjects of 
these states are restricted from the public sphere by morality policing. By performing 
such actions against women, states keep women entrenched in their minor positions 
and, when women step outside of these positions, morality policing provides the 
means to punish and return women to their prescribed spaces. More importantly, 
morality policing aims to contain the practice by making it a punishable offense, so 
other women do not follow in the footsteps of disobedient women.492  
 
In Jordan, there is no institution of morality policing per se, but the state deliberately 
maintains particular laws to restrict the freedom and mobility of its citizens. For 
instance, under Article 320 of the Penal Law, which criminalises “flagrant acts of 
public modesty,”493 women who are found alone in public at night or in the company 
of men who are not relatives can be imprisoned without their families reporting their 
absence to the police.494 Thus, the state gives itself the authority to monitor and 
protect the normative standards of women’s modesty and chastity on behalf of the 
family. It also regulates women’s behaviour within the public sphere, as a woman 
walking at night in the street or mingling with male friends would be seen as violating 
the public modesty.   
 
While these incidents are not punished on as large a scale as in Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
the existence of such a law and its usage in some cases not only allows the 
conservative authority of the police and criminal investigators to impose restrictions 
on women’s liberty and mobility, but also places women in situations that can lead to 
excessive forms of violence by their families or life imprisonment by the state. Also 
of great importance is that these cases depend totally on the officers’ subjectivities 
and their perceptions of public decency and women’s modesty, and are therefore 	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arbitrary. As Hala Ahed, the legal advisor of JWU said, “Some police officers may 
see a woman holding hands with her boyfriend as a normal act while others would 
pursue a case, as according to their mentality this is improper behaviour.”495  
 
Sheikh Naimat, who deals with these cases when women of powerful tribes are 
involved, explained the rationale behind such police practices as being based on the 
fraternal relationship of man to woman in the community: 
When a policeman notices that a girl is publically performing a shameful act, 
he puts himself in the shoes of her brothers or father. We are a conservative 
community. Police officers know that real men would not accept their 
daughters to be in a car with a stranger or walk at night with her boyfriend. 
They have to do something about it. I have dealt with several cases where 
women were found in the cars with strangers or were with unrelated men in 
isolated places. The police engaged me so I could talk to the girl and solve 
the problem. Sometimes, we solved the problem without informing the 
family but we usually make sure that the girl realises the consequences of her 
actions.496  
 
Regardless of whether women were sent to jail based on the law on prevention of 
crime or under the Jordanian Penal Code, these cases demonstrate that women’s 
choices are meant to be supervised and monitored by male family members. If male 
members are not present, state officials then act on their behalf and in accordance 
with the normative perception of what and how a woman should be and act.     
 
Similar Khan’s (2003) finding regarding zina cases and Hooria Hyat Khan’s (2012) 
on ‘honour crime’ cases in Pakistan, my data supports the view that many women 
incarcerated for their own protection are not in prison because of any sexual 
misconduct; their families alleged sexual misconduct to have them jailed when they 
challenged the family’s authority.497 Hooria Khan concludes that when morality is 
preoccupied with “the maintenance of male authority” that “engenders mechanisms of 
control to keep women subordinate,”498 the court and police also “seem to valorize 
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men’s status as custodians of women”499; hence, “the zina laws were promulgated to 
help bring about a just and moral society in Pakistan.”500 
  
The main reason for the imprisonment of Halah, Jihan, and many other women I 
interviewed and worked with, is that they were not being obedient enough to the men 
in their families. Women’s noncompliance with male authority is also found by Khan 
(2003) to be the main reason for incarcerating women in prisons in Pakistan. 
Likewise, as in the state of Pakistan presented by Khan (2003) and Hooria Khan 
(2012), the Jordanian state treated issues related to women’s choice in matters of 
divorce, marriage, and mobility from the perspective that these rights clash with 
female modesty and family’s rights to preserving their honour. In this way, the state 
uses ‘honour crimes’ as a disguise to escape its responsibilities to protect women and 
treat them as equal citizens, rather than as minor subjects. Shahnaz Khan (2003) 
concludes that the “state’s treatment of the zina victims puts into question the nation’s 
commitment to protect the interests of all its citizens…The nation needs morality, and 
women and lower-class citizens are sacrificed to provide a moral face for the 
nation.”501  
 
At the end of 1996, JWU held a conference on the administrative detention of women 
in prison, in which I presented Halah’s case and those of other women prison. Several 
judges, policy makers, police officers, and civil society representatives attended the 
conference. The audience’s responses varied from accusations of fabrication to the 
inability to believe that women were incarcerated in the prison for reasons other than 
those of sexual misconduct. The JWU’s demand was for the government to establish a 
safe place for women survivors of violence and to release women who are detained 
and awaiting their guardians’ permission to leave jail. The issue seized the attention 
of national and international media. However, it was mainly focused on the state’s 
claim of protecting women under the threat of killing in the name of ‘family honour.’   
 
By linking the issue of female administrative detainees to family ‘honour,’ the media, 
some scholars from the West, and some activists encapsulated issues facing women in 	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the prison in particular, and women in Jordan in general, under the issue of ‘honour 
crimes’; thereby, embracing the state’s version of the story. The ‘honour crimes’ issue 
has also been discussed in feminist literature, albeit the focus was merely in relation 
to female sexuality.502 
 
The state has legitimised the action of imprisoning women by entangling it with the 
notion of honour. By doing so, women in the jail have been twice stigmatised: once 
by being in jail in the first place, and a second time by being denounced on their 
alleged sexual misconduct. Regardless of the reasons for which women were 
imprisoned, treating their cases as part of the umbrella issue of ‘honour crimes’ 
complicates their release, places them in more vulnerable positions, and also draws 
attention away from the state’s involvement in protecting male authority over women. 
Furthermore, when simple decisions of marriage and divorce have such brutal 
implications on women’s lives, women in the country are left with no option but to 
either adhere to male authority or find ways to exercise their choices through 
‘bargaining’ or ‘accommodating protests.’ 
 
Amongst women activists I interviewed, one of the issues raised was the continuing 
incarceration of women who run away from home, excluding them from the mandate 
of the national shelter established in 2007 to protect women survivors of violence. 
Nadia Shamrouk the General Director of JWU told me: 
The government is not serious in finding a solution for those women because 
it does not see them as victims but rather criminals of the social values. 
Women who run away from home, according to the state’s logic, are to be 
punished for their act of leaving their family’s house. The police officers, 
judges, and governors fear to treat those women in a just way because each 
one of them perceives women generally as his daughters, wife, sisters, and 
thus turns the law to serve his interests of keeping women as a family and 
state property.503  
 
Excluding women who run away from home from the services of the national shelter, 
the ‘Family Reconciliation House,’ is thus related to the state’s policies of keeping 
those women away from other women, lest they spread a rebellious contagion. It 
poses a public threat to a masculine state as well as a personal threat to male officials 	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dealing with the cases. Halah told me that the police officer who took her from the 
governor’s office to the prison said, “If you were my daughter, I would have gotten 
rid of you before you reached the prison.”504 Rama, whose story I present shortly, had 
also been told by the governor, “If your brothers were real men, I would not have seen 
you here for a third time. You should rot in the prison this time so you become an 
example.” Officials, therefore, personalise their decisions so as to guarantee that ‘their 
women’ would not be influenced by or replicate such risky acts. Several 
discriminatory laws against women, whether family, penal, administrative or civil, 
enable state officials to find ways to enforce punishments for women’s attempts to 
gain autonomy over their lives. Therefore, provisions for wilaya over women, 
whether explicitly or implicitly embedded in Jordanian laws and the practices of state 
officials, sum up the relation between women and the state, the gendered nature of 
punishment, and the role of the state’s criminal punishment in the subordination of 
women and control over their lives and scope of activity.  
 
Lisa Hajjar (2004), in her discussion of state power, Islam and domestic violence, 
argues that the idea that a man has the right to punish and discipline female family 
members is part of “the tactics …to maintain order at home and in society at large.”505 
Therefore, she concludes that without calling into question the legal and social 
structures of male authority, domestic violence against women will continue to be the 
norm: “Seeking means of ameliorating the problem of domestic violence entails 
challenges and changes to the ways in which such authority is legitimated and 
enforced.”506 Therefore, male authority and female obedience, when legalised by the 
state, creates conditions that enable men to enforce their will on matters of marriage, 
divorce, and any other decision related to women’s lives.507 
 
In	  Need	  of	  Correction:	  ‘Witches’,	  ‘Dangerous’	  and	  ‘Crazy’	  women	  	  
Though Halah’s story ultimately had a ‘happy ending,’ many women are not so 
fortunate. Most women I met said that it was as if their lives ended the day they were 	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sent to prison. The stigma associated with being imprisoned suggests that women 
must have done something shameful to themselves, their families, and the community 
at large. Even though they are in the prison for reasons of ‘protection,’ the idea that a 
woman needs to be protected from her family in the first place, questions a woman’s 
morals rather condemns the acts of perpetrators. According to this logic, a family 
would not threaten their daughter unless there was a ‘valid’ reason.  
 
Some of the reasons addressed in the literature for the killing or imprisonment of 
women are those related to controlling women’s sexuality. However, in the context of 
Jordan, the immediate reason for a woman’s killing or imprisonment could be as 
simple as refusing to adhere to the family’s code of dress, initiating divorce without 
familial consent, refusing to marry, a desire to continue studies, or being sexually 
abused by a male family member or friend. Anissa Hélie (2012) argues that control 
over women’s choices of marriage, divorce, and work are less recognised in feminist 
literature than control of women’s sexuality in Muslim contexts. These choices are 
women’s means of challenging established norms and, accordingly, a woman’s 
modesty is perceived in relation to whether her actions challenge these norms, not 
merely to the exercising of her sexual rights.508 
 
The problems related by the seven women I interviewed in the prison, and the four 
who had previously been imprisoned, were not related to sexual misconduct. 
However, most of these women told me that their families had described them as 
‘uncontrollable’, ‘crazy’, and ‘tomboy’ since they were little girls. These traits 
challenge the normative perception of femininity. Control over those women seems to 
be more brutal than over those who conform to normative femininity. Therefore, 
women’s actions do not merely determine how the family responds, but rather 
responses are amplified when these acts are associated with characteristics that 
challenge the basic perception of a woman and how she should walk, talk, or behave.  
 
In the Foucauldian sense, those “dangerous” women challenge the “regularity 
practices” and the established knowledge of femininity as receptacles for masculine 
completeness. As I argued in Chapter 3, training women to behave in a feminine style, 	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which shows shyness, fragility, and incapacity, constructs the assigned attributes of 
femininity on the one hand, and the means to legitimise male authority over women 
on the other. Connell (2006) posits that the production of feminine and masculine 
symbols is a “semiotic approach” of treating men and women as objects in order to 
normalise gender differences.509 In the process of normalisation, the subject is turned 
into an object of the semiotic knowledge, which creates the divergent behaviour of 
men and women.510  
 
When a woman fails to perform or contradicts the semiotic knowledge, she is then 
perceived as a dangerous subject, who needs correction and rehabilitation. The 
process of correction in the case of women prisoners takes place in a collaborative 
sense between family, tribe, and the state, in which the latter is a “willing partner in 
the families’ desire to control their women.”511 As Khan (2003) suggests: “This 
process also helps to criminalise an already impoverished female population.”512 
Halah’s case is a good example here, as she told me how her family’s inability to 
control her sport activities started her troubles:  
I dreamt of being a gymnast. My father once saw me standing upside down 
on my head. He shouted to my mother “look at what you have raised!” I was 
beaten so many times because I used to run in the street, not walk, or because 
I used to hit boys who harassed me. I kept doing sports at school secretly. 
One day my father knew I was in a sports competition. It was the day I was 
dropped out of school. A few months later my marriage was arranged.513 
 
Halah represented a challenge for her family. Her engagement in sports gave her 
confidence and a strong personality. The fear of a woman like Halah is the fear of 
change to the structure of power. In terms of gender norms, it is men’s fear of losing 
the advantages associated with owning power and authority.  When men’s confidence 
is only articulated through the ways they manage and control women’s behaviour, 
then losing such a privilege would certainly contribute to re-determining what 
masculinity and femininity both entail, which might in turn disturb the state’s control 
over its subjects. It is here that the institutional laws of wilaya over women come into 
agreement with the patriarchal interests of preserving the masculine/feminine divide. 	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510 Ibid: 50. 
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513 Interview with Halah , August 2012, Amman.  
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These laws institutionalise the power over females’ activities, so not only can women 
not escape the position of subordination, they can also be punished for embracing 
different ideals than those attributed to them.    
 
Rama is another example of a woman who was perceived as rebellious from a very 
early in life. I heard about Rama when I visited the prison for the first time. The 
guards admired her very much, though she was causing them so much trouble and 
mobilising other women against the prison’s policies. Rama was “the prison’s 
mokhtar (leader of a clan or neighbourhood)” as one the guards stated. Rama was 
bailed out of jail by the Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI) a few days before I 
visited the prison. Lawyers of SIGI arranged for her to stay at the JWU shelter. I met 
her at the JWU shelter before the police caught her and sent her back to the prison for 
the third time. Rama considers herself a “permanent resident of the prison”; she had 
been in and out of the prison for the last five years.  
 
Rama’s story began when she turned 12. Her mother and brothers suddenly began to 
restrict her movement and appearance. Rama hated that she had to go home directly 
after school and not engage in any school activities. She told me that she, unlike her 
other sisters, refused to do whatever her mother and brothers told her: “For whatever 
reason, I was rebellious.” On several occasions, her family prevented her from going 
to school as punishment for her disobedience: “When my brothers used to hit me, I 
used to hit them back. I never accepted their mistreatment. I had never let them see 
my tears, I used to piss them off with a smile.”514  
 
When she was in her last year of school, a man proposed to her and she agreed only to 
escape her family’s restrictions and abuse. Her husband was well-educated and 
allowed her to finish her school and enrol at the university. She had only studied one 
term at the University of Jordan’s business school when her brothers forced her to 
leave the university, threatening to take her back home if she continued to attend 
classes. She said: “I lost respect for my husband after this. He was not a real man. If 
he was, he would have been able to protect me from my brothers. He kept saying he 
could not do anything against my brothers’ will.”  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Interview with Rama, March, 2012, JWU shelter, Amman.  
180	  	  
 
Rama’s family kept supervising her movements and activities. Whenever they 
suspected she was not staying home or was mingling with women they did not 
approve of, they would come, beat her and threaten to take her back to their home. 
Once, she was coming home with her friends and her two children from the Dead Sea 
at night. Her mother and brothers were waiting for her at her house and started 
interrogating her; when she asked them to leave, one of her brothers hit her. She went 
to the hospital with a broken hand and wanted to report the incident, but her sisters 
convinced her not to do so. They took her from the hospital, locked her in the house, 
and forced her husband to divorce her. “My husband was very weak. I also wanted a 
divorce because what was the point of being married to someone who could not 
protect you?” 515 After the divorce, her family arranged for Rama to go to Saudi 
Arabia and live with her older brother. When Rama learned of their intention, she ran 
away from the house. Her ex-husband financially supported her; she rented a room, 
started looking for a job and agreed with her ex-husband to take the two children 
when she was settled. However, in less than a month, the police caught her and sent 
her to prison. This was Rama’s first experience in prison: 
It was so harsh to see yourself ending up in a prison for doing nothing. The 
governor would not listen to me he just kept repeating to me the question: if I 
wanted to go to the prison or to accept going back with my brothers. I did not 
want to go back home with them. I told the governor I could support myself 
and my ex-husband would give money to live with my kids. He asked my 
brothers if they were okay with that, when my brother said no, the governor 
referred me to the jail.516  
 
Rama’s ex-husband used his connections and bailed her out of prison, after which she 
spent three months out of jail without her family’s knowledge. When her family 
discovered that she was out of prison, they again reported her absence and the same 
cycle was repeated at the governor’s office. She was bailed out again by the 
Sisterhood is Global Institute, lawyers and social workers started to work on her case, 
and she was sent to the JWU shelter and stayed for a month. Rama was so hopeful 
that this time things could be different. However, as she told me, her family refused to 
cooperate with SIGI unless Rama was back with them at home, an option totally 
rejected by Rama. Her brothers reported her absence again and she was returned to 
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prison after getting caught with one of her friends at night. SIGI, JWU, and some of 
Rama’s friends tried to post her bail, but this time she did want to leave and refused 
any further attempts for her release. The second time I met her in the prison, she told 
me: “Life here is easier. My biggest worry is not to run out of cigarettes. No fear of 
police to catch me, or my brothers to beat me. Less headache, honestly.”517 
 
Rama was certain that her brothers would not kill her if she had been allowed to live 
on her own. She stated that all of her brothers have good positions at work, children, 
and fairly stable lives. They would not endanger all of this to kill her: “All they 
wanted is to punish me. Not just for running out, but for my personality and who I 
am.” Rama is 28 years old, and divorced with two children. She thinks if the governor 
had not sent her to the prison the first time, she could have found work and lived 
away from her family’s interference.  
 
Rama’s punshiment was not related to any reason other than defying her family’s 
perception of what a woman should do and how she should behave. Rama and 
Halah’s personal traits did not match normative femininity and the values assigned to 
them as female. Their strategies of overtly resisting their family’s order also did not 
encapsulate the performance of a ‘good’ woman. When a woman challenges the 
established norms openly, at the levels of both knowledge and practice, she is then 
seen to pose a greater risk to the masculine state’s harmony and interests.  
 
From women’s narratives, it was notable how regularly families and state officials 
describe them as witches, crazy, and dangerous; such is necessary to maintaining a 
particular conception of women who step outside the system’s framework, as well as 
justify their abuse under the mantra of correction and discipline.  
	  
Tribe	  and	  Class	  arrangements	  in	  the	  case	  of	  runaway	  women	  	  
The detention of women for reasons of protection not only raises specific issues about 
the legitimacy of their imprisonment but also that incarcerated women have lost their 
liberty not as a legitimately imposed punishments for a crime, but for reasons 
intended to uphold a broader collective interest. As judges described, the communal 	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interest is related to the harmony of the tribe and community, and therefore women’s 
defying normative perceptions of femininity is rendered as a punishable act by the 
state in order to keep families and tribes in control of their women. This, in turn, 
maintains a kind of power for the tribe that operates in collaboratively with the state.  
I met Khawlah in the prison on her third day there. Two days prior, she had gone to 
court to complain about her father’s refusal to conclude her marriage to a man with 
whom she was in a relationship. Khawlah was weeping and crying with one question: 
“Why am I here?”518 Khawlah is 38 and, according to the 2010 Jordanian  Personal 
Status Law, she was eligible to conclude the marriage on her own and did require a 
case. However, Khawlah was advised by a judge to seek the help of the Bureau judge 
Sheikh Muhammed Naimat, whose mandate I addressed in Chapter 2.  
 
In Khawlah’s case, Sheikh Naimat could not do anything. He knew that her father’s 
refusal was due to a historical issue between Khawlah’s tribe and her boyfriend 
Ibrahim’s tribe. He said, “You know how it is. We cannot interfere in issues of 
marriage when the interest of the tribe is at stake.”519 Sheikh Naimat was about to call 
the governor for a consult when a car full of men arrived at his place. They were 
Khawlah’s cousins. Sheikh Naimat called the police, who directly referred Khawlah 
to the governor and then to the jail, under the justification of protection. 
 
During my interview with Khawlah, she kept repeating the same question: “Why am I 
here? I am going to lose my job.” Khawlah is a nurse at one of Amman’s private 
hospitals. She works to supports her mother and siblings, as her father left when they 
were very young and she raised her brothers and sisters. “My father has no right to 
object to my marriage. He has never been there for me. I have not seen him for a long 
time.  He usually visits us when he needs money.” Khawlah kept screaming and 
crying. I promised to follow her case; I met Sheikh Naimat, and later her boyfriend 
Ibrahim, together with a lawyer from the Jordanian Women’s Union.  
 
“The story of Khawlah is not a unique case,” Sheikh Naimat said: 
I have dealt with several cases like this. Some women had to leave the 
country, others accused themselves of having sex and losing their virginity to 	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their boyfriends in order to force the family to conclude their marriages. 
When they did such a thing, women knew they might lose their lives but they 
had to try.520  
 
However, the case of Khawlah is particularly difficult for Sheikh Mohammed because 
the two tribes had signed an agreement not to intermarry or have any trade or business 
relations. This goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century, as I learned from 
Ibrahim and Sheikh Mohammed. Khawlah was astonished when she found out about 
this issue from her father: “If my great-grandfather had an issue with Ibrahim’s great-
grandfather a hundred years ago, shall we stick to an outdated agreement? This does 
not make sense.”521  
 
During Khawlah’s imprisonment, Ibrahim tried to find ways to secure her release. He 
told me that he went to the Supreme Council of the Shari’a Court, laid down at the 
door of Qadi Al-Quda (the Chief Justice) – “a practice for Bedouins when they make 
a request from someone” – and did not get up until Ahmed Hilayel, the Qadi al-Quda, 
told him that his demands would be met. Sheikh Hilayel issued a request for the 
Sweileh Shari’a Court to instruct the prison director to allow the marriage in the jail, 
if Khawlah accepted. However, the Sweileh Shari’a Court did not respond to the letter 
and ignored Ibrahim’s request. Sheikh Muhammed Naimat told me the “shari’a court 
could not do such a thing. Khawlah’s tribe will declare war on the judges who would 
dare to do this.”  
 
In my interview with Sheikh Fadi Alawaishh, I asked about cases like Khawlah. He 
explained that Islamic shari’a does not operate in isolation from the social context: 
“We have to consider tradition and kinship ties when we deal with issues of marriage 
and divorce.” This statement confirms that Islamic rules have been adapted to serve 
the interests of the tribes and family at the expense of women; it is more authoritative 
when these rules are associated with God rather than tribes.  
 
Before leaving Amman, I called Ibrahim to check on the situation. He told me that a 
lawyer managed to involve a powerful Sheikh from the south of Jordan who was 
going to take Khawlah out of jail and arbitrate a solution between the tribes. 	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Khawlah’s shouting and screaming still rings in my ears. “The whole system failed 
Khawlah,”522 Jordanian Women’s Union Lawyer, Elham Al-Showa said. “Our hands 
are tied. We are afraid to get Khawlah out of jail and then fail to protect her.” 
Khawlah refused the claims of protection when the policewoman told her that the 
governor was protecting her from her cousins: “This is not protection, this is a 
punishment. What am I being punished for?”523 
 
The interconnected relationship of state, tribal and family guardianship over women is 
the answer to Khawlah’s question of “Why am I here?” Rather, laws on women’s 
affairs are used as a political tool to reinforce male authority over women and, in turn, 
perpetuate the state’s political order through maintaining a stable relationship with the 
tribes at the expense of women. It is the space given to tribes to practice an 
authoritarian role, when all other roles related to the politics of the state are taken 
away.   
 
In closed tribal communities, guardianship is not merely practised by fathers, 
brothers, or grandfathers; it is, rather, decided by the sheikh of the tribe. The father or 
the closest male guardians are sometimes merely implementers of the sheikhs’ 
decisions on marriage and divorce. Women’s relation with state institutions is thus 
determined and managed through the tribe and family members. This is also 
encouraged by state officials’ practices, as some judges told me that they must ask for 
the father’s permission when a woman from an influential tribe asks for a divorce. 
This is not a legal requirement, but as Judge Arabyiat stated: 
We have to ensure that a woman’s decision is not going to cause a conflict 
between tribes. Women are not always rational in their decisions and 
sometimes they ask for divorces for silly reasons. So by consulting the father 
before accepting the case, we protect women from themselves and maintain a 
good relation between the tribes, which in turn preserves the harmony of our 
community as a whole.524 
 
There are several problems with this reasoning. First, even though a woman has the 
right to file a case for divorce, when she belongs to a tribe it becomes necessary to 
check how her decision might affect tribal relations. This means there is a divergence 
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in the legal procedures according to the tribal status of the woman in question. This, 
again, confirms the willingness of state officials to partner with families and tribes in 
controlling women. 525  Second, the harmony of the tribe is given priority over 
women’s interests. Khawlah’s case demonstrates how insignificant a woman’s choice 
and life can be when tribal interests are at stake. As Mounira Charrad (1990) posits in 
relation to tribal and state formation in Algeria and Morocco: 
Whatever the particular pattern governing marriage ties, the control of women was 
necessary for the maintenance of community cohesion…the law provides a basis for 
social control and is meant to imprint on social dynamics a given rhythm and 
direction.526 
 
However, the position of Khawlah’s family within the tribe also significantly 
impacted the ways in which judges, governor, and the tribal judge Sheikh Naimat 
dealt with her case. As she is from a poor and less influential family within the tribe, 
the tribe’s interference in her case was higher than when those involving women from 
rich or influential families. So, within the tribe, there is also a hierarchy that impacts 
the ways in which women’s decision of marriage and divorce are dealt with. For 
instance, Sheikh Naimat told me that, when a woman is from a very “reputable” 
family, he and other judges usually try to find “the right way” to deal with her case. 
According to Sheikh Naimat, no woman from a rich tribal family has ever been sent 
to jail: “There are other arrangements for these women.” One such arrangement, as 
stated by Sheikh Naimat, is to send a woman abroad until the issue is resolved. He 
shared several cases where families made arrangements for their daughters, who had 
run away in order to marry someone the family rejected, to live in London or the USA 
until the woman changes her mind. Another such arrangement is accommodating 
women in Sheikh Naimat’s house, or that of another tribal leader, until the problem is 
contained.  
 
Suzie, whose case I presented in Chapter 4, also mentioned that she left home for 
three days until her family learnt not interfere in her activities. Her actions, while 
similar to those of women in the prison, did not generate the same reaction from her 
family; rather, she felt she had gained more mobility afterwards. This is also related to 
the existence, or non-existence, of social pressure and the family’s position within the 	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community. When women live in communities managed by the tribe, the family tries 
to protect its position by placing more restrictions on women, as those who fail to do 
so might be stigmatised and left without the tribe’s protection.  
 
At the state level, placing women in prison, or in a more comfortable place like tribal 
leaders’ houses or the national shelter, is also part of preserving the class structure. 
Women who belong to rich classes are rarely affected by the gendered punishments of 
administrative detention or public modesty provisions. This is related, first, to 
material conditions. For instance, many rich women said that they stay outside with 
male friends at night. As they usually drive their own cars rather than using public 
transportation or walking at night in the street, they are not under the direct 
supervision of authority. The second reason is the state’s differing views of public 
modesty based on women’s class. Sahar, who is divorced and from a rich tribal 
family, told me that her family did not intervene in her decision to divorce, nor had 
her life changed after being divorced: 
I have my own apartment. My brothers never asked me about who comes to 
my home or where I go. I travel and party with men and women and never 
had any troubles. My family trusts me and I have my independence. Some of 
my family relatives did not like it, of course. I think they do not dare to speak 
to me directly but I know there have been some talks about me every now 
and then.527 
 
Sahar’s decision to divorce, continue living independently, and mingle with friends 
freely are certainly influenced by her status as a woman from a rich tribal family, as 
well as the position of her family within the tribe. Her family has an influential and 
powerful political position within the state’s structure. Therefore, the limitations 
imposed on divorced women, such as loss of freedom of movement, are not 
applicable in Sahar’s case due to the tribe’s influence over women’s affairs when they 
belong to rich and influential families.  
 
In this sense, acts of travelling alone or mingling and partying with men do not pose a 
threat to society’s perceived norms of morality, as long as they are relegated to a 
particular class. By differentiating what morality means and whether a woman’s act is 
punishable, tribes and the state do not simply maintain gender power relations but 
also maintain the class and tribal structure and hierarchy within society. So, what is 	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deemed to be the protection of society’s morals seems to only be applicable to 
particular women. These women, who are supposed to protect public morality, are 
usually more disadvantaged both socially and economically. Therefore, the 
insubstantiality of women’s position and applications of procedures of punishment 
also ensue from the vulnerability of their social and tribal positions. 
 
Conclusion	  	  
In this chapter, I showed how male authority is protected by different state policies 
and procedures, and that the claim of protecting women is more an intent to punish, 
correct and rehabilitate those who step outside the gender order and structure. I 
argued that when women challenge the status quo by demonstrating traits and 
behaviour that counter normative femininity, disciplinary procedures such as virginity 
tests, morality checks, and administrative detention are the state’s mechanisms to 
supervise and perpetuate men’s authority over women. Women, through these 
provisions and procedures, are identified as dangerous and in need of correction. 
Accordingly, they are not only punished but also used as a warning to other women 
who might follow in their in footsteps. Within this context, women’s protection is 
meant to normalise gender, tribe, and class arrangements and perceptions, within the 
framework of masculine state interests.   
Hajjar (2004) concludes that for the state to construe women’s seeking protection as 
violating the principle of male authority, which is deemed as enshrined in Islamic 
laws, it uses Islam to prevent women from seeking its protection.528 However, as I 
have shown in this chapter, masculine states use whatever means at their disposal to 
control women, whether through shari’a, penal codes, or administrative procedures 
not established for women in the first place, but such states have gendered these 
procedures and laws through claims of preserving honour and protecting modesty. 
Although these laws and procedures are meant to protect the social order by 
controlling women, in the case of Jordan, the state has also left space for tribes to deal 
with cases of women runaways, domestic violence, or women found with strangers in 
accordance with the best interests of the tribes and customary laws, as I showed in the 
case of Khawlah and other women.    	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Through the case of women in prison, I showed how most cases have no relation to a 
so-called dishonourable act, which is usually of a sexual nature. Rather, women are 
imprisoned for making choices related to divorce, education, rejecting a marriage 
proposal, and indeed even for simpler reasons, such as a woman’s choice of female 
friends. My findings suggest that the insubordinate nature of a woman’s actions 
within the guardianship system forms the basis of the legal procedures that either 
justify the killing or incarceration of women, instead of the commonly-discussed 
reason of controlling women’s sexuality.529 The state uses women’s sexual behaviour 
to justify legal procedures biased towards honour and morality; in so doing, the state 
validates both its punishment of women who rebel against the system, and its 
cooperation with the perpetrators.  
 
The virginity tests performed on Jordanian women who run away from home, even 
for couple of hours, show that the state places itself in a position to perform a morality 
check on those women. Running away or disobeying their families acquires such 
women the label of sinful and immoral, even if they are found ‘not guilty’ of the 
moral claim. Ayse Parla (2001), in her discussion of virginity tests in Turkey, 
suggests that the state intensifies its use of such weapons in times of disruption to the 
official construction, which are effected through the everyday practices of women 
who challenge the state:  
It seems to me to be more than coincidental that the frequency and the 
violence of the virginity exams at the hands of state officials intensified with 
the emergence of the feminist movement of the post-1980s. This is not to say 
that the exams are a direct response to the movement. Nevertheless, they are, 
I believe, at least in part, an expression of state anxiety during a time of 
shifting norms and a retort to the bolder attitudes of women who are re-
claiming bodies other than those sanctioned by the official ideology.530   
 
I argue, similarly, that such exams are the state’s mechanism to correct women’s 
‘disobedient’ behaviour and limit their capacity to escape the guardianship system. 
Virginity texts are a symbolic mechanism by which the state reinforces its 
surveillance of those who step outside the collective consensus. They are, as Parla 	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World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 65-82; see also Pınar İlkkaracan (2008), and Jackie 
Jones (2010). 
530 Ayse Parla, 2001. “The ‘Honor’ of the State: Virginity Examinations in Turkey” in Feminist 
Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 65-88: 76.  
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clearly puts it, “emblematic of the incorporation of the preoccupation with women's 
modesty, previously enforced primarily through kinship networks, into the 
mechanisms of surveillance deployed by the modern state.”531 
 
Morality checks, virginity exams, and incarcerating women in prison are “disciplinary 
techniques” that, as Foucault suggests, are essentially meant to “correct those who do 
not conform to the established norms and power.”532 These techniques, as I discussed 
through women’s narratives of jailing procedures, also seek to categorise women into 
two groups: those who are able to carry their tasks of conforming to the hegemonic 
femininity established by the guardianship system, and those who are punished 
because they did not attain the required performance level of hegemonic femininity. 
Those women are not only punished but also categorised as risky, dangerous, witches, 
and crazy women. Hence, the act of non-conforming is punishable; a matter that is 
enforced precisely in the legal procedures dealing with women who object to or reject 
their family’s control.  
The case of women prisoners in Jordan confirms the necessity of building linkages 
between the masculine state’s epistemology of women, how such an epistemology is 
institutionally embedded, and the ways in which women become aware of the 
consequences of challenging the state’s masculine perceptions of women.  
 
The limited options women have to manoeuvre, as I have shown, entails that those 
women overtly challenge mechanisms of control. As the imprisonment of women, 
who reject a particular order of family or tribe, is usually a collaborative decision 
made between state authorities, tribal leaders, and family members, the imprisonment 
is both a disciplining method for those who challenged the system and a lesson for 
other women. Indeed, the sentence of two Saudi activists on 15 June 2013, who tried 
to help a woman who faced a two-year travel ban escape her abusive husband, 
included the statement: “This is for other women not to repeat such acts.”533 Women 
are, therefore, made aware of disciplining procedures in order for hegemonic practices 
to be sustained and controlled.  	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532 Michel Foucault,1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan, 
Vintage: 178. 
533 Accessed on 31 December 2013, <http://saudiwomenrights.wordpress.com/category/رﺭﺎﺒﺧأﺃ-وﻭ-تﺕﻼﺑﺎﻘﻣ>.  
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Under provisions related to the protection of public modesty, state officials can 
imprison women found to be in the street at night or mingling with male friends 
during the day. At the same time, women who use their cars to travel at night, or meet 
friends at expensive restaurants, are not subject to the same police practices. Some of 
the women who ran away from home could not afford anything but very cheap hotels, 
which are usually subject to monitoring and police surveillance, making it easier for 
the police to make an arrest even when the family did not report the woman’s 
absence. However, cases of women who could afford to pay for expensive 
accommodation showed that such women do not face the same fate, as police would 
usually not invade these places without authorisation. It is not only being from a 
wealthy family that makes police interference less likely, but also the police’s 
perception of women’s mobility, living alone, and mingling with men as normal acts 
within the richer classes. By such duplicitous perceptions, women’s morals are judged 
based on their class rather than their actions. This leaves us an unavoidable question: 
is it mostly poor women who are expected to embody the deemed national honour and 
morals? In addition, does punishing women from poorer classes serve as a tool for 
disciplining women from other classes?  
 
It was devastating to see some women had reached a state where it was no longer 
important for them to try to leave jail. While Mukarram was explaining to a woman 
what the JWU could do to get her released, the woman replied: “Okay, you try, and 
let me know what will happen with you. Not that I am not hopeful, but it is not 
important any more if I leave or stay.” I was looking at her face and thinking of how 
one could reach such a state, where prison equates to freedom, and whether women 
could feel freer in such a place than in the outside world. I did not have the chance to 
observe life in the jail, as we were only permitted to be in the outside offices, which 
are separated from the cells and the facilities of the jail. But from women’s 
description of the prison experience, they seemed to survive it and make sense of it as 
a space that is not under the control of their families. As Eman described: “to be in the 
prison is to be in a place where you only have to determine what to say or do, no one 
tells you that is right or wrong, even if someone does, they do not have the right to 
punish you.” This raises the question: can the prison experience, intended to correct or 
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rehabilitate women’s behaviour, actually transform women to thinking outside the 
system? If so, can prison have the exact opposite result than what is intended? 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion: State, Gendered Power of Wilaya  
and the Potential for Change 
 
In July 2007, I took part in the NGO delegation to present Jordan’s CEDAW shadow 
report to the 39th session of the CEDAW Committee. In the formal session with the 
official Jordanian delegation and CEDAW members, the Jordanian representative 
opened his statement by saying, “Let me tell you about Jordanian women. I will do so 
through introducing you to my women: my mother, my wife, and my daughter.” The 
representative, who was serving as the Minister of State at that time, went on to 
describe his mother’s, wife’s and daughter’s high level of education and free 
movement inside and outside the country. For him, women in his family represented 
women in the country, thus he saw Jordan as fulfilling its obligation under CEDAW. 
He ended his statement by saying, “Please allow me to welcome my students, the 
women sitting in the back,” referring to the women activists of the NGO delegation.  
His expression of “my women” in denoting his mother, wife, and daughter was very 
striking. Despite the efforts he made to show how independent they were and the level 
of freedom they enjoyed, this expression shows that regardless of the position of a 
woman in the family, whether she is a mother, a daughter, or a sister, she is deemed to 
be a follower or dependent of a man. The minister also found a way to relegate the 
same dependent status upon activist women when he pointed to us as his students. 
Whilst there was one delegate whom he had taught at university, several other women 
were actually older than him in age and well-known activists and politicians in the 
country.  
The minister’s expressions of “my women” and “my students” reflects men’s attitudes 
and state rhetoric of guardianship of men over women. For the same reason, the 
official report to CEDAW put the responsibility for such attitudes on Jordanian 
society, which was described in the report as “patriarchal in nature and women play a 
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secondary role compared to men in family and in society.”534 The effect of this 
statement is to suggest that women’s subordination is rooted in and perpetuated by 
culture, and that the state has no power over society’s values and traditions. The 
statement of “patriarchal in nature” meant to also show that a change in women’s 
status is not possible, because patriarchy reflects the order of nature – presumed to be 
a superpower that operates outside the state’s power and structure – rather than a 
manifestation of the order of gender politics within the state’s institutional setting.  
I argued in this thesis that the state’s institutionalisation of the concept of wilaya in 
the Jordanian Personal Status Laws (JPSL) has a reproductive role in constituting 
women as subordinate to men and defining their gender identities and roles. In this 
thesis, discrimination against women and inequality in Jordan are treated as based on 
the state’s political project, which uses the concept of wilaya in the law, 
fundamentally conceptualising women as dependent minor subjects and placing them 
under the protection and control of men. Consequently, I suggested that, rather than a 
legal provision, which implies the authority of a male guardian to conclude the 
marriage of a female relative, wilaya over women is a wide-ranging, dynamic, multi-
stranded state discourse that constructs and reproduces the normative notions of 
femininity and masculinities.  
The discussion of different debates in Jordan in relation to women’s rights to 
mobility, pass their nationality to their children, or obtain a passport without male 
approval, consisted of three arguments: that these rights are a ‘threat to religion,’ a 
‘threat to national harmony’ and a ‘threat to national identity.’ These arguments are 
very much related to the justification of wilaya over women, as the role of the 
guardian is to ensure that women are obeying the rules of the family and tribe and 
pose no threat to the unity and harmony of Jordanian society. The role of the guardian 
in such debates is assumed to be broader than controlling women’s choice of 
marriage; rather, it is emphasised as key to preserving an authentic Jordanian identity. 
But why are women, and not men, seen as posing a threat to national identity? Why 
are women, who are portrayed as the mothers of the nation in the national narrative, 
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Othered in the nationality law, dealt with as foreigners, and deemed irrational and 
guided by emotions rather than logic in the JPSL?  
The aforementioned questions, as I discussed earlier, would not be answerable 
without an analysis that considers the historical and political processes of Jordan’s 
state-building, the effects of colonialism and a Western discourse of the sex difference 
model. Also, one must consider the state’s alliance with both internal and external 
conservatisms – be it of tribes, religious groups, political parties; or, through the links 
with conservative neighbouring countries, particularly the Gulf states – as well as the 
mediating role that Jordan still plays between the West and the region, specifically 
pertaining to the Palestinian question. The position of Jordan as a state dependent on 
foreign funding means that its economic stability is managed externally; this position 
has made political and social stability in the country of great importance to the 
regime, as this is how it maintains its power and existence. Such social and political 
stability is played out in alliances with tribes and Islamic parties, on the one hand, and 
control of political opposition and civil society groups on the other. Such alliances 
have resulted in the marginalisation of individuals’ rights and freedoms in favour of 
empowering tribes and conservative groups in the country. The internal alliance of 
state, tribe, and Islamic parties is a reflection of the interests and views of the state’s 
external alliance with conservative nations and political powers, be it in the region or 
at the global level. Therefore, Jordan’s position on women’s rights, as I have argued, 
cannot solely be examined  as based on internal powers and structures; this position is 
also the result of Jordan’s place within global capital and political agendas.  
On the other hand, a lack of resources in the country has required that the regime 
invest in people’s education. Women and men have benefited greatly from such 
policies. The level of education women enjoy in the country is the highest in the 
region; the literacy rate amongst both men and women has reached 96%, and more 
women than men hold a bachelor’s degree. However, the percentage of female 
unemployment in 2013 was 76.6%, as compared with 24.4% for male unemployment. 
While women occupy different types of jobs, their percentage is still much higher in 
those seen as ‘feminised’ jobs, such as teaching, nursing, and providing social welfare 
services. The progress made at the levels of education and employment has not, as a 
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consequence, challenged women’s status in the national narrative, laws, and state 
policies towards women. Rather, the state has organised the division of labour 
between men and women in different institutions in a way that corresponds with the 
dichotomy of femininity and masculinity.  
In revisiting her approach in “Bargaining with Patriarchy,” Kandiyoti (1994) 
discussed the significance of understanding that masculinity is hegemonic in a given 
time and place through involving the examination of various patriarchal institutions 
that reproduce strategies for subordinating women.535 Therefore, studying the ways 
through which women’s gender identity is produced necessitates looking at how 
different masculine state institutions (religion, family, law, kinship, media, states’ 
public administration, etc.) intersect, cooperate, and function to reproduce and 
maintain notions of masculinity and femininity within the gender, class, and political 
orders.536 In this light, and when the state controls and manages these institutions, its 
role remains relevant in any attempt to understand how the construction of normative 
femininity in the law works to legitimate operations and procedural methods in order 
to control women’s abilities to develop capacities and roles outside of the status quo.  
 
The consideration of the historical and political trajectories of the Jordanian state, 
despite not being examined in-depth in this thesis, is meant to address the relevance of 
the state as a gender regime in the analysis of how the masculine and feminine selves 
are constructed and reproduced in a specific context. I have aimed to add to the 
literature and arguments of scholars – such as Kandiyoti (1987, 1991); Al-Ali (2008); 
Charrad (2000a, 2000b, 2001); and Al-Rasheed (2013) – who studied different 
contexts in which the state and its web of internal and external forces and relations is 
central to understanding the politics of gender in the Middle East, rather than a 
cultural or religious explanation for the continued marginalisation of women and their 
rights. For this thesis, what is particularly relevant is the state’s adoption of the 
system of guardianship over women.  
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Within the state’s system of guardianship, I made three central points: first, that the 
systematic inclusion of provisions of wilaya over women serves as a construct of 
normative femininity; second, that there is a relationship between how women 
perceive male authority and the perception of the Self from within, through, or outside 
the normative construction of femininity; and third, the ambiguity and contradictory 
state of women’s everyday practices is related to the tactical nature of these practices, 
which are informed by available options, opportunities, and the potential of escaping 
the system without being sanctioned or punished. The detailed case studies of women 
prisoners showed that the tactical nature of women’s practices is not optional but 
rather tied to the system of guardianship and state protection of male authority over 
women. These cases illustrate the established control mechanisms the state uses to 
police women’s choices of marriage, divorce, education, and work, and sanction any 
attempt of free choice made outside the system of guardianship.  
The	  Law	  as	  a	  Construct	  of	  Femininity	  	  
The linkage made between the established male authority in provisions of wilaya over 
women and normative femininity uncovered the mechanisms by which construction 
of women’s sense of the Self operates through a well-defined set of laws and 
disciplining procedures.537 In the second chapter, I examined provisions of wilaya in 
the JPSL, first through studying different Islamic schools of thought’s interpretation 
of wilaya, particularly the Hanafi and Maliki schools, as these schools of thought are 
dominant in the Muslim family law of Jordan. I underlined how different 
interpretations of wilaya over women have informed the basis for the dichotomy of 
femininity and masculinity, and thus established normative femininity in fiqh 
literature in opposition to masculinity. In examining the different interpretations of 
wilaya over women in various Islamic schools of thought, I concluded that – despite 
their differing standpoints pertaining to wilaya over women – all schools agree in 
principle on the necessity of maintaining men’s authority over women on the grounds 
of their weak and irrational nature. Consequently, highlighting the divergence in 
interpretations of wilaya over women in fiqh literature cannot achieve egalitarianism 
in the PSLs, as the basis of all interpretations is a woman’s need for men’s protection 
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and supervision due to the naturalisation of women’s bodies and minds as different 
from men.  
Muslim family laws have undergone several reforms since the 1990s in both Arab and 
non-Arab contexts. 538  Laws that have constructed responsibility however, as I 
discussed in Chapter 2, have not been open to contestation and changes. This is 
because Muslim family laws are divided into two categories of provisions: first, those 
with goals that serve to inform other provisions and establish gender norms related to 
femininity; second, those that define rights and gender roles, which have been 
challenged and amended. In relation to the first, Welchman (2011) terms wilaya and 
qiwama (husband’s legal authority) provisions in the Muslim family laws as “legal 
postulates” that “inform areas of law without being specifically invoked as the basis 
for a particular provision.”539 Moors (1995) also terms laws related to dower and 
property rights in Palestine as “gender constructs,” where she emphasises the role of 
the legal system in defining women as “protected dependents,”540 which constructs 
and produces gender differences between men and women.541  
I discussed how judges of Amman’s shari’a courts have issued rulings based on the 
understanding that wilaya over women is a required protection mechanism due to 
women’s deemed lack of reason and rationality. Such cases show that provisions of 
wilaya over women in law and practice conceptualise a fixed model of femininity 
with an idealised image of women as weak, dependent, and incompetent, as well as 
regulate the acceptable gender roles that suit such a model. By defining normative 
aspects of femininity and masculinity and establishing roles, provisions of wilaya 
over women determine the ways in which gender relationships function within the 
larger gender order and hierarchy. Thus, wilaya over women provisions are treated in 
this thesis as the main pillars of the construction and reproduction of normative 
femininity; they are key to the maintenance of gender hierarchy through the roles 
assigned to men as guardians and protectors of women. 	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I discussed in this thesis that the use of shari’a as a source for legislating women’s 
rights limits these rights to how each state understands or interprets religious rules; 
such rights are also implemented in accordance with the state’s deemed national 
interests. The discussion of some legal cases of wilaya over women in the courts, 
where contradictory procedures and inconsistency at the level of practice between 
law, tribe and religion, revealed that protecting the interests of family, tribe, and class 
is a higher priority for the state than preserving religious values or the rule of law in 
the country.  
The trajectory of the  khul’ (divorce initiated by women) article in the JPSL is one 
example of how state legal institutions reverse rights given to women in family law if 
these rights are found to impact marital relationships and the understanding of 
masculinity and femininity. In 2010, the government amended the JPSL; one of the 
changes involved the removal of the provision for khul’, which was added in 2001 as 
an amendment to the 1976 law.542 However, in the 2010 JPSL, two options remained 
for women to initiate a divorce based on khul’. The first option is the ‘consensual 
khul’543 where a woman and man agree to initiate divorce by using khul’. However, a 
woman’s choice is no longer as central, as it was in the removed article of khul’, to 
initiating a divorce.544 The second article is talaq al-iftada’, or “divorce by ransom,” 
where a woman has to pay a ransom if she wants to get a divorce without her 
husband’s agreement. One reason given for the changes and removal of the khul’ 
article was that khul’ jeopardises the reputation of a woman and her daughters. As 
qadi al-qudah (Chief Islamic Justice) Ahmed Hilayel said: “We felt that it would be 
hard for the daughter of a mother who divorced herself from her father via the khul’ 
law to be called the daughter of such a parent. It is socially damaging to the 
daughter.” 545 
 
In recalling the debate around khul’ in Jordan, which lasted around ten years, the main 
issue was the use of the word ‘khul’’ – the noun form of the verb khala’a, which 
means ‘removal of something entirely.’ Women who used the article to obtain a 	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divorce were stigmatised and looked upon as ‘bad women.’ Men who were divorced 
by the khul’ article were seen as weak. In one of the conferences held to discuss the 
JPSL at the Jordanian Women’s Union, I was facilitating a discussion with judges and 
lawyers. A shari’a judge stated: “Khul’ is against our traditions. The man is the head 
of the house. When he is divorced by his wife rather than him initiating the divorce of 
his wife, things are turned upside down.” Indeed, the judge meant that the man is no 
longer in charge of the woman and responsible for her actions. Women’s active 
choice of initiating divorce challenged the perceptions of decision-making in marital 
relationships. Masculinity was perceived as under threat, and this potential danger 
was circumvented by ensuring men’s active choice through the ‘agreeable khul’.’  
 
This example, and others discussed throughout the thesis, illustrates that perceptions 
of men and women in the law are highly significant. It also shows that in dealing with 
women, the legal system differentiates between women who should have an active 
choice in divorce and those who should not, based either on their class or tribe. The 
article related to talaq al-iftada’ has retained active choice for those women who can 
afford to pay ransom, while others have to make compromises to reach an ‘agreeable 
khul’’ or spend years waiting for the court to issue a divorce verdict. This example 
also begs the question: can efforts to amend or change these laws from within Islamic 
shari’a and the framework of the existing gender order reach the aspiration of 
equality between men and women?  
 
In the first part of my thesis, I showed how a masculine state works in collaboration 
with other institutions to give power, founding legitimate operations and procedural 
methods for institutions such as family and tribe to manage, produce, and construct 
normative femininity and masculinity. I argued that there is an institutional 
knowledge produced through the conceptualisation of women in the law as minor 
dependent subjects. This discourse strategically uses the division of gender difference 
that values masculinity at the expense of femininity. The reconstructed valuation of 
masculinity and the devaluation of femininity, in turn, is used to justify the need for 
women’s protection to preserve the interests of the family, tribe and state from the 
irrational decisions women are presumed to make. The construction of the ideal 
feminine in laws on wilaya is politically reproduced, normalised and naturalised in 
relation to fitrah or tabia’h in order to restrict the possibility for women to push back 
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against the limits of doxa and the ‘common sense’, accepted social and legal aspects 
of femininity and guardianship.  
The continuous and varying efforts to naturalise the ideal feminine as something that 
women are born with – such does not need to be learnt, as it strives from “nature not 
culture”546 – and the weight given to supervise, manage, and control women’s sense 
of themselves are all continual processes to retain masculine privileges through, what 
Kandiyoti terms, “masculinist restoration”547 that: 
Comes into play at the point when patriarchy-as-usual is no longer fully secure, 
and requires higher levels of coercion and the deployment of more varied 
ideological state apparatuses to ensure its reproduction. The recourse to violence 
(or the condoning of violence) points not to the routine functioning of patriarchy 
or the resurgence of traditionalism, but to its threatened demise at a point when 
notions of female subordination are no longer securely hegemonic.  
The legislation of normative femininity is to ensure that aspects of femininity remain 
subordinate.548 Masculinist restoration might then be a mechanism of patriarchy and a 
continuous process through which women are constructed as the subordinate ‘Other.’ 
In the case of wilaya over women, the principle of women’s dependence is 
established, where a woman as a person is defined through her guardian and not her 
individual self. Women’s sense of the idealised feminine is then constructed and 
situated in relation to and through the interplay of two types of institutions: 
institutions that construct and give legitimacy to hegemonic femininity, like law and 
religion; and institutions that reproduce, manage and organise women’s roles within 
the framework of normative femininity, such as family, juridical institutions, 
economic entities, and tribes. The role of these institutions in how women view 
themselves in relation to hegemonic femininity also, to some extent, intersects with 
women’s class, educational background, the existence of alternative formal and 
informal networks (like women’s NGOs), and connection to or detachment from their 
tribe’s power and structure. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546  Sherry B. Ortner, 1972, “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?” Feminist Studies, Vol. 1, No. 
2 (Autumn, 1972), pp. 5-31. 
547 Deniz Kandiyoti, 2013. “Fear and Fury: Women and post-revolutionary violence” published on 
Open Democracy, accessed 15 December 2013, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/deniz-
kandiyoti/fear-and-fury-women-and-post-revolutionary-violence>.  
548 Ibid. 
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Manifold	  Forms	  of	  Femininity	  	  
Moors (1995) argued, in her study on Palestinian women’s property rights, that the 
changing perceptions of manhood and womanhood have an effect on the ways in 
which property rights in Palestinian society are perceived by women.549 Likewise, in 
my research, women defined their rights in relation to how they perceive and 
conceive of femininity. However, women’s femininity or sense of womanhood 
appeared to be produced in relation to women’s interpretation of and responses to the 
male authority they experienced within a web of relationships and institutional 
settings. By this, I suggest that the realisation of rights is based on the understanding 
of the Self from within, through, or against normative femininity, which is largely 
impacted by women’s attitudes towards male authority. Such attitudes are developed 
within a system where male authority is protected and maintained by institutions of 
law, religion, state political and economic institutions, and tribe. These institutions 
play an intersectional role of constructing, reproducing and organising gender 
identities and roles.  
In Chapter 3, I examined women’s perceptions of the Self in light of how femininity 
is constructed in wilaya provisions in the Jordanian family laws. I argued that 
women’s understanding of male authority over them impacted the ways in which they 
embraced a complex combination of compliance, accommodation and resistance. 
Whilst normative femininity implies a fixed model of what a woman is and should do 
– as well as that women are unable to see femininity, in the Gramscian sense, except 
from within the gender norms and order – women’s differing attitudes towards male 
authority that are developed within the changing social and political contexts reveal, 
however, that different accounts of femininity can exist but such has not resulted in an 
absolute rejection of or resistance to normative femininity. Consequently, I argued 
that as long as femininity is naturalised and normalised in a way that depicts women 
as legal minor subjects, who need protection, discipline and male rationality, women 
remain in a state of reworking their femininity so as to not totally subvert the system; 
instead, they conform to it in order to minimise its effects and applications on their 
lives.  
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This process of reworking femininity within the system of wilaya necessitates that 
women either  fully or partially accept, in Bourdieu’s sense, the natural, unspoken and 
unthinkable of the taken for granted position of women’s dependency and 
irrationality. In the system of wilaya, absolute rejection or overt resistance could have 
a high cost, which means that all forms of femininity embraced by women have to 
embody a form of doxic mode, in one way or another, be it utter compliance or a 
convoluted combination of accepting certain aspects of normative femininity and 
rejecting others.   
Through several empirical examples pertaining to how women view femininity, I 
categorised women’s views into three accounts: first, compliance with normative 
femininity; second, a discrepancy between ‘saying and doing’ femininity, where what 
women do differs from what they believe; and third, the exceptional or masculine 
sense of the Self. I concluded, in Chapter 3, that there is a variety of interpretations of 
normative femininity that reflect, in the first account, forms of internalisation and 
compliance with the normative gender order by accommodating the interests and 
desires of family and tribes. In this account, women’s internalisation of and 
compliance with normative femininity differed in terms of their attitudes and 
understandings of male authority in either specific or general terms. It was not the 
norm that women viewed themselves as incompetent or appreciated the rationality of 
masculinity, it was, for some women, only understood in this way when they thought 
of what femininity means in relation to the persons of authority, who are mainly seen 
as fathers and brothers. Women who viewed their capacities in relation to men’s 
capacities generally tended to internalise and contribute to maintaining normative 
femininity. For those women, as I discussed, wilaya is a security measure that protects 
their interests, as they view women as inherently weak and in need of protection. For 
other women, who reject some aspects of wilaya but accept others, femininity is still 
perceived in a normative sense, as it is articulated in relation to family and tribal 
interests; thus, women’s understandings of the Self depend on their web of 
relationships. The larger the domination and the stronger the linkage between 
different institutions of family and tribe, the more women internalised and conformed 
to normative femininity. In this account, women’s fear of losing or risking tribal and 
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family ties and support required a normative identification of the Self in a subordinate 
position to masculinity.  
The pragmatic sense of femininity, on the other hand, depicts a complex combination 
of rejecting some aspects of femininity and internalising others. In this second 
account, a pragmatic sense of femininity appeared largely amongst my research 
participants who were wealthy, well-educated and working. The experience and 
knowledge women develop through their achievements in education and positions in 
the public sphere contradicts what they experience in both public and private 
institutions as women. For instance, some participants who occupy high positions, 
such as judges, lawyers, doctors, and engineers, shared experiences of being unable to 
give parental consent – in the absence of their husband – for their children to undergo 
surgery, to obtain a passport for themselves or children, to travel, or to raise a divorce 
case in the court unless authorised by their guardians. Thus, the pragmatic mode of 
femininity reflects Jordan’s complex entanglement of neoliberal ‘double-speak’ 
policies of the “instrumentalisation of women’s rights”550: women’s education, 
political participation and economic engagement are encouraged and promoted as 
universal human rights while, at the same time, the existing gender norms in relation 
to family and tribal relationships are accommodated.551 Jordan’s dual position, which 
I discussed in Chapter 1, is tied to the country’s reliance on the external aid of 
Western and Gulf States and international organisations – such as the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank – to survive economically, and the internal support 
of the tribes and Islamic parties to maintain its legitimacy.552 As is the case with other 
authoritarian regimes in the region – such as that of Egypt, Tunisia and Iraq, which 
were viewed as examples of “state feminism”553 – double-speak policies brought 
some positive change for women’s rights; however, these roles do not alter the 
profoundly unjust gender order, they merely enlarge some areas of manoeuvring for 	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women.	   
Such a deliberate policy challenges the conception of some states, who have some 
progressive policies towards women in education or the workforce, as ‘feminist 
regimes,’ or that the state is working towards feminising its policies.  Rather, as far as 
progress is deemed to be made from within the masculine ideology of the state and its 
economic and political interests in mainstreaming perceptions of normative femininity 
and masculinity in the law, it cannot not be considered genuine progress. As Connell 
reminds us, it is not only the number of men in state institutions that make it 
masculine, it is rather the ideology and masculinised policies and laws within the 
state’s different institutional settings.  
The third account – the masculine and exceptional sense – embodies a form of non-
compliance with normative femininity, however, it has yet to reflect a total departure 
from the normative gender script. Masculine women disassociate themselves from 
femininity altogether, embracing a masculine sense of the Self. Interestingly enough, 
these women could not understand their capabilities outside the normative framework 
of femininity and masculinity. By identifying more closely with masculinity than 
femininity, they could make better sense of their capabilities. In other words, for some 
women, they experience a high level of confidence whilst, at the same time, living in 
a system that views women as generally weak; this, inevitably, creates some crisis of 
self-conception. Some of my research participants expressed feeling such as: “I am an 
exception;” “My personality has not had anything to do with ounotha (femininity);” 
and “My personality is that of a man not a woman.” These expressions reflect that 
some women are able to escape the normative construction of their behaviour and 
roles, but only when it is understood as exceptional and closer to masculinity rather 
than femininity. 
Some experiences of women feminist activists show that even when women escape 
normative femininity in their self-conception, and do not perceive themselves as 
exceptional, they are treated as exceptional and extraordinary within their 
communities. In some such cases, women have even been alienated and perceived 
outside the categories of men and women, particularly when they have a position of 
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authority over men. This alienation is meant to make sense of both the differing 
personalities of those women and the authority they have; they neither fit the fixed 
model of femininity nor does their authority correspond to the normative roles of 
women. Alienation is, thus, one of the domination strategies aimed at separating those 
women as exceptions and making ‘sense’ of their authority over other women or men, 
which could prevent other women from following their example or changing their 
perceptions towards women’s abilities and capabilities.  
The forms of femininity interplay with women’s different power, class, education, 
and tribal positions. This means that women can develop different accounts of 
femininity, but the construction or self-positioning of women – who either covertly or 
overtly resist or challenge normative femininity – as pragmatic, exceptional or 
masculine does not inevitably entail questioning the processes of classification and 
differentiation of assumed male authority and female subordination. Ultimately, the 
existence of different forms of femininity shows that, as Terry Eagleton stated, “There 
are presumably different kinds of legitimation, all the way from an absolute 
internalization of ruling ideas to a more pragmatic or sceptical acceptance.”554 
I have used the intersection of women’s social class, education, working status, and 
tribal affiliation in this research to address the ways in which the wilaya system 
impacts women’s experiences and understandings of femininity in a variety of 
contradictory and changeable ways. My intention is not to categorise or assume a 
particular set of attitudes and practices amongst women based on class, education, 
working status or tribe. In fact, multiple accounts of femininity depicting various 
forms of doxa – be it compliance, pragmatic or exceptional – were expressed by 
women from different classes and education levels. There was not a unified account 
specific to women from a certain class. However, I have also addressed that tribal and 
class affiliation change the ways in which the wilaya system is understood and 
experienced by women. Poor women and those who live in close tribal communities 
live under stricter conditions of wilaya than women of wealthy and diverse 
communities. For poor and tribal women, attempting to define the Self outside the 
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normative framework runs the risk of more severe social consequences; resisting 
normativity could entail losing one’s freedom of mobility, movement and life, as I 
discussed in Chapter 5.  Wealthy women, and those with high level of education and 
good positions at work, could have more options; they might have the possibility to 
experience and translate wilaya differently, as well as to modify, to some extent, 
gender normative roles. However, such does not necessarily or imperatively transform 
or alter the fundamentally iniquitous gender ideologies and scripts, rather it creates 
paradoxical and ambiguous modes of femininity.  
Nonetheless, as Connell posits in relation to how hegemonic masculinity aims to 
subordinate men who do not fit its criteria, ambiguity and paradoxical modes “in 
gender processes may be important to recognise as a mechanism of hegemony.”555 In 
the case of femininity, the exceptional and pragmatic modes, which embody an 
internalisation of some aspects of the assumed position, could be manifestations of the 
failure to reproduce femininity as a fixed model that constructs all women as weak 
and dependent. Consequently, the existence of multiple forms of femininity, as well 
as women’s view of themselves within changing socio-political conditions, challenges 
the cultural explanation of women’s subordination made either by the state – as a 
justification for its policies – or by orientalist thought regarding women’s position in 
the region. Such a multiplicity, albeit embodied in different forms of doxic modes, 
also challenges femininity as a fixed status, provides women different ways to escape 
aspects of this status, and allows different meanings of femininity.  Although 
women’s differing and contradictory views of femininity have not been 
transformative at the level of gender ideology, as Kandiyoti (2003) rightly put it with 
regards to men’s ambiguous practices of masculinity, they “may give rise to both 
defensive masculinist discourse and a genuine desire for contestation and change.”556 
The existence of different modes of doxa illustrates a desire to question women’s 
taken for granted position. This could be necessary to altering, changing and realising 
a state of contestation, and maybe a denunciation of normative femininity altogether.  
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Tactics	  in	  the	  Everyday	  life	  of	  Femininity	  	  
In the process of writing this conclusion, I received a message from one of my 
research participants on Facebook. She wrote: “I wanted to inform you of my good 
news. I moved out of my family’s house and rented my own apartment.” I was very 
surprised to hear her news and responded, “How did you manage to do so?” She 
replied: “I always do whatever I want to do. I just had to figure out how and the right 
moment for it.” Her reply summarised two important arguments in describing 
women’s everyday practices in Jordan as tactical in nature. The first argument tackles 
how women live under the system of male authority and survive the restrictions 
imposed on them without being passive subordinate subjects, rather than whether 
their efforts are successful or why they try to escape or accommodate male authority. 
There are different reasons why women may challenge or accommodate male 
authority, but these reasons do not necessarily involve their classification in the 
categories of either resistant or submissive.   
Kandiyoti (1998) argued: “women’s attachment to and stake in certain forms of 
patriarchal arrangements may derive neither from false consciousness, nor conscious 
collusion but from an actual stake in certain positions of power available to them.”557 
This is clearly manifested in the case of wealthy women, who are caught between the 
hardships they experience in relation to choices of marriage and divorce and the 
privileges they enjoy as members of a wealthy class in relation to their ‘modern’ 
lifestyle. It is not that they totally internalise or unconsciously comply with the 
naturalised, accepted social practices for women, but more that they make sense of 
these practices based on a calculation of interests, which makes them conform and 
accommodate class and tribe interests rather than protest against gender norms.  	   
Waiting for the right moment or opportunity, as Saba stated, means that women may 
accept practices that appear to be in line with male domination and authority. If these 
practices were merely analysed as they appear on the surface, then the conclusion 
would either be that women submit to male authority or are ambivalent and 
accommodate cultural values. When I interviewed Saba, I could not guess that she 
would be able or have the desire to undertake such a move. This is precisely what the 	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tactic does. It creates surprises since it usually works underneath the order; making 
use of the order without publicly challenging it.558 In so many instances, the tactical 
nature of women’s everyday practices was the result of fear, as the consequences of 
directly and publicly challenge male authority can be severely negative. Some of the 
consequences described by women are: being locked at home; being forced to drop 
out of school or university; being beaten; or facing threats of killing. All of these 
consequences place women in insecure positions, and inevitably prevent women from 
taking actions that might lead to such punishments. These consequences are not 
imaginary; rather, in the Foucauldian sense, they are the disciplinary methods that 
determine the scale of control exercised over women. When the scale of control, with 
its varying methods, is socially accepted and backed by provisions of wilaya that 
legitimise the disciplining of women and produces practices of obedience, 
disciplinary methods then serve to maintain the “general formula of domination”559 
over women. Women then have to find ways to achieve their own ends and, at the 
same time, escape disciplinary methods.  
The case of women prisoners, consequently, opens the door to more closely 
examining women’s attitudes and perceptions of femininity, as well as practices of 
challenging male authority. The cases encapsulate the social and legal conditions 
through which women choose to perform a certain role within a context where male 
authority is not just legalised but also supervised and protected by the state’s laws and 
enforcement mechanisms. This case also necessitates that we not see women merely 
as unthinking subjects, who unconsciously or consciously reproduce and contribute to 
their own subordination; rather, women are very aware and conscious of the symbolic 
and material threats and consequences. The choice between overt resistance and 
compliance sometimes involves a choice between life and death, freedom and 
imprisonment. When a personal decision – such as divorce and marriage – becomes a 
threat to women’s whole existence, women are left to participate in their life’s 
decisions only through “the manipulation of norms and conventions to promote their 
interests.”560  	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The need for violence against and punishment of women who step outside the 
normative framework means that femininity, as it is conceived, has been contested, 
compromised and resisted by women; a danger that required mechanisms of control 
and disciplinary measures to be established in order for normative femininity to be 
enacted without contestation. The case of women prisoners is an example of the 
methods that the state uses to protect the system of wilaya. The state’s role in policing 
women’s choices made outside the guardianship system perpetuates the notion of 
honour and female morality as the very basis of authentic Jordanian identity, which in 
turn founds the social and legal grounds for the killing and jailing of women under the 
claim of family ‘honour.’ The claim of preserving morality and honour is undermined 
when one analyses state officials’ differing responses to women based on class and 
tribal affiliation.  
Women’s tactics – bargaining, false compliance, deception, bribing younger brothers, 
secretive relationships, and so forth – appear to be a way in which they test the limits 
of reality and the possibility of destabilising it without risking their lives. The more 
women’s tactics succeed in disrupting some aspects of the sense of reality, the greater 
they build a cumulative understanding of how the system of punishment and 
discipline can be reworked for their own advantages and ends. In this respect, women 
are rational agents not only trying to make the most of their boundaries, in most cases, 
but also can, in few cases, succeed in rewriting their gender roles. While these tactics 
do not fundamentally alter gender ideologies at the collective level, in some cases 
they materialised into strategies of resistance to realise autonomy; in other cases, they 
merely expanded or protected some areas of manoeuvring and freedoms. However, 
the realisation of autonomy in the context of a wilaya system that naturalises women 
as weak and dependent, and within the limits set by the institutions of law, religion, 
family and tribe, does not necessarily lead to or produce substantial, long-term change 
regarding, and indeed amongst, women. Regardless of whether they challenge the 
normative gender order or maintain it, these tactics depict the ‘practical failure’ of the 
wilaya system and its vicious disciplinary methods in garnering women’s absolute 
compliance. 
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Appendix: List of Interviews   
 
 Name Age Marital 
Status 
Education Profession Class/Place of 
resident  
Tribe 
membersh
ip 
Date of the 
interview 
1. Amani 13 Single Secondary  Student Middle/East 
Amman 
Yes June/2012 
2. Salma 22  Secondary Not employed Poor class/East 
Amman/ 
No June 2012 
3. Tahani 
Siam 
48 Divorced BA Not employed Rich class /West 
Amman 
No November/
2011 
4. Mariam 36 Divorced Primary Not employed Poor class/East 
Amman 
No May 2012 
5. Kholoud 
Barghouthi 
54 Married BA President of 
Naour Society 
Middle class/ West 
Amman 
Yes May 2012 
6. Khawlah 38 Single Diploma Nurse Poor class/Centre 
of 
Amman/interview 
in the prison 
Yes November 
2011 
7. Amal 34 Married Primary A worker in a 
factory 
Poor class/East 
Amman 
No January 
2012 
8. Sahar 32 Married BA Program manager 
at a human rights 
organisation 
Rich class/ West 
Amman 
Yes September 
2012 
9. Wafa’ 24 Single BA Accountant Middle class/ West 
Amman 
No April 2012 
 
10. Dema 43 Married BA Unemployed Middle class/West 
Amman 
No April 2012 
 
11. Huda 33 Married BA Employed at the 
public sector 
Middle class/West 
Amman 
No April 2012 
12. Ahlam 44 Married BA Head of 
department/ 
public sector 
Middle class/West 
Amman 
No June 2012 
13. Ala’ 36 Divorced BA Pharmacist  Middle class/West No June 2012 
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Amman 
14 Halima 34 Single BA Engineer Poor class/East 
Amman 
No June 2012 
15. Maysa 25 Single MA Unemployed Rich class/West 
Amman 
No May 2012 
16. Nadia 28 Single BA Designer  Upper Middle class No April 2012 
17. Rand 24 Single MA Unemployed 
currently but she 
is searching for a 
job. 
Middle class No May 2012 
18. Sana’ 36 Single BA Lawyer/Activist Rich class/ West 
Amman 
No January 
2012 
19 Reem 27 Single BA Business manager Middle class/East 
Amman 
No June 2012 
20. Shireen 29 Single BA Journalist Poor class/ Jabal al 
Nadhif 
No April 2012 
21. Siham 27 Single BA Engineer Middle class/West 
Amman 
No June 2012 
22. Salam  Single Higher 
Diploma 
Graphic designer Middle class/West 
Amman 
yes June 2012 
23 Roula 28 Single BA Program officer Middle class No January 
2012 
24. Hana’a 48 Married College 
Diploma  
Unemployed Poor class/Jabal Al-
Nadhif 
No April 2012 
25. Elina 29 Divorced Primary Unemployed Middle class/East 
Amman 
No January 
2012 
26 Sarah 28 Married College 
diploma 
Social worker Poor class Yes  May 2012 
27. Suzie  29 Single MA Unemployed  Rich class Yes  November 
2011 
28 Leila 39 Married MA Engineer Rich class No August 
2012 
29 Diala 41 Married BA Manager/Bank Rich class Yes June 2012 
30 Sahar 2 37 Divorced BA Unemployed Rich class Yes  August 
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2012 
31 Reema 59 Married BA Unemployed Rich class/West 
Amman 
NO August 
2012 
32 Hala 49 Married College 
Diploma 
Work in a 
hospital  
Lower Middle 
class/ East Amman 
No June 2012 
33 Jihan 25 Single Secondary Unemployed Lower middle 
class/ interview in 
the prison. 
No March 
2012 
34 Rama 28 Divorced Did not 
complete 
her BA 
degree 
Unemployed Lower middle 
class/two 
interviews, one in 
the prison and the 
second at JWU 
shelter. 
No March 
2012/Augu
st 2012 
35. Eman 22 Single Secondary  Unemployed Poor 
class/interview in 
the prison. 
Yes  March 
2012 
36 Shatha 18 Single Primary Unemployed Poor 
class/interview in 
the prison 
Yes March 
2012 
37. Fatima 26 Divorced Secondary Unemployed Poor 
class/interview in 
the prison 
No August 
2012 
38. Basmah 34 Single College 
diploma 
Unemployed Lower middle 
class/East Amman 
No August 
2012 
39. Mervat 21 Divorced Primary Unemployed Poor/Interview in 
the prison 
NO August 
2012 
40. Ibtisam 31 Married Diploma Unemployed Poor/ Jabal Al-
Nadhaif 
No April 2012 
41. Kefiya 35 Married Diploma Accountant Poor/ Jabal Al-
Nadhaif 
No April 2012 
42. Haneen 24 Single BA Nurse Poor/ Jabal Al-
Nadhaif 
No April 2012 
43. Doua 41 Married Higher 
Diploma 
Teacher Poor/ Jabal Al-
Nadhaif 
No April 2012 
44. Kadija 23 Divorced Primary Unemployed Poor/ Jabal Al-
Nadhaif 
No April 2012 
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Interview with Activists and lawyers at the hotline and shelter services 
 Name Position Age  Education Date of the 
interview 
1. Nadia Shamroukh General Director of 
Jordanian Women’s 
Union 
56 BA in Law January 2012 
2.  Asma Khader General Secretary of 
the Jordanian National 
Committee for 
Women/Founder 
/Chair of Sisterhood is 
Global Institute in 
Jordan 
60 Law November 
2011 
3. Hala Ahed Lawyer 42 PhD in Law August 2012 
4.  Najieh Zoubi Director of JWU 
shelter and Hotline 
49 BA in 
psychology  
March 2012 
5.  Maram Maghalseh Lawyer/JWU 38 BA in Law November 
2011 
6. Elham Elshow  Lawyer 41 BA in Law March 2012 
 
Interviews with Judges  
Name Position/ Location Date of the interview 
Sheikh Ghaleb Sartawi Head of Swieleh Sharia 
Court/Amman 
November 2011 
Sheikh Jamal Rahamneh Head of West Amman Sharia November 2011 
43. Ghalia 26 Married Secondary  Unemployed Middle class/ 
Na’our/tribal area 
Yes January 
2012 
44. Samah  31 Married College Unemployed Poor/Hai Al-
Tafialah/ tribal area 
Yes May 2012 
55. Ghosoun 43 Married College 
diploma 
Nurse Poor/Hai Al-
Tafialah/ tribal area 
Yes May 2012 
56. Amal 24 Single BA Employee at the 
public sector  
Poor /Hai Al-
Tafialah/ tribal area 
Yes May 2012 
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Court/Amman 
Sheikh Ziad Arabiyat A Judge of West Amman Sharia 
Court/Amman 
November 2011 
Fadi Alawaishh A judge of West Amman Sharia 
Court/Amman 
November 2011 
Sheikh Said Nahhar A judge of Amman Sharia Court November 2011 
Sheikh Muhammed Al-Naimat A Royal Bureau judge March 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
